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ABSTRACT OF nm DISSERTATION 
Business and Politics in Costa Rica. 1849-1860: 
Consensus and Conflict within the Coffee Planter and Merchant 
Elite during the Mora years 
by 
Carmen Maria Fallas Santana 
Doctor of Philmophy in History 
University of California. Los Angeles, 1988 
Professor Robert N. Burr. Chair 
The politics of the period from 1849 to 1860 are analymi in this dissertation in 
the context of the politi~ economic, and social relations among the members of the 
Costa Rican ruling elite. This elite was made up of planters who were also merchants and 
whose economic interests were closely related to the expansion of an export agriculture 
based on coffee cultivation. These coffee planters and merchants were the architects of the 
political institutions of the second half of the nineteenth centmy and shaped them to foster 
the continued growth of the export agriculture. The presidency of Juan Raf~el Mora. a 
leading coffee planter and merchant. serves as a basis to illustrate that the effon to 
transform· the government into the fundamental agent for the development of coffee 
exports created political consensus among the elite. 
The military coup that ousted Mora in 1859 shows that despite the consensus, the 
relations of the coffee planters and merchants were marked by periodic outbreaks of 
vi 
conflicts. The analysis of the coup points out that the elite's struggle for control of the 
govmunent was intensified as a result of the role assigned to it as the main promoter of 
economic development. The government became inaeuingly important for the elite from 
the economic point of view because it fulfilled that task in two ctifferent ways. As the 
entity in charge of creating the infrastructure fer the expansion of coffee exports, it 
maintained public order, enacted laws to regulate commert.e and 1abcr and built roads and 
port facilities. The government also acted indirectly as supplier of capital for the elite 
through the panicipation of its members in the economic activities that were under the 
government's control or through their misuse of the national treasury as public officers. 
The fullfiiment of both tasks created conttadictiom that frequently put the personal 
interests of some coffee planters and merchants against the general interest of elite-and 
gave rise to political cont1icts. The study demonstrates that because the coffee planters 
and merchants constituted an elite made up of in1CrCOlmeeted families their members were 
able to resolve their political conflicts through negotiation and comp,omkie. It contends 
that elite's capacity to abate political conflicts accounted in larp part fer the relative 
stability of Costa Rica in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
vii 
V:>nl V.LSOO l dVW 
INTRODUCilON 
1be name of Juan Rafael Mora always comes to mind when Costa Ricans evoke 
the memory d the countty's most prominent political figures of the Dinea=nth century. 
Mora, who came to power in 1849, is remembered as the president who wrote a very 
important page of Costa Rica's and Central America's history, when he took the lead in 
the war that defeated the American filibusacr William Walker in Nicaragua in 1857. 
Mora, indeed, is pra•sed as the founding father whose deu:rmination to fight for keeping 
Costa Rica's independence played a pivotal role in the consolidation of the national 
sovc=ignty. 
The political legacy of Mora., nonetheless, went beyond the defense of the 
countty's independence in a critical manent of its history. The nearly ten years that Mora 
was in office marked a very important period in the development of the infrastructure of 
the Costa Rican national state. The administtadon of Mora. in fact, was charac1mzcd by 
significant achievements in the centralization of power, the ?COrpnization of the 
government's revenue sources, the strengthening of the military appararus, and the 
development of political and legal institutions. These accomplishments were the outcome 
of Mora's effons as a leading member of a ruling planter and merchant elite, to transfonn 
the state into the fundamental agent of the development of an export agriculture based on 
coffee cultivation. 
Mora's facet as one of the statesmen who contributed substantially to the 
dewlopment of Costa Rica's economic and political institutions has been obscured by the 
tendency to analyze his administration from the pmpectivc of the war against Walker. 
The epic desaiptions of that war haw led to the idealization of Men's figure and to 
present him both as a hero and, because of his execution in 1860, as a manyr for later 
generations.1 This idealization of Mora bas led to see him isolated from the social, 
2 
economic, and political context in which he acted. The epic approach to the 
administration of Mora has contributed to leaving unanswered the main issues behind the 
historiographical question of why Mora was overthrown in 1859 by a military coup 
sponsored by the coffee planter and mc::rchant elite and executai a year later. 
The overthrow of Mora and his premature and tragic death have been explained as 
a reaction of the coffee planter and merchant elite to Mora's intention to perpetuate himself 
in power. It has been claimed that Mora's prominent participation in the war against 
William Walker had a negative effect upon his personality. His defeat of Walker, 
according to that view, led Mora to regard himself as the only person capable of 
preserving Costa Rica's independence. The inaeasing arbitrariness and authoritarianism 
with which Mora managed public affairs in the last years of his administration have been 
interpreted as a manifestation of his determination to remain in power by any means to 
fulf°ill what he thought was his mission.2 
Mora, to be sure, showed an increasing tendency ~ the monopolization of 
political power through arbitrary means after the victa:ious military campaigns against 
Walm. Nonethel~ that explanation does not clarify completely the issue of Mora's 
overthrow because throughout all his years in office Mora used an iron hand to manage 
public affairs. Very often during the 18SOs Mora's sttong approach to the administration 
of government went far beyond the limits imposed by constitutional principles and into 
the realm of arbitrariness and illegality. Regardless of that. the coffee planter and 
mechant elite supported Men's government without raising major objections to bis 
political behavior until the last years of his $0VemmeDt. 
This study approaches the issues of the overthrow of Mora and his execution 
from the perspective of his political and economic roles as leading coffee planter and 
merchant and in the context of his relations with the elite. It demonstrates that Mora's 
political ambition in the late 1840s was nurtured to a large extent by a temporary reversal 
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in his cormnetcial ventures that led him to seek office to cope with financial troubles. The 
study contends that Mora's financial motivadons to get involved in politics were 
combined with a strong character, leadership qualities, and a clear undemanding of the 
political measures that it was necessary to implement to fosier the growth of the export 
agriculture. The combination of these three elements created a political formula that gave 
singular charactcri3tics to the period between 1849 and 1859. 
The study points out that that fommla established the basis for a political 
consensus among a small and closely rewed coffee planter and merchant elite which 
made the administration of Mora one of the most stable periods in the second half of the 
nineteenth centmy. The important achievements in the development of the political and 
economic institutions of Costa Rica during the Mora years were the result of that political 
formula. The war against Walker, however, was an event that changed significantly the 
nature of the relations of Men with the test of the leading members of the elite. 
The political fcrmula that had wcxkcd so efficiently dming the first half of the 
govc:mment of Men entered into a crisis after 1857. Crucial in the gradual deterioration 
of that political formula wu the fact that the public treasury wu almost depleted as a 
result of the military campaigns in Nicaragua. The extraadinary military expenses 
created a deficit in the public treasury for the first time in the 1850s which stopped the 
implemenwion of Mora's agenda aimed at fostering the growth of coffee cxpons. The 
clashes between Mora and the prominent members of the elite which preceded rupture of 
the political consensus in the latel850s. howeva:-, did not sum entirely from the 
tempOIII) neglect of some points of that agenda. At the ccre of those clashes was the 
financial crisis that had bampc:rcd substantially the capabilities of the public treasury to 
serve indirectly as the main financial agent of the elite. The public treasury fulfilled that 
task before coffee expon:s created a solid financial infrastructure to foster its own 
continued growth. In fact, the economic activities related to the government, such as the 
4 
operation of the national distillery, enabled the members of the eli1e to earn some money 
which they lab:r invested in their exporting and importing busineaes. Dming the early 
decades of the development of expcxt agricultme, indeed, the prominent members of the 
elite depended significantly upon the protics they obwned from the contracts to supply 
sugar cane and tobacco to the goyemment, concessions to exploit natural resources such 
as forests and advances of cash to work their mining ventures. 
After the national financial crisis bad significantly reduced the resources of the 
public treasury Mora, compelled by his own financial troubles, began to exclude other 
members of the elite from the profits derived from activities related to the government 
through an increasing arbitrariness and corruption. Serious conflicts of interests 
emerged, f<r example, between Mora and the concessionmcs of the distillery about 
profits and losses derived from liqucr production. The rupture of the consensus was due 
also to Mora's determination to use his power to cope with his personal difficult financial 
situation at the expense of the capital of several Jeading members of the elite . Hence, the 
coup of 1859 was a reaction of the coffee planter and merchant elite aimed at stopping 
Mora from using his power in ways that were very detrimental to the economic interests 
of many of its most prominent members. 
The enmination of the causes of the overthrow of Mora points out that the line 
separating political consensus from conflict among the elite, indeed, was very thin when 
major economic issues were at stake. However, the political struggles of the coffee 
planters and merchants in the second half of the nine1eenth ccntmy, no matter how 
intense, never evolved into bloody and prolonged civil wars and usually were not 
resolved by violent means such as executions. 1bc execution of Mora marked such a 
radical deviation of the usual ways in which the elite resolved its intcrnal differences that 
the government was forced to explain it. The explanation of the circumstances 
surrounding the decision to execute Mora reveals the crucial role in abating political 
5 
conflicts that wu played by an elite constitu1ed of in1ere0nnected leading families. The 
homogeneous nature of the elite with its common political goals and kinship links, in 
fact, prevented the periodic outbreak of conflicts from dividing the coffee plancers and 
merchants into several imconciliabJe factions. The analysis of the clements that were at 
the basis of the political consensus and the mechanisms through which the elite resolved 
its conflicts contributes impcxundy in understanding Costa Rica's history as a politically 
stable country in the second half of the nineteenth century. Moreover, that analysis 
contributes to the explanation of the role played by those mechanisms of conflict 




!Among the boob that illustraie the 11:0dency to approach Men's life from the 
epic perspective are: Junta patri6tica pro Juan Rafael Mora. El CQtW,arig del bent;mmto 
de ta pagja ex-presidcJue GeneraJ dQn Juan Rafael Mgrp,, ts1+1214 (San Jose, 1915); 
Octavio Castro, Laude, fvnracmn de; Mora, EJ hombre, el esooista, el heme y el martir 
(San Jose, 19S5); Anuro Echevema. Juan Rafael Mora, el heme y su pueblo (San Jose, 
19S6). 
20eto Gonzalez, Obras hjst6ricas 2d. cd (San Jose, 1973), pp.211-212. 
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CHAPTER.ONE 
nm COFFEE PLANTER AND MERCHANT ELITE 
AT MID-NINETEEN1H CEN1URY 
When Juan Rafael Mora was elected president in 1849. Costa Ri~ a country of 
20,704 square miles, had a population of about 100,000 people. The capital city of San 
Jose was the center of the political life and the major economic activities. There were 
three other main urban centers located relatively close to San Jose. Canago, the former 
colonial capital. was located twenty-one miles east of San Jose while Heredia was seven 
miles north and Alajuela fourteen miles west. San Jose, however. was where most of the 
leading members of the elite resided. In fact, regardless of the relatively shon distances 
between San Jose and the three other main towns, traveling between them was difficult 
because of the conditions of the roads. These conditions were so bad. especially during 
the rainy season, that it took several hours and sometimes days to travel between towns. 
The only good road at that time, in fact, was the one that conncctcd these main 
urban centers. all located in Costa Rica's central valley. with the port of Puntarenas on the 
Pacific. situated seventy•seven miles from San Jose. This road became Costa Rica's 
lifeline after the first regular shipments of coffee to Great Britain firmly incorporated this 
country into the world market in the early 1840s. Puntarenas became the port from 
which coffee was exported until the late nineteenth century when the construction of a 
railroad to the Atlantic established a moo: direct route to the markets abroad. Before that, 
the tropical rainy climate of the Atlantic coastal region. its vegetation. and topography set 
obstacles that the capital and technology availab~ in the 1840s and 1850s could not 
overcome easily. Consequently, Costa Rica strengthened its contacts with the outside 
world through the Pacific even though this meant that the coffee had to travel down the 
coast of South America and around Cape Hom before getting to the marlccts in Europe 
8 
and along the Atlantic coast of the United Swcs. 
The favorable ecological conditions of Costa Rica's central valley were a 
determining factor in the concenttarion there of mmt of the population and the major 
activities since the colonial period. This valley, at an elevation of 3,000 feet, has fertile 
volcanic ~ an annual average temperature of sixty-five degrees Fahrenheit and two 
well defined seasons, of eight months of rain and four of dry season. These 
characteristics were propitious for agricultural activities, first for the production of 
subsistence crops and later for growing high quality coffee. The absence of a large 
population was another important factcr that prevented the expansion of settlements out 
of the central valley. By the mid-nineteenth century, in fact, most of Costa Rica outside 
the central valley remained virgin lands. There were small settlements along the road to 
Puntarenas and cattle-raising ranches and small towns in the Guanacaste province, 
contiguous to Nicaragua, but the rest of the countty was forests. unoccupied plains, and 
mountains. 
The geographical stage in which the elite developed its activities, therefore, was 
relatively small The prominent members of the society maintained rural and urban 
properties in Cartago, ~ Alajue~ and their neighboring villages, as well as in 
other pans of the countty, but spent most of the time in the capital. San Jose was a town 
of approximately 12,000 people and had a perimeter of eighty-one blocks. The accounts 
of foreign visitors and travelers of the mid-nineteenth century described the capital as a 
city of one-story buildings and houses, most of them of adobe with red tiled roofs, 
whose center was the main plua. Across the street from the plaz.a on the east was the 
main church. Facing the plaza on the north east was one of the military barracks, the 
Cua,nel Principal Two blocks north of the western corner of the plaza were the 
government offices, the Congress, and the Court. Not far away from the government 
offices were the stores and businesses of the principal merchants. Within a radius of a 
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few blocks were the houses of the leading families. I 
Juan Rafael Men and the odler leading figures who had a main role in the political 
and economic events of the 1850s were members of these prominent families. The eli~ 
in fact, constituted a group of about twenty-two leading families by the uud-nm=enth 
centmy. These families were the Mora. Monteale~ Aguilar. Castro. Camnza, 
Escalante, Quiros, Iglesias, Fenwl~ Guti=Tez, Salazar, Oreamuno, Carazo, Bonilla. 
Jimenez. Gallegos, Solares. Alfaro, Bmoeta, S~nz. Ulloa, and Moya.2 
The members of these principal families which became the largest coffee planters 
and mechants after Costa Rica was firmly incorporaled into the world mamt constituted 
an elite closely related by kinship. The exis1cnce of groups of intcrconneded prominent 
families which dominated entire geographical regions and economic activities, to be sure, 
was a common phenomenon in most of Latin America during in the nineu:enth cennny.3 
The netwa-k of leading families. however, gained even mote strength in Costa Rica 
because it was a fringe area. pocx- and neglected throughout the colonial period. Costa 
Rica lacked significam silver and gold mines, a large sedentary Indian population and a 
strategic geographical position in relation to the central colonial areas of Mexico and Peru. 
The absence of the most important elements fer becaning firmly incorporaled into the 
Spanish colonial system. indeed. Jed Costa Rica to play a very marginal role within the 
economic and political life of that system. The isolation from the main colonial markets 
gave origin to the development of an agriculture of subsistence that only pe:rmiaed limited 
exchange. As in other fringe colonial areas where the structures ex the Spanish system 
were weak. the Costa Rican elite took control over the bureaucratic apparatus to have 
access to a steady source of income and the econanic benefits derived from the exercise 
. of power. This elite also developed and strengthened a network of kinship links in order 
to expand its possibilities of economic survival amid an economy of subsistence. The 
need to consolidate resources through kinship created a monolithic elite that managed to 
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transfer its political power to successive aencntiom of its descendants. The meticulous 
and massive genealogical research of the Colla Rican sociologist Samuel s~ in fact, 
bas shown that most of the coffee planters and merchants were descendants of the 
conquerors and early settJers of Costa Rica.• 
Juan Rafael Mora was among these leading coffee plantas and merchants who 
inherited his political and social position. Bom on February 8, 1814, he was the eldest of 
the nine children of Camilo Men and Ana Benita Porras. The genealogical tree of Mora 
has been traced back to the sixteenth-century caiqueror Juan Vuquez de Coronado.S 
The ancestors of Men also held posts in the civilian and militaJy bureaucratic apparatus 
during the colonial period. Men's great-grandfather, f<r insaance, was captain and 
lieutenant governor of the villages of Asem and San Jos6 in the mid-eighteenth century. 6 
Mora's father Camilo was a member of Congress from 1829 to 1833. In addition, 
Camilo Mora was among the group of men who in the early 1820s regwered the first 
claims to exploit the gold and silver mines in Montes del A~ located west of the 
central valley not far from the road to Puntarenas. 7 The lack of proper technology, 
machinery, and substantial capital hindered the full exploitation of these mineral 
resources. Nonetheless, the mining ventures of the Montes del Aguacatc generated ~ 
capital which latcr was invested in coffee cultivation. 8 Camilo Mora also dedicated 
himself to commerce and had business parmcrships with two leading members of society 
Jose Santos Lombardo and Rafael Gallegos. Santos Lombardo and Gallegos, who was 
Juan Rafael Mora's godfather, participated prominently in the independence movement 
and the political life of the early national period. 9 
Juan Rafael Men demonstra1Cd inclinations more towards c:ommca:c than 
intellectual pursuits. Mora, in fact. did not have any formal education beyond elementary 
school because from an early age he became actively involved in his father's businesses 
and opened his own store when he was nineteen years old. He combined his commercial 
11 
ventures with investments in mining, sugar cane plantations, and 1ata' with coffee 
cultivation. Mora had a strong but at the same time affable charac1a' which gained him 
the appreciation of the people who dealt with him. Men, indeed, seemed to have been 
very popular among bodl the ordinary people who bought merchandise at his store and 
woria:d at his haciendas and the elite to whom Men was tied through an intricate network 
of kinship and other relations. IO 
Through his marriage to Ines Aguilar in 1847, Mora became pan of the family of 
Manuel Aguilar, who wu chief of state in the late 1830s. Mora's brothers and sistcn 
also were married to members of the leading families. His sister Ana Mana Men was the 
first wife of Jos6 Mana Montealegre. Mora's brother-in-law Jose! Mana was born in 
1815 and was the oldest of the nine children of Mariano Montealegre and Jer6nima 
Fernandez. Mariano Montealegre, who wu Guatemalan. mived in Costa Rica in the 
early nineteenth centmy to serve as an accountant for the Royal Tobacco Monopoly. 
His participation in Costa Rica's polirlcal life was outstanding. Mariano Montealegre was 
involved in the events that prompted the separation from Spain in 1821, and later served 
as vice-chief of state and held other important public posts. Montealegre was also one of 
the main investa"S in the mining ventures of the Montes dd Aguacatc and later the owner 
of large coffee haciendas.11 
Jose! Mana Montealegre studied medicine in Sa>dand and became the first Costa 
Rican graduate from an European university in the nineteenth century. In contrast, the 
rest of the members of Montealegre's· generation who pursued a career, which was 
usually in law or medicine, studied at the University ofLedn in Nicaragua or at the 
University of San Carlos in Guatemala It wu not until the end of the last ccntmy when 
an increasing number of Costa Ricans began attending uni'ICl'Sities in Europe and the 
United Statcs.12 Nonetheless, the wealth and especially the contacts that Mariano 
Montealegre acquired through his mining ventures enabled him to educate his sons Jose 
12 
Mana and Mariano junicr in Europe. The two MonaJep brothers spent about twelve 
years in Great Briiain since they were very young when they were sent there. But when 
· Jose Maria and Mariano, who became an engineer, returned 10 COiia Rica in the late 
1830s they mca-poraled rapidly in10 the local society. Both combined the practice of their 
professions with coffee cultivation and politics. J~ Maria Montealegre wu appointed 
tempoimy president after Mora's overthrow in 1859 and later was elecu:d in 18(,() fa- a 
three year tenn.13 Mariano and his other brother Francisco also participated actively in 
politics as ministers and members of Congress. Both of them married into the Gallegos 
family.14 
The maniages of Mora's brother Jose Joaquin and his sisier Rosa to members of 
the Gutierrez family significantly increased the kinship netWaic of the Moras. Just as his 
older brother Juan Rafae~ Jose! Joaquin Mora owned large coffee haciendas, was very 
active in the expon and import business. and had investments in the mines of Montes del 
Aguacate. Jose Joaquin was ooe of the top aides of President Mora and served in several 
military and civil positions during the 1850s. Dolcres Ou~ Jose Joaquin Mora's 
wife, was the daughter of Agustf'n Gutierrez and Josefa Penamonge, natives of Nicaragua 
who settled in Canago. The eleven children of this family inherited large cattle ranches in 
the Ouanacaste province contiguous to Nicaragua but had also important coffee haciendas 
in Canago and investments in other ventures. The Outierrezes constituted one of the best 
examples of how the Costa Rican elite consolidaa:d its economic, socia4 and political 
position through mmiage. All of them marled members of the leading families. In fact, 
the Ouderrczes became related to the Iglesias, the Bonilla, the Oreamuno, the Barroeta, 
the Mora, and the Oiralt families. IS These maaimonies established indirect kinship links 
that were also important in the relations of the coffee planters and merchants. Jose 
Joaquin Mora's marriage to Dolores Gutierrez, for instance, linked him to Francisco 
Oreamuno, a member of the one of the leading families of Canago. Oreamuno served as 
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vice-president during the administration of Juan ~ael Men until be died in 1856 victim 
of a cholera epidemic. The marriage of I~ Joaquin Mora also n:wed him to Francisco 
Mana and Demettio Iglesias, whose sister Ramona. as well. was married to a member of 
the Gutim'ez family. This relationship very likely facilitaied Iglesias' acquisition of a 
contract from President Mora to operate the government's liquor distillery in the early 
1850s. • 
Francisco Mana Iglesias and his brother Demetrio were the sons of Joaquin 
Iglesias, who was important in the independence movement and contributed to drafting 
Costa Rica's first constitution. The father of the Iglcsiases also was part of the group of 
the leading miners in the 1820s and 1830s.16 Demettio Iglesias studied law in Guatemala 
but dedicated himself to coffee cultivation and co~ as well. Francisco Maria was 
an energetic coffee planter and merchant who did not pursue a formal education but was 
well-n:ad and published scwral booJcs.17 
Francisco Mana Iglesias established a business firm with Satumino TlDOCO, 
which was known as "Tinoco & Co." Tinoco was a native of N'icaragua who 
befriended members of the Iglesias family when they moved leDipotllily to that COWltry 
during the mid- l 830s after Joaquin Iglesias got involved in a failed coup against the then 
President Braulio Carrillo. Tinoco married Mana Iglesias, one of the sisters of Francisco 
and Demettio, and moved back with the n:st of the family to Costa Rica in1839.18 
Having mived in Costa Rica. Tinoco bought several rural properties and later 
transformed some of them into coffee haciendas at the same time that be was dedicated to 
commerce. Tinoco succeeded rapidly in his commercial ventures and by 1842 was • 
among the twelve leading impar reu of the country.19 
The Iglcsiascs had a very influential wicle on the maternal side, Anselmo 
Uorentc, who was Costa Rica's bishop from 1851 to 1871. Bishop Llorentc was very 
close to Francisco Mana and Demetrio Iglesias as well as to another of his nephews, 
14 
Julian Volio. Certainly, the financial support of Bishop Uorcnte enabled Volio to study 
law at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala. Afa:r bis graduation Volio returned to 
Costa Rica and married Cristina Tmoco, one of the daughten of Satumino Tmoco, who 
was also bis second cousin. Francisco mmied bis niece Emiqueu Tinoco. Demetrio 
Iglesias was married to Eudoxia Castro, the daughter of Jose Mana Castro another 
leading political and economic figure of the nineteenth century. 
Born in 1818, Jose Mana Castro was the only child of Ramm Castro and 
Lorenza Madriz. He was an intellectual who studied philosophy and law at the 
University ofLe6n in Nicaragua. Castro was president twice, from 1847 to 1849 and 
from 1866 to 1868, and held important offices in several administrations. Like most 
members of the elite, Castro combined bis participation in politics and intellectual 
pursuits with the management of bis coffee haciendas and cattle ranches. Castro was 
married to Padfica Fe:rmndez who was a second cousin of the Montealegres and the 
Carranzas. 20 
Bruno Carranza, a medical doctcr trained in Guatemala was one of members of 
the Carranza family who participau:d lD>St actively in the economic and political life of the 
country during the 1850s. He was born in 1822 and was one of the twelve children of 
Miguel Carranza and Joaquina Ramirez. Like most of the progenitors of the main coffee 
planters and merchants, Bruno's father Miguel was among the leading miners of the 
1820s and 1830s and as well as a member of Congress. Likewise, Miguel Carranza 
imported Costa Rica's first printing press in 1830 and began the publication of a 
newspaper soon after that. This newpaper titled El Com;o de Costa Rica was the first of 
a long series of newspapers that the Cammza family published throughout the rest of the 
nineteenth centmy. Beginning in 1847 and for a period of many years, Bruno Carranza 
was the editor of several of these newspapers. 21 Carranza, nonetheless, combined his 
duties as newspaper editor with the attention of bis coffee haciendas and other 
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businesses, including am:mg other things the operation of the national liqu<r distillery 
from 1856 to 1859.22 Carranza was mmied to his second cousin Jerdnima Montealegre, 
the sister of Jme Mana, Mariano and Francisco Montealegre. 
Vicente Aguilar was another very impcx1ant member of the elite. A native of 
Cartago, he was b<Xn in 1808 to Alejo Aguilar and Joaquina Cubero. Aguilar along with 
his brother RamSn wen: the only members of their large family that became leading 
~ economic and political figures. Vicente Aguilar learned the three R's when he 
worked as an apprentice to a tailer. In 1839 he married Dolores Salazar, the daughter of a 
prominent and wealthy Nicaraguan family that had mived in Costa Rica in 1835 after 
fleeing from a volcanic eruption. Through his marriage Aguilar became related to the 
members of the Fenwtdcz and Gallegos families who were also married to others of the 
Salazars. 
Aguilar began his business activities growing cacao in Matina. a region located on 
the Atlantic coast and carrying it to the market in San Jme. Aguilar lare:r invested in the 
mining industty of Montes del Aguacaic, and in pearl fishing in the Gulf of Nicoya in the 
Pacific Ocean. He also had haciendas on the outskirts of Cartago, Heredia and San Jose, 
as well as several properties in those urban centcrs.23 Through his divene enterprises 
Aguilar was able to accumulate some capital which enabled him afterwards to invest 
heavily in coffee cultivation and become one of the largest planters and exporters. 
Aguilar exported coffee initially in association with Juan Rafael Mora with whom 
he established a business partnership in 1842. Mora and Aguilar did business together 
for a period of six years until 1848 when they dissolved their partnership by mutual 
agreemcnt.24 This business partnership, nonetheless, became the central issue of a 
dispute between Mora and Aguilar almost ten years after the firm was dissolved. The 
animosity that this dispute generated between the two former business panners and 
friends nnned Aguilar into Mora's main political enemy in the late 1850s. 
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There were, however, no bad feelings between Aguilar and Mora when they 
decided to scpamte and do business on their own after 1848. Aguilar was among the 
group of men to whom Mora reSOl'1l:d fcx- advice on political and economic affairs during 
the 1850s. Aguilar served briefly as Mora's vice-presjdent at the same time that he 
remained active in the export and import business. He benefited importantly from the 
boom brought about by the establishment of strong links to the European markets which 
enabled him to amass a fortune that was considered substantial in the local context. 
Aguilar, who died on April 23, 1861, in fact, was reputed to be one of the wealthiest men 
of his time. 25 Table 1 which lists the total value assets of other prominent members of 
the elite demonstrates how wealthy Aguilar was relative to other coffee planters and 
merchants. 
... .. , 
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TABLE 1 
TOTAL AND NET VALUE OF 
ASSETS OF SELECTED MEMBERS OF1liE ELITE 
IN COSTA RICAN PESOS 
Vicente Aguilar 
Juan Rafael Mora 
Manuel Jose Caram 
Cecilio Umana 
Cecilio Quesada 
Jos6 Mana Montealegre 
Calixto Acosta 
Jos6 Mana Castro 
Leonzo De Vars 
Rafael Gallegos 








































Source: Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica, Mortuales de San J-, nos. 9124, 1689, 
10001, 9648, 9661, 7608, 9394, 9362, 10022; Protocolos Lara y Ownorro, no.152. 
Manuel Jose Carazo, was also umng the most influential political figures of the 
1850s. He sened as Mora's MinisterofFmance from 1849 to 1856. Caram was an 
autodidact whose culture and erudition imp,.essed many foreign visiiors who met him. 
These visiiors Wrote that most of the members of the eliu: lacked foreign language skills. 
Those fcrcignen remarla:d, however, that Caram spoke English very well because he 
had lived in the Unib:d StaJes for a few years and had a good command of French and 
German.26 These skills and his trips abroad had enabled Caram to oven:omc the cultural 
Uarirarims of the local society. But while his inu:Ilectual inclinations and erudition in 
some matters set him a bit apart from the majority of the coffee planters and merchants, 
Carazo was in no way an outsider to the eliu:. Caram, indeed, was a leading merchant 
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and had imponant coffee haciendas. He WU descendant cl two pcmineut f.amilies of 
Canago, the Carazos and the Bonillu and mmicd inlD the Peralta family, who was also 
imponant in that city. 
A good number of the foreigners mived in Costa Rica throughout the Dineu:enth 
century fleeing political turmoil in their pJaces of aigin or in search cf new economic 
oppcxtunities. Many of these foreigners became part cf the local eli1e through marriage 
and commercial links • By the mid-nineteenth, most of the immigrants from Central 
America were mainly from Nicaragua and Gwuemala with only a few natives cf El 
Salvador and Honduras. The most notable among the small nmnber of Salvadorans was 
Jose Mana Canas. He was bom in 1809 in the village cf Suchicoco and was one of the 
eight illegitimate children of Francisca Canas and Jose Marcelo A vil~ the local priest. Tl 
Canas pursued a career in the military. He had a distinguished participation as an officer 
in the Central American army during the 1830s when the fiw countries ~ 1l:mp01'3rily 
united and formed a federal republic. Canas met the Honduran General Francisco 
Monmn while he was serving in the federal army. He fought side by side with Monmn 
who wanted to keep the Centtal American nations united at a time when the collapse of 
the federation was imminent. It was as a result of the military defeat of Morazan's cause 
that Canas arrived in Costa Rica in 1840. 
Canas was granted political asylum in Costa Rica by President Braulio Canino 
and was appointed military commandant in the Atlantic port of Moin. A&r three years, 
Caiias was moved to Carta.go and then to Puntarcnas to serve as customs inspector. 
Around 1845 Canas bought some land in the Gu.anacaste province and planted sugar 
cane. He also dedicated himself to commerce and purchased a sailboat to transport 
mcrchandisc and passangers along the Pacific coast of Central America. Simultaneously, 
Canas took on an increasingly important role in the political and military life of Costa 
Rica. In fact, President Jose Mana Castro appointed Canas as colonel of the army in 
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1847. Likewise, in early 1848 Castro sent Caftas to Centtal America on a diplomatic 
mission to improve Costa Rica's commercial rclatiom with the other countries of the 
region. Later in 1849 Castro named Caftas u his MiniS1er of Fmance and War, and be 
served in that post until May, 1850. 28 
Cadas's marriage to Guadalupe M~ the sister of Juan Rafael Mora established a 
very close link between Canas and his brother-in-law. Mora, in fact. had in Canas one of 
his closest aides and an unconditional supporter who was willing to accompany him in 
any enterprise or project that he undertook. Canas. indeed. was Mora's minister of 
finance, served as commanding officer of the anny and held other offices dming the 
1850s. After Mora was overthrown Cadas went also into exile with him and met his 
death in October, l 8fJO as a result of Mora's failed attempt to recover power. 
Among the Guatemalans who had a prominent place in Costa Rica's political and 
economic life were Nazario Toledo, a physician who arrived in °1835, and Lorenzo 
Montufar. Toledo was distinguished in the 1850s as Mora's diplomatic envoy to Centtal 
and South America. Montufar, who first got to Costa Rica in 1850, was a strong 
advocasc of the liberal cause and lived there when the political siruation at home was 
adverse to his party. He moved back to Guatemala on several occasioos only to return to 
Costa Rica when liberals suffered other setbacks in their struggle with conservatives for 
the control of power. Montufar's training as a lawyer enabled him to make an important 
contribution to the organization of the Costa Rican judiciary system and the revision of 
codes and the drafting of new ones. Montufar was fmeign minisu:r during the last years 
of the Mora administration, was justice of the Supreme Court and served in different 
offices in the 18fJOs and 1870s.29 He established kinship links to the Costa Rican elite 
through his marriage to Marla de Jesus Ennquez. who was a cousin of Jose Marla 
Castto. 
Toribio Argilcllo was ooe of the distinguished Nicaraguan immigrants. A native 
20 
of the city ofLecSn, Argiicllo studied law at that city's university. He married Mercedes 
Mora, one of Juan Rafael Mora's sisters. The premature deaths of Argilello and his wife 
led Men to take care their three young children. The oldest of these children wu Manuel 
ArgUello who wu born in 1834. Mora sent Arg(lello to study law at the Univenity of 
San Carlos in Guatemala. He returned to Costa Rica after his graduation in 1857 and 
Mora appointed him as judge in San Jose. 30 ArgOello regarded his uncle Juan Rafael 
Mora as his father. He defended vehemently Mora's political actions and was a witness 
of the events that led to the execution of his uncle. Argilello's effons to vindicate the 
memory of Mora resulted in the publication of a first hand account of the major political 
events of the late 1850s.31 
Manuel Arg(lello married Mariana De Vars, the daugther of Leonzo De Vars. De 
Vars was among the first French nationals who established themselves in Costa Rica in 
the nineteenth century. De Vars initial ventures revolved around the export of 
brazilwood but he became a coffee planter after the expansion of the export agriculture. 
In 1851 he established a business partnership with Jose Duran another of bis sons-in-
law. De Vars got the concession to operate the national distillery from the government of 
Mora in 1859. He formed a society with another Frenchman, Leopoldo MOUl'Cn to 
manage the distillery. Duran was also involved in this partncrship.32 De Vars' first wife 
was Rita Castillo, whose sisters were mmied to members of the Quiros and Escalante 
families. De Vars kinship links were extended to the Bonilla family after his second 
marriage to Jacinta Bonilla. 
Among the prominent members of the German community during the Mora years 
were Francisco Kurtzc and Fernando Strcber. Kume was an engineer who designed and 
supervised the construction of the two major buildings built in the 1850s, the National 
Palace and the liquor distillery, and other major public works. Strcber was a well-read 
lawyer who made important contributions to the development of the Costa Rican legal 
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institutions. Both Kunze and Streber along with Alejandro Von BOlow mived in Costa 
Rica in the early 1850s. These three people were agents representing the interests of a 
company fmmed in Berlin in 1849 to establish a colony of German immigrants in Costa 
Rica. The large number of settlers that this project ex colonization aimed at bringing into 
Costa Rica never came but this plan prompted the arrival of sevm1 eme1p1enelll'S. 
Included in this group wen: Guillenno Nanne, who had some business connections with 
Mora. and Otto Von Schroter. 33 
Von Schroter established a business fum with Edward Joy, one of the prominent 
Englishmen in mid-ninercenth cennuy Costa Rica. Edward W. Allprcss was also among 
the English merchants. Allpress manied Vicente Aguilar's oldest daughter and 
established a business firm with bis father-in-law in 1857.34 
A person who was also linked to the German colonization projects was Crisanto 
Medina, an Argentinean who mived in Costa Rica in the 1840s. He settled in 
Puncarenas, the Pacific port. and at first dedicated himself to c:ommetee. Medina got 
involved in the coloomtion plans in the early 1850s when he obtained a vast extension 
of land fran the government in a region called Miravallcs, locau:d in the northeastern pan 
of Costa Rica. Medina worlccd in association with the Berlin colonization company to 
promote the establishment of German settlers in Miravalles.35 Regardless of the efforts 
to attract immigrams, the Miravalles settlement project never mumialimi. Medina got 
involved in another project with the government in 1857. This time it was a project to 
create a bank. This project was implemented but bad a shcxt life because several factors 
forced the closure of the bank a few months af1i:r it was opened. The failure of the bank 
in 1858 got Medin.a involved in a bitter business dispute with the firm of Satumino 
Tmoco and Francisco Iglesias which bad significant role in the overthrow of Mora's 
government. 36 
Many foreigners established themselves in Costa Rica to serve as agents of those 
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commercial firms to whom the elite exponed its coffee production. Among these 
individuals was the Bolivian Eduardo Bceche who was the agent of the Scottish firm of 
"John Thompson Wattson & Co." Beeche represented the interests of the branch that 
this firm had in Valparaiso, Oule. Beeche also was Chile's consul to Costa Rica at the 
same time that he became involved in coffee cultivation and c:omu::.eu..e. He settled 
permanently in Costa Rica and mmied Juan Rafael Mora's niece Dorila Argilello in 
1858.37 
While these aforementioned leading members of the mid-nineteenth century Costa 
Rican society were by no means men of the people, they did not constitute a haughty elite 
in this period. The distance that scparaacd the coffee planters and merchants from the 
mass of the people was far less imposing when Mora and his generation were in power 
than at the end of the nineteenth century. The coffee-based export agriculture brought 
about an unprecedented economic growth that transfmncd Costa Rica completely. The 
impact of coffee expcm was so important that by the 1890s Costa Rica had very little 
resemblance to the backward, isolated region it had been when it separated from Spain in 
1821. 
The economic prosperity derived from the coffee boom, to be sure, began to 
affect the lifestyles, consumption habits, and customs of the elite from its beginnings. As 
early as the l 8SOs there was a tendency to imitate European pattc:ms of life through the 
impon of a great variety of goods unknown before in Costa Rica. These goods ranged 
from furniture, pianos and cognac to the west fashions in clothing. The openings of 
new economic hori7.0ns, nonetheless, did immediately not change established patterns of 
interaction and social behavior. President Mora and other prominent merchants, for 
example, continued to wait on the customers in their stores themselves. In fact, to the 
astonishment of foreign travelers, on Saturdays, the busiest market day, it was possible 
to find Mora in his store cutting pieces of cloth f cr his customers who came in from the 
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countryside. One of these foreigners wu W-tlhem Marr, a German who first visited 
Costa Rica in 1852 Marr WU appalled by the shopkeeping activities and the market-
place mentality of the country's m>st distinguished mm and ccnsidered it a great obstacle 
for development. He pointed out that on market day, the justices of the Supreme Court 
sold cotton stockings, the Minisu:r of Fmance Manuel Jose Carazo tried to convince 
potential buyers of the good quality of his drinking glasses, while military officcn sold 
nails and ~ and physicians had remedies and soda ref.rcshments for sale in the 
main pl87.a of San Josd.38 Man- considered that the talents of intelligent and well-read 
men like Minister Caram were being wasted because they spent m>st of their time 
bargaining with their customers instead of pursuing m,re important activities. 39 
Man- and other foreign visitors were even more shocked by the favorite 
entertainment of the Costa Rican elite in the 18505, the cockfight. Some coffee planters 
and merchants, to be sure, gathered in the evenings at the only hotel that existed in the 
capital at that time to socialize, drink, and gamble. But the elite's main meeting place 
was at the weekly cockfights on Sunday afternoons. Marr wrote that be had a chance to 
meet many of the prominent social and political figures at the cockfight On the day Marr 
visited the cockfight he found there President Mora and his brother Josd Joaqu{n, along 
with many other leading coffee planters and merchants. Marr wrote that present in the 
same building where the cockfight was taking place were also individuals of the lower 
social classes. Marr manifested his disapproval and contempt for the way in which the 
elite members mingled with the ordinary people and bet for their favorite cocks against 
poor and barefoot men. 40 
The unaffected and open way in which the prominent coffee planters and 
merchants dealt with the mass of the people in the mid-nineteenth century was due in 
large pan to the economic conditions of the colonial period that ~vented the 
development of a highly stratified society. The ancestors of the coffee planters and 
24 
merchants were not far better off than the ordinary people and in many cases had to till 
the land themselves to survi'YC due to the lack of a large laborforce.41 AJ amaaer of fact, 
there was not a considaable separad.on between upper and Iowa' classes in Costa Rica 
beftX"e the development of the export agriculture. It was the wealth pncrared by coffee 
that gradually set the members of the elite apart from the rest of the people. 
The Mora years fell within the period of transition from the economy of 
subsistence to the export economy. The earnings from coffee exports had not changed 
yet the local economic conditions which had forced the elite to diversify its ventures in 
order to increase the possibilities of obtaining profits. Even though the members of the 
elite were investing increasingly in coffee cultivation during the 1850s they continued to 
be actively involved in sugar cane production, cattle raising, mining, and commerce. In 
addition to diversify their ventures. these coffee planters and merchants, like their 
~ reinfmced their network of kinship and business links to strengthen their 
fortunes and reDted to the government fer an additional source of income. 
These men. however, were able to accomplish politically something their 
forefathers could not achieve during the colonial period. The coffee planters and 
merchants shaped and oriented the political institutions of the Costa Rican yoWlg republic 
to further their economic interests. The elite strengthened the state apparatus and 
provided it with the resoun:cs to create the infrastructure that the continued growth of 
coffee exports demanded. The Mora years marked the beginning of that process of 
· transfcxmation of the ·swe into the main promoter of economic development which took 
place throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. 
The analysis of the presidency of Mora will show that some of the main 
foundations for the consolidation of the national state were laid during the 1850s. It will 
point out also that in the early decades of the development of the export agriculture, when 
coffee earnings had not solved yet problems such as the 1aclc of cum:ncy, the 
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accomplishment of some long tenn goals wu posq,oned by the elite's endeavor to use to 
the government's funds to cover ii, UIJDY'dja!e financial needs. ~ enxrrinati0'\ of 
Mora's administration will demonsttale duu be and many coffee plamas and merchants 
participaicd actiwly in the implemenwion m key points of the pm:rnment's agenda. That 
situation blurred the line sepanting the privare businesses of the elite from the 
administration of public affairs and was crucial in the political struggle among the coffee 
planters and merchants that prompted Mora's overthrow in 1859. 
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CliAP1"ER 'IWO 
nm POUTICAL AND ECONOMIC CAREER OF 
JUAN RAFAEL MORA 
The CaJ1:CI' of Juan Rafael Mora constituted a very good example of the liberal way 
in which coffee planters and merchants mixed economics and politics to further both their 
personal interests and those of the elite in general. In Mora's case, however, his 
combination of business with politics created a fmmula that WOIXed rcmaibbly well for 
him and the elite for almost a decade. At the basis of that formula were Mora's strong 
character, pragmatism and leadership quali~ and his clear understanding of the 
economic and political needs of the country. 
Mora began his incursion into the field of commerce when he opened a general 
stcxc in San Jos6 in 1833. Dming the early years of bis commercial activities Mora 
attempted on two different occasions to establish business partnerships with other 
merchants to expand his ventures. These initial efforts were fruitless but Mora finally 
was able to form a company with Vicente Aguilar in 1842.1 By that time Mora had 
begun to expand his businesses by traveling to Jamaica where he took gold and silver 
from the mines of Montes dcl Aguacate and exchanged these metals for manufactured 
goods which he later sold in Costa Rica. He had to travel abroad and do the transactions 
himself due to the absence of agents and representatives of fcxcign firms in Costa Rica. 
who became active there only after the expansion of coffee exports. At the same time that 
and developing several coffee haciendas through the purchase of small plots of land and 
consolidating them into larger units. These haciendas were located in the outskirts of San 
Jose, most of them in Pavas siruated west of the capital and others in the southern part of 
town, in a place called La Isla. 2 
31 
Mora's associatim with Aguilar enabled both of them to have a solid start in the 
coffee expcxt business. Their firm, known as "Mora & Aguilar," began its operatiOllS 
with a capital of 18,000 ~ which were the equivalent of 3,600 pounds sterling and 
became of one the largest export and import companies in the 1840s.3 Aguilar and Mora 
were able to take a lead in the export business by increasing the volume of their coffee 
shipments through the purchase of coffee produced on other growers' haciendas. Chile 
was the first market for Costa Rican coffee and was the most impcxtant one until coffee 
began to be shipped directly to Great Britain after 1844. Consequently, soon after the 
establishment of his partnership with Aguilar, Mora traveled to the Orilean port of 
Valparaiso with an impcxtant cargo of coffee in 1843. He went there to explore the 
possibilities of establishing commen:ial links m behalf of the company "Men & Aguilar" 
with one of the major export firms there. Men accomplished his goal since he was able 
to sell his coffee cargo to the agentS of the Glasgow firm of "John Thompson Wattson & 
Co." These agents provided the firm "Mora & Aguilar" with credit mainly in the form of 
advaDCC3 of merchandise that Mora took back to CoS1a Rica in we 1843. After this 
initial trip, Mora made several others in the following five years, taking advantage of the 
newly-established business conncctiOllS in Chile. On those trips Mora carried out 
transactions on behalf of the company, and also took orders for goods from other Costa 
Rican merchants and purchased merchandise for his own store.4 
Men started to participate in politics while he was developing his commercial 
connections abroad. He began his political career in the 1840s, a decade charac1erizcd by 
a very restive political climate.. The political instability of the 1840s was manifested in the 
fact that seven different people headed the executive ~ in a period of nine years and 
none of them was able to complete his term. As a matter of fact, President Braulio 
Carrillo was overthrown in April. 184~ by the Honduran General Francisco Moram. At 
the time Marmo was living in exile in New Granada. but he had not abandoned his plans 
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of resurrecting the Central American Federal Republic. Consequently. Moraun regarded 
the invitations of Carrillo's opponents to carry out a military coup as an excellent 
opportunity to regain power in Central America. Treason amon1 the goyemmcm troopS 
facilitaeed Moraun's invasion and rapid take OYCr of power in Costa Rica. He was 
appointed chief of state in July, 1842, but unfonunau:ly for M<X'IDII. two months later he 
was ousted by another anned movement. and was executed in San Jose.5 After these 
violent events, Jose Mana Alfaro was chosen as inb:rim president until Francisco Marfa 
Oreamuno was elected in 1844. But Oreamuno resigned after twenty-five days in office 
and was succeeded by Rafael Gallegos. Galle~ in tum, was overthrown by another 
military coup in 1846 that brought Jose Mana Alfaro to power once again. 6 
Mora was elected member of the constiment assembly summoned in 1846 to draft 
a new constitution after the coup that ousted Gallegos. When this new constimtion was 
adopted all the individuals who took part in the constituent assembly, including Mora. 
became members of Congress. The elections held in 1847 were won by Jose Mana 
Castro who chose Jose Mana Alfaro as vice-president. Alfaro, however, resigned in 
September, 1847 and Men was elected to replace Alfaro. 
Mora served as vice-president in an administration that was also charactcri.zcd by 
political unrest. The two years of the government of Jose Mana Castro, from 1847 to 
1849. in fact, were marked by several attempted revolts and constant rumors of 
conspiracies. The reasons that led Jose Mana Alfaro to resign to the vice-presidency 
were also responsible for a great deal of the instability of the Castro years. Alfaro was 
the member of one of the leading families of the city of Alajucla. Alfaro along with his 
brother Florentino, who was a military commander, had participated actively in the events 
that led to Morazan's invasion and to the fall of Gallegos. The coup that ousted Gallegos 
and put Jose Marla Alfaro in power as interim president. indeed, was led by his brother, 
Florentino Alfaro. Due to his active involvement in the overthrow of Gallegos, Jose 
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Mana Alfaro was expecting to be confirmed as president when elections were held in 
1847. But it was Jos6 Marla Castro and not Alfaro who wu elected. This rejection 
planted the seed of political resentment that turned the military fm:es of Alajuela under the 
command of the Alfaro brothers into a continuous source of unrest. 7 
The tmmoil of the 1840s had transformed Alajuela in a military stronghold since 
an imponant number of armaments and ammunition had been concennied there in the 
course of the constant rise and fall of governments that charactem.ed this decade. 
President Castto, in an attempt to reduce the military power of Alajuela ordered the 
transfer to San Jose of all the armaments with the exception of the rifles that each 
militiaman kept at home. This move increased the resentment of the A1faros and their 
suppa,i:rs and marked the beginning of several failed revolts against Castto's 
govcmmcnt. 8 One of these rebellions provided Mora with the opportunity to 
dcmonstrare his political skills, and especially his ability to take control rapidly of a 
critical situation. 
Certainly, in March 1848 while Mora was serving as acting president he took 
rapid and effective measures to supress a rebellion of a group of Alajuelans who tried to 
overthrow Castro while he was in Puntarenas. However, the rebels' plans failed 
because immediately after be learned of the uprising. Mora suspended all constitutional 
guaran~ declared a swc of emergency, and ordered that every man between the ages 
of founeen to fifty should repcxt within three hours to the military commanders of each 
town to defend the government. 'Ibe government 1rOOpS marched to Alajuela and the 
rebellion movement wu suffocated.9 
In June. 1848, a few months after Mora played that crucial role in suppressing 
the revolt. he resigned as vice-president. Mara's resignation has been intcpreted as a 
result of his differences with Castro regarding the punishment applied to the men 
involved in the failed rebellion of March of that same year. Mora thought that it was 
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necessary to use an iron hand to preserve law and order while Castro tended to favor a 
more tolerant approach.10 To a large extent, Castro's relucwx:e to use force was 
responsible for the fall of his government in November, 1849. Castro's fall, however, 
was not the result of a revolt that «iginu:d in Alajuela er any other armed m:wement, but 
the outcome of a belligerant opposition within the elite circles that wanted a stronger man 
in charge of the executive office. That man was Juan Rafael Mora. 
The events that preceded the election of Mora reveal some of the ways in which 
the coffee planter and merchant elite manipulated the constitutional principles and 
government instirutions to achieve its goals. ~ in most places, the elite excluded the 
mass of the people from participating in elections and in the government by restricting 
citi2enship to property owners. The constitution of 1848, in force when Mora was elected 
president, granted cimenship to males twenty-one years or older provided that they 
owned property valued at least 300 pesos. or had a minirn,1m annual income of 150 
pesos. A literacy qualification was added to these requisites in 1853. The right to v~ 
however, was limited to male citi2ens twenty•five years or older that 1NeI'C head of the 
family, literate and had a mioirnurn of 1,000 pesos in properties.11 
In 1849, Congress was made up of twelve representatives who served six years 
and were elected through indirect elections. The men who served in Congress during the 
last months of Castro's administration had engaged in a series of political maneuvers that 
aimed at appointing Mora as vice-president when it was imminent that Castro was going 
to hand in his resignation having been pn:ssured by an increasing opposition. The way to 
Mora's election was opened when Castro's vice-president Manuel Jose Caram resigned 
in October, 1849. Congress called for an election to choose Carazo's successor. Mora 
was elected in early November, 1849, but the results of the elections were not made 
public until two weeks later, on the day of Castro's resignation. 
The resignation of president Castro was precipitated by the warnings of Jose 
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Manuel Quiros, the commanding officer of the military bmack of San Jose. Quiros went 
to visit Castro at his house and told him to leave office voluntarily, otherwise be would be 
ousted by a coup and sent in10 exiJe.12 In the praence of such threat. Castro notified 
Congress of his decision 10 su:p down from p0'lf'Cl' il1101Ntiately. The congressmen 
accepted Castto's resignation on November 16, 1849, and shonly after announced the 
election of Mora as vice-president and called on him to take the oath of office. The 
constitution of 1848 stipulated that in the absence of the president because of death, 
resignation, or any other reason. the vicc•president should take his place. In the case of 
Castto's resignation. nonetheless, Congress altered the constitutional procedures by 
calling for an election for president. Mora. who was already entitled co take the 
pretidency, was elccu:d by a majority of voees.13 The decision of these congressmen to 
go through an unncccssary procedure indicates that they wan1ed Mora's election to be 
sanctioned by all means available. 
By late 1849 when he was elected president, Mora was facing financial troubles 
originating mainly by the fall in the price c:L coffee in the European market during the 
previous year. Mora had recently dissolved his partnership with Vicente Aguilar but had 
continued doing business by himself with the firm of "John Thompsai Wattson & Co." 
in Chile. On his last trip to Valparaiso before be was elected, Mora found out that the 
debit balance in the account that he had with the Thompson firm was much higher than he 
anticipated. It was at that time when Mora learned that the last coffee cargo that the 
company Mora and Aguilar had left on consignment with the Thompson firm bad been 
sold in Europe at half of the price assessed at the moment when the contract to have the 
cargo sent overseas was signed. The amount of the losses was considerable taking into 
account that this was a cargo of 33,562 quintals of coffee. The losses amounted to about 
lS0,000 pesos, the equivalent of approximately 30,000 pounds sterling.14 The capital 
with which Mora was doing business transactions had been supplied largely by "John 
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Thompson Wauson &: Co." Mora bad received advances of cash and merchandise over 
the profits that would result from the coffee sales in Europe. Consequently, the fall in the 
price of coffee reduced not only the amount of profits that would cover part of Mora's 
debt to the Thompson firm but also the capital that he would haw available for business 
operations at home. 
Hence. Mora bad a considerable financial obligation to bis creditors abroad at the 
time when his name was being strongly supponcd as the successor of Castro. Vicente 
Aguilar claimed years later that Mora's financial troubles played a major role in his 
decision to look for the presidency in 1849. Aguilar declared that his former business 
partner Mora was about to be sued by the Thompson firm far the payment of lS0,000 
pesos when he took power. IS There is no specific information in the notarial records 
that corroborates Aguilar assertions about Mora's financial difficulties in the late 1840s. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence in those reca-ds which indicall:S that Mora had 
considerable cn:dit obligations at home and had defaulted on some of them. Mora, for 
example, owed more than 20,000 pesos to Eduardo Wallcrstcin, a German merchant who 
resided in Costa Rica.16. Mora's transactions in these records show that during this 
period be sold some of his coffee haciendas. That Mora did not replace those haciendas 
immediateJy is further indication of an unstable financial situation. 
Consequently, there was very likely a great deal of economic interest behind 
Mora's political ambition since the presidency implied receiving a steady income and the 
possibility of using public fund, liberally to cope with his personal financial troubles. 
Mora's personal motivations to seek public office, however, were combined with his 
clear understanding of the functioning of politics and notable leadenhip qualities. This 
combinati011 gave origin to a political formula that led the elite to support strongly Mora's 
election and the main policies of his administration. This political formula proved to 
worlc out very effectively for Mora and the elite for almost ten years. Mora, in fact, was 
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elected for a second presidential term in April, 1853.17 
Mora's strong character and Pfflgmltism. mi1ed very well the interest of the elite 
in a hist0rical moment in which the use of fon:e wu pivotal for preparing the terrain for 
the consolidation of the authority of national sta1e. Mora, unlike his predecescr Ios6 
Mana Cu~ did not hesiwe to use an iron hand when the circwmtances demanded it or 
to violate the constitution if that wu the fas1eSt way to achieve a goal. In comparison 
with other Latin American countries. Costa Rica's political histmy in the nineteenth 
century is notable for the absence of prolonged. bloody civil wars. Nonetheless, the 
events of the 1840s revealed that as in other places, during the formative stage of the 
national swc the executive power was al the mercy of regional a>nflicts, persaial 
ambitions and political rivalries. 
The firm incmporation into the world mmet in the second half of the nineteenth 
century hastened the process of consolidation of the national stare in Latin America. In 
the early stages of this process the stare made its presence felt mainly as an instrument for 
repression and social comro1 in charge of eliminating the obstacles that were hindering the 
development of the new economic oponunitics opened by the markets abroad.18 The 
increasing preponderance that the institutiats designed fer the reinfcrccment and 
legitimation of centtal power had within the government of Mora corresponded to that 
early stage of the process of consolidation of the national stare. 
Mora. to be sure, from the very moment that he took power in December, 1849, 
underscored that the creation and prcservation of political stability would be the priorities 
of his govemmenL The positivist fcrmula of "Order and progress" was frequently 
quoted in Mora's annual reports to Congress. President Mora pointed out in these reports 
that coffee exports were growing and becoming the core of the national economy al the 
same time that they were unleashing a steady flow of material progress. Mora 
emphasiz.ed that order was a sine QJll non for progress and for Costa Rica's 
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transformation into a "civilized" country such u the European nations and United States. 
The first measures implemented by Mora 10 crea!e the conditions for maintenance 
of Older involved important refonns 10 the orpnization of the military. Mora declared 
that a great deal of the instability of the previous years had been due 10 the loosening of 
the bonds of discipline and obedience among the military officers. This situati~ 
according to Mora, had transformed the army into an instrument of factions that 
promoted regional divisions and conflicts and wu a constant threat to the man in the 
presidency instead of being the backbone of bis authority. Consequently, Mora said that 
he was determined to eliminate those elements that had altered the army's functions and to 
tum it into a subordinate and obedient body .19 
The existence of only one military barrack in San Jose, the Cuaru;l Principal , was 
one of the reasons for the weakened loyalty of the military officers toward the 
government. This situation had turned the comrnandirJg officer of this barrack into a very 
influential individual with enough power to act independently and frequently against the 
president's orders.20 Therefore, Mora established a second barrack in San Jose in April, 
1850 to reduce the power of the commanding officer of the Cuanel Principal who was at 
that time Jose Manuel Quiros. Mora CKdered that all cannons except one. and all the 
rifles, and ammunition be transferred from the existing bamck to the new one called 
Cuarb;l de Artillert'a. Quiros and some of bis officen resented this measure which was a 
clear indication of Mora's lack of trust of their loyalty and support to his administration. 
Quiros' discontent led him to make a series of demands to Mora and even to threaten him 
with a coup. Mora responded by dismissing Quiros and other officers who suppated 
their commander from their military posts. The conflict with Quiros, nonetheless, did not 
end there since the deposed commander organized a revolt in early June. I 850. But this 
movement failed, and Quiros and his supponers were imprisoned and sent abroad into 
exile. 21 This measure definitively resolved the problem and Mora gained absolute control 
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over the bamlcb. Mora entrusted the post of commander in chief of San Ios6 to his 
brother-in-law Ios6 Mana Caiias and later to his lx'otber 1096 Ioaqu{n Mora. 
The mxpnization of the barracks was followed by tnemm:s oriented towards 
making the military a professional. well-ttamed and well-«{Uipped body. The Costa 
Rican army by the mid nine11:Cnth century was still cxpnim1 under the Spanish colonial 
system of militias. Only a small group of men served in what was called the permanent 
force. The rest of the military fcxce was made up of civilians who participatcd in 
periodic training exercises but were cal.led to semce only in the event of an emergency to 
back up the permanent force. Z2 There were about 5,£,00 men in these militias in the early 
1850s and Mc:ra attempted to inaeasc this number up to 9,000. However, he only was 
able to increase them to 7,500 men during his administtarioo. Likewise, Mora enacted 
new regulations for these militias in Deccmber.1850 that aimed at turning them from a 
group of mmtly barefoot peasants who bad vecy little notion of martial discipline into 
mere IXOfessional armed ~mces. The establishment of a milialry school in San Ios6 in 
1852 under the supervision of Fernando Salisch, a retiJed German officer, to train the 
militias constiruu:d an example of Men's effmt to reinfcxce the armed fon:es. 23 
The Costa Rican army in the 1850!, nonetheless. was strengthened mainly 
through the purchase d imponant amounts of armament and ammunitions. The annual 
l'Cpcx1S of the Minislc:r of Finance and War to Coogress throl1ghout this decade mentioned 
that the government was buying arms both to modernize and to enlarge its arsenals. 
Important sums of money, in fact, were invested in these arms purchases in England. 
1be total price of those purchased in 1854, for example amounted to 4,712 pounds 
sterling. This purchase included two cannons and other artillery equipment. SOO Minie 
rifles with bayonets, 300 barrels of gunpowder, and fifty barrels of bullets and other 
types of ammunitions. 24 The impcxuti.on of such large quantities of arms in the first half 
of the 18SOs was justified by the Men administration as aucial for maintaining the 
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political S1ability recently reestablished thanks to the elimination d. the elements that had 
been a source of unrest in the past. Mora's Minister of Fi.nancc and War Manuel Jose 
Carazo, in fact, explained that the government was taking advantage of the climate of 
stability to implement the "well-known principle Si vis pacem, para bellmn , if who wish 
peace, prepare for war. "25 Later in that decade the constant military build up was 
justified as pivotal for Costa Rica's defense against any threat to its stability coming from 
abroad. 
The priority placed on the military within Mora's govcmmcnt is evident in the 
records of the amount of money allocated in the national budget for the armed forces 
during the 1850s. The military consumed the largest amount of the government's 
revenues with the exception of the money destined to pay the salaries of public 





































Source: Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica. Congreso, nos. 5233, 7873, 7231, 20838, 
5158, 7843 and Hacienda 6438. Information for 1858 and 1859 is missing in the 
documentation. 
The budgets of 1856 and 1857 did not include the additional sums allocated to 
finance the military campaigns against Wtlliam Walker; nor do figures in Table 2 include 
the money spent in the purchase of armament dming this period. The figures in Table 2 
become even more meaningful when compared to the amounts allocated f<r education 
during that period. The national budget during the 1850s only included an average of 
5,000 pesos a year to be destined to the establishment and financing of elementary 
schools.26 
Mora's policies regarding the military iroved to be very effective in eJi~naring 
the focus of unrest and armed opposition of the previous years. The 1850s, surely, were 
a decade of political stability which was the outcome of the use of fon::e, measures taken 
to reconcile regional factions and Men's popularity. The problem of the discontent of the 
Alfaro brothers and other leading Alajuelans disappeared during Men's government 
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because he revoked most of the orders and decrees of fonner president Castro regarding 
Alajuela which had generated a lot of resentment and opposition.'n The fact that Jos6 
Mana Alfaro and his brother Florentino, the camnaoding officer of the barrack of 
Alajuela, were friends and suppo11e1s \lf Mora also played an imponant role in the 
stability that characteriz.ed his administration. 
The military build up of the 1850s imposed a substantial financial burden which 
demanded the reorganization of the means of collecting public revenues. At the middle of 
the nineteenth century the bulk of Costa Rica's public finances was made up of income 
generated from the government monopoly on liqucr and tobacco. The determination of 
the coffee planter and merchant elite to avoid all direct taxation on landed wealth or 
income, ~ led it to keep and reinforce these monopolies which had been established 
by the Spanish authorities during the colonial period. 
The most profitable of these two monopolies was the one on liqua sales. 
Consequently, Mora implemented a sc:rie of measures to rcaganize it and make it even 
more productive. Up to 1850 the government had authom.ed the distillation of liquor 
from sugar cane in homes and haciendas by people who paid a fee to do so. These 
people acquired the right to distill liquor with the condition that they later sold their 
production to the government since the retail sale of aeµardicntc was exclusively on its 
hands. The existence of numerous illegal distilleries and the icluctancc of some 
individuals to sell their liquor production to the government made it necessary to hire 
inspectors and other officers to enforce the laws icgarding the monopoly. This situation 
in the long run generated mare expcmcs to the public treasury than the expected results, 
and the problem of the illegal distillation and sale of liquor continued unresolved. 
Hence, in July, 1850, Mora enacted a decree prohibiting all private distillation 
and establishing a national liqucr distillery to be operated by a contractor. This private 
contractcr would sell all the liquor production to the government since Mora's decree did 
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not eliminale its privileges as the exclusive retailer of alcoholic beverages. This 
reorganization of the liqucr monopoly came into effect in January, 1851 and in part. aimed 
at eliminating the cost of paying officials to wau:h for illegal distilleries. In addition and 
just as imponan~ the new regulations aimed also at increasing the amount of liquor 
produced and improving the quality of the liquor through the inttcduction of better 
devices and more hygienic procedures in the elaboration of the alcoholic beverages. 28 
The creation of a national distillery operated by a private contractor proved to be 
very effective from the point of view of the inacase in public revenues derived from 
liquor sales. The annual repcxu of Mora's Miniscer of Fmance to Congress emphasiz.ed 
that public revenues had grown S11:adily since the establishment of the national distillery. 
The minis1er declared that the new distillery, indeed. had reduced costs and increased 
liquor production. The imponant increase in the the public revenues derived from liquor 
sales in 1850s is shown in Table 3. 
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TABLE3 
REVENUES OF 1HE LIQUOR DISTD.J.ERY 
1850-18<,0 
IN COSTA RICAN PESOS 
Year liquor revenues total government %oftotal 
revenues revenues 
1850 42,150 193,522 21.4% 
1851 SS,601 229,406 24.2% 
1852 72,702 27~623 26.6% 
1853 74,993 485,957 15.4% 
1854 103,312 360,172 28.6% 
1855 110,100 490,097 22.4% 
1856 72,305 506,920 14.2% 
1857 181,182 655,028 27.6% 
1858 178,225 615,923 28,9% 
1859 
1860 111,868 400,000 27.9% 
Source: Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica. Congreso nos. 5233, 7873, 7483, 5097, 
5158, 5934, 7018. 
Maa, his Minister of Finance, Manuel Jose Caram and his Minister of Interior, 
Joaqu!n Bernardo Calvo, proudly pointed out in their annual repons to Congress in the 
first half of the 1850s that the implemcnt2tion of the ccnttal points in the government's 
agenda had had a very firm start thanks to the profits yielded by the liquor industry 
which had made the public treasury thrive. During first six years of the Mora 
administration, certainly, the condition of the public treasury was sound. In fact, Cost2 
Rica at that time did not have a foreign debt or any other substantial burden upon its 
national finances that could have taken resources away from the government. Therefore, 
while the funds of the public treasury were not ~uge they were enough to cover the basic 
expenses of the government, and also to finance the military build up, the improvement of 
the road to Puntarenas and other projects related to the development of the export 
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agriculture. 
The sound condition of the public treasury during the first half of the 1850s was 
crucial as well in the smooth implementation of bodl Mora's personal goals and those of 
the coffee plan1CrS and merchants without majer conflicts of interest. As a matter of fact, 
some measures and dispositions that accompanied Mora's cff<rt to strengthen the 
executive power indicaie that he was able to divert substantial sums of money from the 
public treasury for his personal use. 
The strengthening of the executive power that took place parallel to the 
reinforcement of the military, as in most of Latin Amcri~ was a process that combined 
the expansion of the powers of the president with measures that tended to inculcate the 
acceptance and respect to his authority. This eff<rt to instill respect fer the high-ranking 
authorities was manifesa:d in the construction of the National Palace, a sumptuous 
building that was finished in 1855, to home the offices of the president and his two 
~ and the Congress. This endeavor was manifested also in the idea that public 
officers should be well-mnuneraicd to penorm their duties with dignity. 29 The 
emphasis on the need to increase the salaries of public officers as a way to highlight their 
authority c:onstituU:d a very appropriate anu:cedcnt for the approval in Congress of 
considerable sums of money fer Mora in the form of discretionary funds. 
1be congressmen who were closer to Mora and his strongest supponers in the 
early years of his government included Miguel Mora, the president's brother, Satumino 
Tmoco, Rafael Barroeta. Tomu Sandoval, Modesto Guev~ Santiago Fern~z, 
Lucas Alvarado, and Francisco Mana Oreamtmo who was the vice-president and served 
also as president of Congress. These members of Congress played an important role in 
Mora's misuse of public funds since they threw a veil of legality over it by actively 
supporting a series of motions to raise Mora's salary and assign him discretionary 
funds. 
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In June,185~ in fact, Lucas Alvarado poinled out in Congress that the salary of 
the president, which was then 3,000 pesos a year, had not been modified since 1841 
when the salaries of the other public employees were raised. Alvarado's commentary 
gave origin to a congressional motion for providing Mora with a special allowance to 
compensate him "for the constant efforts that he had made to take the public treasury out 
of the ruinous conditions in which it was when he took power".30 This motion 
remarked that thanks to Mora's decisive actions the treasury had acquired a level of 
prosperity not known before. It also underscored that the Mora administration had had 
important beneficial effects upon the country. Likcwi~ the motion pointed out that 
Mora had saved Costa Rica from falling into anarchy and disorder and had set the country 
among the group of politically stable nanons.31 
There is a remark in this congressional motion that suggests that the intended 
purpose of the motion was other than the one expressed. This remarlc pointed out that the 
perftXmaDCC of Mora's public functions bad compelled him to neglect his large 
agricultural and commercial cntelprises, and that this had caused a remarkable damage to 
his personal interests. The document added that the republic could not permit that "the 
economic sacrifices of such an illustrious patriot be passed over unnoticed." 32 
The congressional motion to reward Mora f<r important achievements of his 
administration contended likewise that the accomplishments of his governments had 
obligated Mora to use his personal capital to pay for unexpected expenses related to his 
presidential duties. The document considcrcd that Costa Rica should followed the · 
example of other countries that had assigned their rulers a sum from the public treasury 
to cover extraordinary expenses. This motion added that in those countries the rulers had 
no obligation to account for the way in which the allowance was spent because it usually 
was intended to carry out measures to preserve order and tranquility and those matters 
should be kept confidential.33 This commentary provided a very convenient argument to 
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make Mora unaccountable for considerable amounts of money that he received throughout 
the 1850s as discretionary funds. 
As a maner of fact. Congress issued a decree 011 July 1, 1852 giving Mora 3,000 
pesos for discretionary funds and declared that thereafter the amount of this allowance 
should be fixed each year.34 The following year, in June, 1853, Congress declared that 
it had resolved to grant Mora a raise of 2,000 pesos because his salary was not included 
in the dispositions that increased the salaries of other public employees in 1852. Thus, 
this disposition increased Mora's yearly salary from 3,000 to 5,000 pesos.35 The 
motion that proposed the raise pointed out that Mora's "politeness and tact" had prevented 
him from authorizing an increase for humelf. The proposal praised once more Mora's 
government by emphasizing that the raise wu necessary to give the president "a 
testimony of approval of his accurate administration of public affairs. "36 Men, 
according to this motion, deserved recognition fer the way in which in the last three 
years, "public revenues had thrived, internal peace had prevailed, and the government 
had been beneficial to the country".37 Likewise, Congress in a separate decree approved 
an allowance for Mora of 4,000 pesos of discretionmy funds for the year 1853.38 
That the amount of these discretionary funds grew very rapidly in a short lapse is 
another indication that this allowance was intended to serve purposes that were different 
from what Congress manifested. The discretionary funds increased from 4,000 to 6,000 
pesos in 1854, and the latter amount was also allocated in 1855. However, in 1856 
Congress augmented the allowance to 10,000 pesos declaring that the war in Nicaragua 
posed increasing demands to the procection of the 11:ffitorial integrity of the country. 
This same amount was approved in 1857 fer discretionary funds for the president since 
Congress considered that the war in Nicaragua continued to pose a serious threat to Costa 
Rica's sovereignty. The funds assigned to Mora in 1858 amounted to 8,000 pesos but in 
the following year, in 1859 they were increased to 10,000 pesos.39 
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Therefore, Mora began his peritXi of government in we 1849 earning a yearly 
salary of 3,000 pesos. When he wu overthrown in 1859 he had an annual income of 
15,000 pesos, which was the combination of his salary with the discretionary funds 
allowance. The exaggerated increase of Mora's income becomes evident when r, • • •• a.-4 
with the salaries of other high ranking officials. This is illustrated in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Source: Gobiemo de Cosm Rica. Cglg;tj6n de Leyes y Decn;tos, vols. 12·16. 
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Source: Gobiemo de Costa Rica. Colccci6n de Lem y Decretos. vol.12. 
The salaries of the members of the Supreme Court were the only ones that were 
increased three times during the 1850s. The assignment of new functions to the Justices 
of the Supreme Cowt in 1856, in fact. was accompanied by a modification of their 
salaries. The Supreme Court Regent's salary was increased to 1,(,()() pesos, the District 
Attorney's to 1,42.S pesos. the salary of the newly appointed President of the Court of 
Second Instance was established on 1,3(,() pesos, and those of other four Justices were 
augmented to 1,314 pesos. 40 Mora's government resolved to increase the salaries of the 
members of the Supreme Court one a:ae ti.me in 1858 as a pan of the reorganization of 
the Judicary and as the administration put it "in recognitim to their high-rank and 
responsibilities in the delicate task of administering justice" .41 The salary of the Regent 
was augmented to 2,300 pesos, those of the District Attorney and the President of the 
Court of Second Instance to 1,900 pesos and those of the Justices to 1,800 pesos.42 
Regardless of the substantial raise in the salaries of the Justices of Supreme Court 
so 
those hikes were not in proportion with the increase of Mora's. In fact, there was an 
increase of almost a 1~ in the Regent of the Supreme Court's salary while Mora's 
raises were at~- The presidential duties and responsibilities of Mon and his efforts 
to foster the development of the country's political and economic institutions in no way 
justified such huge raises in his salary along with the allocation of an allowance for 
discretionary funds. The other Congressional justification to grant Mora discretionary 
funds dealt with expenses that he might have in his task of maintaining public order. It 
was not necessary either to approve discretionary funds for that purpose because the 
government allocated considerable amounts of money for military expenses in the 1850s. 
This fact as well strongly suggests that the discretionary funds were intended to supply 
Mora with additional capital from the national treasury since these allowance and his 
salary were paid in advance and with preference over any other public expense during his 
administration. 43 
Even though there was no solid ground from the point of vie_w of the public 
needs to give Mora discretionary funds, the favorable economic conditions that prevailed 
during the first half of the 1850s made possible the payment of such funds and his huge 
salary without imposing a burden too heavy on the public treasury. These prosperous 
coµditions, however, disappeared as a result of Mora's decision to get Costa Rica 
involved in the war that was being fought in Nicaragua against the American filibuster 
William Walker. This crusade for the defense of Central America's sovereignty proved to 
be very expensive. The military campai~ indeed, exhausted in a period of a few 
months the resoun:es of what up to that moment had, been a sound public treasury. The 
war against Walk.er marlced a turning point in the Mora administration because it 
significantly altered the course of Costa Rica's internal affairs. For more than a year the 
priorities of the government revolved around national defense while other important 
aspects of the public administration were neglected. But the war is also significant 
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because it marted the beginning of the decomposition of the combination of elements that 
earlier on had propitiated Mora's rise to power. The breakup of the political consensus 
among the coffee planters and merchants towards Mora began when he went ahead with 
his plans to launch an offensive attack against Walker in 1856. Men got Costa Rica 
involved in a military confrontation with Walker against the opinion of most of the 
leading members of the elite. 
William Walker, a native of Tennessee. was an adventurer who believed fervently 
in the Manifest Destiny doctrine. Walker had adopted the idea that it was in the interest of 
civilization to conquer and dominate people who were not capable of developing the 
resources of their natives lands. This caiviction led Walker to organize an invasion to 
Baja California in 1853 in an aurmpt to establish an independent ICpUblic on Mexican 
soil. Walker was rapidly defeated by the Mexican anny and fled bade to the United 
Sla!CS. This military expedition. however, gave Walker renown in the circles of the 
adventures which took him to Nicamgua in June, 1855. N'aragua was at that time tom 
by a civil war benveen a liberal faction concenttaied in the ncxthem city of Le6n and a 
conservative one which was very strong in the city of Granada located in the south of that 
counay. The liberals saw in Walker and bis army of adventurers an excellent ally to 
strengthen their fon:es and defeat their caitenders and consequently called Walker to 
N'u:aragua to back them up. Soon after Walker arrived in Nicaragua and joined the liberal 
forces he assumed political and military cmtrol of the region that was dominaied by this 
faction. 
The news of Walker's takeover of the liberal faction and his rapid progress 
towards the caitrol of the tat of Nicaragua aleru:d the ocher Central American 
goyemments. Walker represented a serious th.teat to the independence of all the region 
since he had already made public bis dc1ermination to unify all the Central American 
countries into one republic and annex it to the Slave States of the United States. 
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Consequently, the other Central American governments began to e:xchange letters and 
communications about the situation in Nicaragua and to consider the possibility of joining 
efforts to oust W alkcr from that country. President Mora took the initiative in these plans 
to organize a combined offensive against Walbr. He was kept well-informed of the 
events in Nicaragua through Costa Rica's envoy to the United Scates and other sources. 
The strong presence of Walker's forces in the proximity of Nicaragua's border 
with Costa Rica and a series of diplomatic incidents with him increased Mora's fears of 
an imminent invasion in early 1856. The relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
became very tense after Mora refused to receive an envoy of Wal.km who had been sent 
to try to convince his government that Walker did not harbor any plans fer a military 
aggression against Costa Rica. When he was ordered to leave Costa Rican tenitory 
without having had a chance to talk to Mora, Walker's envoy threatened military 
retaliation. Thcref<re, in February, lS,6 Mora requested Congress to grant him extended 
presidential powers to <rganize a military expedition to defend the ncxthem border and to 
march to Nicaragua if that became necessary. Mora wu convinced that once Costa Rica 
began the offensive against Walker the other Central American countries would also send 
troops and that the Nicaraguan people would as well join the faces fighting against the 
American intruders. He thought that a united Ccnttal American front would defeat 
Walker and his men easily and in a shon period of time. Mora, however, was 
overconfident about the military support of the other countries which came several 
months after Costa Rica got involved in the war in Nicaragua. 
The armed confrontations with Walker's army began soon after Mora and the 
Costa Rican troops marched to the border in late March, 1856. The first combat took 
place within Costa Rican tmitory, since Walker's men had already invaded this country 
when Mora and the army were in their way to the border. After a surprise attack and 
rapid defeat of Walker's men in Guanacaste, Mora marched with the troops into 
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Nicaragua where they engaged in several confrontations and vanquished the enemy forces 
in the city of Rivas. The Costa Rican army remained in Nicaragua 1D1til we April, 1856 
when the outbreak of an epidemic of cholera mcrbus forced Men to order the retmn of 
the troops to Costa Rica. The cholera epidemjc extended to Costa Rica during June and 
July, 1856, taking a high toll among the population. In fact, approximately 10,000 
people died as a con3CQUence of this epidemic. Because of the epidemic Men was 
unable to resume the military offensive against Walker until early November,1856. 
Mora did not accompany the army in this second offensive which was fought on two 
different fronts. One group of soldiers went to the nortbcastem part of the Costa ~ to 
the San Juan River region which was an strategic point. This river sened at that time as 
an intcroceanic route coMecting the Atlantic and the Pacific and was Wal.m's lifeline. 
The control of the San Juan River by the Costa Rican fcxces consequently cut off the 
supply line of arms and food to the Americans. The other front was localed in 
southwestern Nicaragua where the Costa Ricans were finally joined in the fight by troops 
from the other Ccnttal American countries in early 1857. The combined offensive on 
both fronts weakened considerably the American forces and Walbr SU!l'Cndered in May, 
1857.44 
This victory over Walker filled Mora with pride and turned him into a national 
hero for later generations. Nonetheless, Mora paid a very high political price for this 
triumph. Most of the leading coffee planters were against the idea of an offensive attack 
against Walker because they considered that Costa Rica <lid not have the capability to 
finance a war abroad. These men also had reservations about Mora's capacity to direct 
such enterprise due to his lack of military training and experience. These prominent 
members of the elite were opposed to the war because they feared as well that it would 
take the already shon supply of labor away from productive activities and would have 
other unpredictable consequences. 
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The preparation far the military campaigns in Nicaragua, as the elite anticipated, 
demanded the imposition of two forced internal loans to increase the resources of the 
public tteasury. Mora, in fact, in February 1856 enacted a deaee imposing a forced loan 
of 100,000 pesos on the residents of the four main cities. San Jos6 was asked to 
conaibute 45,000 pesos, Cartago and Heredia, 20,000 pesos each, and AJajuela, 15,000 
pesos. Mora appointed a commission of five people in each city to make a list of the 
individuals that would have to pay the conaibution and to determine the amount of the 
conaibutions ac..-ording to the income of each person. The individuals that wen: chosen 
to pay were compelled to do so within a month. If they failed to do so they would be 
obliged to pay double the amount established, and would lose the right to receive any 
interest on their money. A second forced loan for 50,000 pesos was imposed in late 
A~ 1856.45 The internal loans generated discontent among the elite not only because 
of the imposition of a mandatory contribution but because the goyemmcnt paid them back 
in bonds instead of cash.46 The mobilization of troops to the northern border also 
disrupted the nmmal development of economic activities because the government forced 
citizens to provide the army with food supplies, horses and oxen. The transponation of 
goods, for example, was affected because the government confiscated cans to move 
troops or armamen~. 
The disagreements concerning the war against Walker, and the consequences of 
these military campaigns estranged several men who had been among Mora's strongest 
supparn:n during the early years of his government. The most visible separation was 
that of Mora's Minister of Fman~ Manuel Jose Carazo. Caram was one of the people 
who insisted that the war against Walker demanded military capabilities that Costa Rica 
lacked He remained in office during the time that Mora and the army were in Nicaragua. 
Caram, however, was very distressed by the news that he received from Mora regarding 
the number of deaths. Carazo was quoted as saying that he had warned Mora and 
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everybody else that Costa Rica's unpreparedness for a war abroad was going to result in 
a high death toll but nobody bad paid aaention. 47 Caram raigned in June, 1856, soon 
after Mora returned from Nicaragua. 
The war alienaled Mm from seven! prmninent coffee plamm and merchants but 
that in itself was not responsible for the rupture of comensus that pnmpltd Mora's 
overthrow. It was the financial crisis brought about by the war that changed the 
conditions of Mora's political formula which had functioned successfully up to that 
moment. The war against Walker, cenainly, exhausb:d the resources of the public 
treasury and created a deficit that slowed down the implementation of Mora's agenda. 
The new Minister of Fmance Rafael G. Escalante repancd to Congress in 1857 that the 
military emergency of the previous year had consumed most of the resources of the 
treasury, acated an internal debt of ahmst 100,000 pesos and imposed new financial 
burdens on the government Escalante pointed out that as a result of the war the 
administration had acquired the obligation to pay compensations to the widows and 
families of the dead soldiers, and salaries and indemnities to the militiamen.41 
This difficult national financial situation was in no way transitory; it outlasted the 
Mora administration. Mora. nooethelcss, during the last years of his government 
concentrated all bis efforts in the implementation of measures aimed at solving the 
financial aisis. Pivotal in the endeavor to cope with the critical financial situation were 
the measures taken to keep the national distillery operating with profit, to establish an 
issuing bank. and to sell some municipal and communal lands. 
But Mora in the late 1850s was not only facing the problem of running a country 
with a depleted public treasury. He was also having serio~s personal financial troubles 
and the critical conditions of the national treasury made it impossible for Mora to resort to . 
it for funds to cover his major credit obligations. The most important evidence of Mora's 
financial difficulties was the sale of two of bis largest coffee haciendas located in Pavas to 
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pay his creditors in 1857. 
The transactions ex properties registered by Mera in the notarial reccrds during the 
first half of the 1850s show that be was buying properties in Pavas to substitute those he 
had been forced to sell in 1848. Indeed. soon after Mora became president be bought a 
hacienda of twenty-four hectares in Pavas cultivated with 28,000 shrubs of coffee for 
4,300 pesos.49 Pending credit obligations. however, frust:ran:d Mora's plans to enlarge 
his coffee haciendas in Pavas. 
Mora himself acknowledged publicly that his debts to foreign crediurs forced 
him to sell two of his main coffee haciendas.so Even though Mora did not specify in that 
public commentaiy who were those foreign creditors information in the notarial records 
strongly suggests that one of them wu Eduardo Wallers1ein, a German merchant who 
was Costa Rica's consul to London during the 1850s. That information also indicates 
that Mora sold one his coffee haciendas in Pavu to Mariano Montealegre in March. 1857, 
to pay a debt of 4,000 pounds sterling to WalJerstein.51 The coffee hacienda sold to 
Mariano Montealegre had eighty hectares. The sale included the hacienda's two-story 
house with the furniture and all the household items that were inside the dwelling. the 
buildings where coffee grains were dried and processed for exponation, several oxcarts 
and tools, and fifteen hectares of pasture land Montealegre bought this hacienda for 
37.SOO pesos that he paid to Mora in cash, coffee and drafts drawn on pounds sterling. 
Mora. indeed, received 2,SOO pesos in cash at the moment of the transaction, and 1.500 
quintals of coffee in April,1858, worth 15,000 pesos. Likewise, Montealegre covered 
the remaining 20,000 pesos of his debt to Mora with drafts for 3,846 pounds sterling. 52 
. The other coffee hacienda in Pavu that Mora was forced to sell was purchased by 
the partners of the firm "John Thompson Wattson & Co." of Valparaiso, Chile. This firm 
had been Mora's principal foreign creditor dming the 1840s and 18SOs. Eduardo 
Bceche, who was the agent in Costa Rica for the Thompson firm, in fact. bought this 
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hacienda for 3.SOO quintals of coffee in Ocu>bcr,1857. Beecbe administered the hacienda 
for many years on behalf of partners of the Thompson firm. The document conc:cming 
this transaction did not disclose the size of this coffee hacienda but it pointed out that the 
sale included two houses, a small pasture land, and a coffee mill that Mora "bad recently 
received from Europe" with its tools and spare pans.53 
The fact that Men had been investing in the purchase of equipment f<r processing 
coffee, such as the aforementioned mill, indicates as well that his immediate plans by 
1857 involved the improvcmen~ not the sale of his haciendas in Pavas. The sale of bis 
stock in a mining venture points out also that Men had an urgency for money at the time 
that he sold the two haciendas in Pavas. On January 19, 1857 Mora sold to Vicente 
Aguilar: his half of a mine that they both owned in a place called Quebrada Honda for 
10,000 pesos. Aguilar gave Men 8,000 pesos in cash and 2,000 pesos in goods.54 
Mora also borrowed 6,000 pesos from Mariano Montealegre in March. 1857, and few 
months later be sold a warehouse that he owned in Puntarenas to Juan Lazzo for 3,500 
pesos. 55 Those transactions and the fact that Men filed a lawsuit against Vicente Aguilar 
in December, 1857 for compensation for losses in business operations that had taken 
place almost ten years bef<x'e provide additional evidence that Mera was severely in need 
of money. 
Mora's financial troubles coincided with the crisis of the public tteasmy, and 
consequently he miented the implementation of measures aimed at solving the national 
eccoomic problems in ways that would faciliWI: abo bis own financial IeCOVer)'. The 
accomplishment of this dual goal, however, wu met with strong opposition among 
several leading members of the elite and that contributed substantially to the fall of 
Mora's g_ovcrnmcnt in 1859. Men's determination to promote his personal financial 
recoveey amid the national crisis, in fact. gave origin to serious clashes of economic 
interests with those members of the elite involved in the operation of the liquor distillery, 
S8 
and those affccu:d by the failure of the bank and the sale of public lands. 
The analysis of the main issues behind those conflicts of in=ests will conttibute 
in clarifying the nature of the political conflict that Jed to Ma-a's ovenbrow as well as the 
elements that served as the basis for the consensus that bad charac1am:d his 
administration earlier on. 
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CHAPrER mREB 
mE BUSINESS OF THE UQUOR 
DISTn.LERY AND POLITICS IN 1liE 1850s 
The measures taken by Mora in 1851 to sttenghcen the government's monopoly 
on liquor distillation and sales served very well the intended purpose of increasing the 
revenues of the public treasury during his administration. The concentration of all liquor 
production in one national distillery had other imponant economic consequences as well. 
The establishment of a national distillery created a sizeable and steady domestic marlcct for 
sugar cane, the basic raw material for the production of alcoholic beverages. Moreover. 
the contract for the operation of that distillery enabled some members of the elite to have 
direct participation in one of the most profitable business at that time. The operation of 
the liquor distillery, in fact, represented a major source of money to finance the expansion 
of coffee ventures in the context of a local economy in which currency was limited. 
This analysis of the operation of the national distillery under a private 
concessionaire during the 1850s points out that it was a source of consensus and conflict 
between Mora's government and the handful of leading coffee planters and men:hants 
who obtained this lucrative contract. The main reason for this was that the same 
limitations of the local economy that led the government and some leading members of the 
elite to depend upon the liquor distillery as the major source of capital restrained the 
financial capabilities of that business. In the period of transition from the economy of 
subsistence to an expon one, in fact, agricultmal techniques were deficient, there were 
no good roads connecting the couna-yside with the main towns. and there was a labor 
shortage. Those factors set imponant obstacles to the development of agricultural 
ventures oriented towards the domestic market. Those obstacles were manifested in the 
problems that the liquor contractors faced in relation to the supply of sugar cane and 
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other raw maierials. These problems along with those regarding the purchase and 
installation of the distillery equipment frequently reduced the profits of the contractors -
and put them at odds with Mora's government. The conflicts between Men and the 
contractors over profits, losses, and fines for not supplying the government with agreed 
quantities of liquor were serious enough to tum 'the former concessionaires into Mora's 
main political opponents by the late 1850s. 
The radical shift in the relations between Mora and Satumino TIDOCo, the first 
member of the elite who obtained the contract to operate the liquor distillery in the 1850s 
clearly illustrates the weight of economic issues on political conflicts. TlllOCO obtained 
the contract to operate the national distillery fer a period of four yem in a public auction 
held in October, 1851 in which he was the only bidder. He was a member of Congress 
at that time and one of Mora's strongest supporters in the Legislature. Tinoco also had 
personal relations with Mora through his indirect kinship links with the president's 
brother, Jose Joaquin Mora, who served as bondsman for Tmoco's obligation with the 
government as liquor conuacur. 
Tmoco's contract with the government gave him the right to operate the distillery 
from July l,185~ to July 31, 1856. He assumed the responsibility of selling a monthly 
quota of liquor, that had to meet cenain standards of quality, to the government at a 
previously arranged price. Tmoco gave a bond of 10,000 pesos as a guarantee for the 
building, equipment, and the instruments used for distillation, all of which were provided 
by the government. The contract stipulaied that the concessionaire would have to pay a 
fine of 10,000 pesos in the case that be could not fulfill his obligations.1 
The caitract with the government gave the concessionaire the libeny to make 
arrangements directly with private individuals f<r the supply of brown sugar and other 
raw materials needed for liquor production and for other purposes related to the business. 
Tinoco established a partnership with tw0 other members of the elite, Ram6n Quiros and 
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Nicolas Ulloa, to operate the distillery in association with them. Quiros and Ulloa 
obtained the right to sell Tmoco four hundred quintals of brown sugar each month to be 
used in the elaboration of liquors. Tmoco's two associates and other suppliers of brown 
sugar bad problems fulfilling their assigned quocas because the production of their 
plantations frequently was less than what they anticipated. The owners of larger sugar 
plantations very often signed contracts with individuals who had assumed the obligation 
to supply brown sugar to the distillery. These contracts gave the larger planters the right 
to sell their sugar cane to the distillery in the event that the smaller ones could not meet 
their obligations. Vicente Aguilar, one of the wealthiest members of the elite, was among 
those larger sugar planters. He signed an agreement with Nico1's Ulloa in 1853 to serve 
as bondsman in the latter's obligations to Tmoco. By serving as Ulloa's bondsman, 
Aguilar also acquired the right to have access to the privileges and benefits implied in the 
conttact to operate the distillery.2 Aguilar, in fact. participaied very actively, although 
indirectly, in the business of the liquor distillery throughout the 1850s. 
Regardless of Aguilar's participation as supplier of brown sugar when Ulloa 
failed to fulfill his obligation, Tinoco frequently could not meet the monthly liqua- quota 
that he had to deliver to the government. Aguilar's deliveries, in f~ were not enough to 
mm up for the shortage of brown sugar that resulted from irregular supplies from other 
individuals. These problems reduced the profitableness of the distillery operation 
because Tmoco, as contractor, had to pay tines to the government fa- the liquor shortage. 
The low supply of brown sugar, for example. made it impossible for Tmoco to deliver 
the agreed number of bottles of liquor during May and June, 1855. As a result of that 
Tmoco had to pay a fine of 8,000 pesos to the government. 3 
The losses brought about by the irregular supply of brown sugar led Tinoco to 
request the government to cancel his contract to operate the distillery in June,1855. 
Tmoco declared that he was even willing to pay the 10,000 pesos fine stipulated in the 
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contract for breaching it if that was the easiest way to invalidate completely bis obligations 
to the government. Mora, however, did not accept Tmoco's request. Mora was 
quoted in an official communication u saying that be was aware of all the difficulties that 
nnoco had had for delivering liquor to the government because of the low supply of 
brown sugar. Mora declared that be wanted "to reconcile" the inb:rCSt of the public 
treasury with the private interests of the contractcr since Tmoco had made all the possible 
effons to fulfill his obligations and to prevent a larger shortage of liquor in the previous 
six months. Mora, nonetheless, was firm in his position of not allowing T"lllOCO to 
cancel bis contract. Mora came up with a response to Tmoco's request that involved 
signing a new contract to keep the distillery running under the same management until the 
expiration of Tmoco's concession in 1856. The govemment insis1ed that new contract 
with T"moco "would guarantee the treasury the revenues that came from liquor sales 
without serious harm to the interests of the contractor and with little sacrifice for public 
finances. "4 The terms of this new con~ nonetheless, were not very favorable for 
Tmoco because he was made liable to pay 6,00) pesos in damages for the inegular liquor 
deliveries dilling the first half of 1855. The government agreed to reduce the amount of 
liquor that T"moco had to provide during the rest of that year and made other concessions 
in relation to the quality and the price of the product. But the liability to pay fines for 
future shortages of liquor was not eJirnioatcd from the revised contract. 5 
The central issue behind Tmoco's decision to cancel the contract was that the 
government kept demanding the payment of fines as soon u he did not deliver the agreed 
quota of liquor. But the administtation did not pay Tmoco with the same promptness for 
the liquor that was delivered regularly. As a rnatn:r of fact, the government was usually 
behind in the payments of the liquor delivered. 6 Mora's uncompromising attitude that 
forced Tmoco to continue as contractor of the distillery even though he was losing money 
marked the deterioration of the harmonious relations that had existed between them 
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before. The tensions between Ma-a and Tinoco increased in April, 1856, when Tinoco 
requested a government audit of the national distillery account. The reason for that 
request was that the government had kept charging Tmoco damages for the shortage of 
liquor without first calculating the total value of the liquor delivered. Mma responded to 
that request by ordering the suspension of payments to Tmoco for the liquor delivered in 
May and June, 1856, which amounted to 9,000 pesos. The government's excuse for the 
suspension of that payment was that there apparently had been a shortage of five 
thousand bottles of liquor in June.7 The fact that the administration withheld the 
paymentof9,000 pesos enraged Tinoco who alleged that the shortage of liquor, to a great 
extent, was the government's fault. Tinoco bad imported brown sugar from El Salvador 
to solve the problem of the local shon supply but because of the military emergency at 
that ~ he was not able to transpOrt the sugar from Puntarenas to San Jose. By mid-
1856 Costa Rica, in fact, was involved in the war against Walker, and as a result of that 
military emergency the government confiscaa:d the oxcarts that TlDOCO sent to Puntarenas 
to transpcxt the sugar and used them to load arms and supplies for the troops. 8 
Mora's order to suspend the payments for the liquor delivered by Tinoco 
provoked a political incident that has remained a bit obscme in the historical works 
dealing with this period. In mid-June 1856, soon after Mma gave that order, Tmoco and 
his brother-in-law, Francisco Mana Iglesias were anesu:d after the government accused 
them of planning a conspiracy to overthrow Mora. Iglesias was also Tmoco's business 
partner and as such actively participated in the operation of the distillery. The govcmmcnt 
published a document written by lglesiu in which he criticized the administration and 
made serious charges against Mora. These charges went from misappropriating public 
funds, despotism, favoritism, and political pcrsecu~on, to commiting strategical C1TOl'S 
which had increased the death toll during the military confrontations with Walker in 
Nicaragua in March and April, 1856.9 
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After bis arrest, Iglesias defended himself saying that the document that the 
government had published and labeled u a "re'IOlutionary act" was just a piece of paper 
containing personal thoughts that he bad ne\"ef made public. Iglesias declared that he had 
given the document in discussion to Vicente Herrera after be was arrested. Herrera was a 
friend of Iglesias who was a member of the Supreme Court at that time and had a high-
ranking post in one of the military barracb. Acaxding to lgl~ Herrera visited him in 
prison and asked him for the alleged revolutionary proclamation on three different 
opportunities. Herrera told Iglesias that Mora wanted to sec the proclamation "out of 
curiosity" and that the contents of that document were not going to be used against him in 
comt.10 Iglesias trusted Herrera's word and handed over the document. Iglesias declared 
that he was convinced that his reluctance to comply with Mora's request would have 
worsened bis situation. which was already difficulL Men, however, did not honor his 
word and the document wu published u a proof that Iglesias and Tmoco were actually 
involved in a conspiracy against his government. When Iglesias }X'OCl:Sted and declared 
that he had been victim of a bettayal on the pan d Mara. he wu accused of slandering 
the presidenL Court proceedings were bekl to prosecute Iglesias fer that serious charge. 
That this incident ievolved around the clashes of ecanomic interests ielated to the 
liquor payments is brought to light in Iglesias' defense against the slander accusation. 
Iglesias' defense, in fact. wu centered on denying the government's charge that he and 
TlDOCO had purposely delayed the delivery of the liqucr production in order to damage 
the in1aeSU d the public treasury. Iglesias emphasized dial the shortage of liqucr was 
due to problems in the supply of brown sugar to refute the accusation that he and Tmoco 
had instigaied discontent among the people by depriving the treasury of its main source of 
ievenues. Iglesias and Tmoco also bad to defend themselves against the charge that they 
lacb:d patriotism because they bad allegedly refused to deliver liquor to the government in 
a moment when the country desperately needed the earnings from it to finance the war 
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against Wallrzr.11 The coun ne'IU de11en:nintd if IaJesiu and T.moco were guilty of 
conspiring apinst the pemmeilt became Mera ordered the ctisrnt111t m the clmp 
before the judp pw any~ Men, sbowin1 the arlmnrinea dw frequendy 
charadaimi bis political behavior, ordered Tmoco and IaJesiu to leave the coumry 
hrnnrdiau:ty. 'Iberefore TlDOCO and Iglesias IDOYed to GuaremaJa in 1856 and remained 
there until the fall of Men's goyemmcnt.12 
The earnings from liquor sales iD=ased significantly during the fim half of the 
1850s and constituted the main soun:c of revenues of the g0\'el'DJDC11t.13 Mora's 
government, however, was frequently behind in payments to Tmoco even though the 
administration was receiving a subsianrial amount of money fn:m retail sales al ak:cholic 
beverages. The fact that the government financed the implementation of projects that had 
priority in Men's agenda. such u the military build up, with revenues from the liquor 
distillery very likely accounted for those delays in the payments. 'lbe inconveniences 
created by those delays probably .were not very serious or 100 detrimental to Tmoco's 
interests as liquor contractor when the ccnditions of the public treasury were sound. 
TlDOCO received the payments even if it was not at the moment that be sold the liquor. 
Mora's decision to get Costa Rica involYCd in a war in Nicaragua in early 1856 set a 
heavy burden upon the national finances that changed that situation. Mora's reluctance in 
mid-1856 to negotiate an agr=ment with Tinoco in relation to liquor deliveries and his 
decision to withhold the sums of money that the administration owed him indicate that 
the war bad already affected the conditions of the public treasury. The new financial 
burdens increased the government's dependence upon liquor revenues at that critical 
moment up to the point at which it began to affect the interests of Tinoco and.his 
associates. 
The problems faced by Tinoco and his associates during the first half of the 
1850s, nonetheless, did not discourage other members of the elite from participating in 
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the liquor distillery business afterwards. As a matter of fact, the events n:wed to the 
alleged conspiracy of Tinoco and Iglesias took place a few weeks befcre the expiration of 
the their contract which ended officially on July 31, 1856. Bnmo Carranza assumed the 
operation of the distillery u the new conttactor the next day, that is on August 1, 1856. 
~ another prominent member of the elite, was also among Mora's strong and 
loyal suppot leis and served in an adviscry council that Mora appointed in the early 
1850s.14 Like his predecessor Tinoco, Carranza was the only bidder in the public 
auction for the contract to operate the national distillery. This auction was held in May, 
1854, two years before the expiration of Tmoco's contract because the government had 
plans to constrUct a building for the distillcry, which at that time was operating in an old 
warehouse. Consequently, the government wanted the new concessionary to begin 
working well in advance on the design of the building and the importation of new 
distillation equipment. 
Camnza associated with Nicol'5 Saenz. another leading coffee planter and 
merchant, and the French merchant Victor Dujanlin to operate the distillery. The 
govcmment granted Carranza and his partners the right to import exempted from all duties 
the goods necessary to put the new distillery into operation, and agreed to provide the 
containers for delivering the liquor.15 However, for Carranza the operation of the 
distillery was not a business devoid of conflicts and problems. Carranza bad serious 
disagreements with his partner Dujanlin just before their contract with the go\'CffllDCnt 
went into effect. Dujardin bad been the partner in charge c:L purchasing in France the 
distillery equipment to be installed in the new building. This new building was designed 
by Francisco KU1'tZC. a German engineer who resided in Costa Ri~ and who supervised 
its construction by the goYemmCnt. Dujardin bad a coofrontation with Carranza over 
what the former considered as defects in the construction of the ovens in the new 
distillery building and the latter regarded simply as modifications of the original design. 
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Carranza defended the modifications as necessary because the equipment design sent by 
Dujardin from Europe demanded a larger investment than the government could afford. 
Therefore, Kunze as the engineer responsible for the work had made the necessary 
changes in the ovens but without altering the basic design. This disagreement was 
followed by Cmanza's accusations that Dujardin had not purchased the stills and other 
apparatus according to the specifications of the contract and had hired two French experts 
that had not installed the equipment properly .16 These disagreements led Dujardin to 
withdraw his participation in the partnership to operate the distillery. 
But at the same time that Dujardin separated from the operation of the distillery, 
Vicente Aguilar became actively involved in the liquor business as creditor of Bruno 
Camnza. By October, 1856, Carranza had a debt of 9,637 pesos to Aguilar. They 
signed a contract that same month according to which Aguilar loaned Carranza 5,363 
pesos to increase the total amount of the debt to 15,000 pesos. In return for this new 
loan. Carranza gave Aguilar cme eighth part of the contract to supply liquors to the 
government. The document signed by Aguilar and Carranza declared that Aguilar would 
participate in the contract "as much as it would suit his interests", and he would not be 
liable for the financial obligations stipulated in it. These obligations were mainly the 
payment of fines for not meeting the monthly liquor quota:· Aguilar also acquired the 
right to supply the national distillery with up to one fourth of all the brown sugar. honey 
or juices required for the elaboration of liquors. The accord had another very 
advantageaus coodition for Aguilar since it specified that Cammza would pay him a 
higher price f<r these raw materials than he would pay to the other suppliers.17 Aguilar's 
participation in the liqu<r distillery was not limited to supplying large amounts of brown 
sugar dming the time that Carranza was the concessionaire. Aguilar also became an 
important supplier through his commercial firm "Aguilar & Allpress" of some of the 
goods required for the distillation. including the imported stills, drugs, and essences used 
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in the liquors. 
Cammza's contract with the government gave him the right to operate the 
distillery for eight years. But in July, 1859, after only three years in charge of the liquor 
business, Cammza n:quesll:d the cancellation of his obligation. Carranza sent a letter to 
the government explaining that several obstacl~ but mainly the lack of monetary 
rcsomces, prevenll:d him from continuing with the operation of the distillery.18 
Cam.ma was not explicit in the narure of his financial troubles but the fact that his debt to 
Aguilar had increased to about 33,000 pesos by 1859 indicates that he had had to keep 
bonowing money to manage the distillcry.19 
The active involvement that Aguilar had had in the liquor business throughout the 
1850s, and especially the considerable investments that he had in it as Cammza's creditor 
indicate that this was a profitable venture for him. Aguilar's strong interest in the liquor 
business was reflected in the request that be made to the government in 1859 for running 
the distillery after Carranza decided to cancel bis contract. . Aguilar, however, was not 
the only person in1efl:Sted in replacing Cmanza. The official document that cancelled 
Cammza's liquor contract , in fact, pointed out that two people, Vicente Aguilar and 
Carlos Salazar bad made offers to the government to manage the national distillery. This 
public document declared the government had discussed both proposals and rejected 
Aguilar's because the offer made by Carlos Salu.ar "had more advantages for the public 
treasury. "20 This document did not elaborate on the tenns of Aguilar's proposal to 
supply liquor to the government or on why Salazar's was more advantagCOUS. 
The contract that Salazar signed with the government stated that he was acting on 
behalf of Leomo De Vars and Leopoldo Mouren, two French-born merchants residents in 
San Jose. Salazar,~ soon after signing the contract to run the distillery transferred 
to De Vars and Mouren all the rights and obligations stipulall:d in it. Consequently, De 
Vars and Mouren got the concession to run the national distillery for eight years, 
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beginning on August 1, 1859. They assumed the obligation to pay the former contractor 
Carranza 54,000 pesos in several installments f<r the distillery equipment, drugs, raw 
marerials and other articles that were in the plant's facilities. As the new contractors, De 
Vars and Momen also assumed also the obligation to pay Cananza's debts with the firm 
"Aguilar & Allpress", and with other people. This new conttact stipulated as well that 
at the end of the eight-year period, the private contractors would hand all equipment and 
apparatus of the distillery over to the government and those would become property of 
the state. The contractors would receive a compensation of 15,000 pesos in monthly 
installments of 2,000 pesos as payment for the cquipmenL21 
The issue of Mora's participation in the business of the liquor distillery during the 
1850s came to light after the fall of his government and revolved around this contract 
signed in 1859 by Salazar, De Vars and Momcn. A.fta Mora was ovenhrown, he was 
accused of corruption and favcritism. These charges were illustrated by pointing out that 
Mora had received 20,000 pesos in cash from the individuals who bid fer the liquor 
contract in 1859. The payment allegedly was made by these individuals to receive more 
advantageous conditions in the terms of their contract with the government 22 This 
accusation, however, pointed out not only Mora's corruption but also the wrongdoing on 
the part of the liquor contractors since it added that, thanks to the gratuity granted to 
Mora, they had obtained a concession that was largely detrimental to the public 
treasury. 23 
The suggestion that the liquor contractors, who were leading members of the elite, 
had been accomplices of Mora's unethical behavior by ~lying with his demands made 
necessary a clarification. This clarification, which appeared in the newspaper Nueya Era 
did not mention Leonzo De Vars, Leopoldo Mouren, or Carlos Salazar by name. 
Nonetheless, it pointed out that the individuals who got the liquor contract in 1859 were 
not at fault for the damage that Mora's corruption had caused the public treasury. The 
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explanatory remada emphamed that these concessionaires probably were not aware of 
the secret maneuvcrings through which the 20,000 pesos entered into Mora's private 
treasury. That commentary argued that the money was included in the 54,000 pesos that 
the new cootracton paid to Bruno Cammza fer the distillery equipment and other 
apparatus. The clarification in the newspaper implied that because the transference of 
money took place through Men's "secret maneuverings," De Vars, Mouren y Salazar 
did not know about the payment of that compensation. The explanatory note 
underscored that the intended purpose of elaborating on the issues related to the liqucr 
distillery was to elucidate the truth about Mora's COffllption and not to offend the people 
involved in that particular contract. 24 This clarification implied that Cmanza knew 
about the deviation of the 20,000 pesos but excluded him from any wroodoing by 
describing him also u a victim of Mora's abuses of power. 
This accusation about the payment of a gratuity to Men in remm for the liquor 
contract was accompanied by other charges about his participation in the business. These 
charges claimed that Mora bad managed to have considerable involvement in all the 
contracts granted to private concessionaires to run the distillery during the 1850s as 
supplier of sugar cane from his plantations in Alajuela. The only evidence of this, 
however, is a document that shows that between 1857 and 1858 Mora had sold 5,155 
quintals of brown sugar to the distillery for 23,199 pesos. 25 The documents of the 
contracts did not have any reference to that issue but it is very likely that there had been 
verbal or private agreements in relation to it. This tendency tD present the liquor 
contractors as victims of Mora's misuse of public funds is challenged by the fact that 
when T1DOCO and Camm.a got the contract they were very close to him and they profited 
along with Mora and others from that business when conditions of the public treasury 
were good. Certainly, regardless ofTmoco's and Carranza's having obtained the liquor 
contract in a public auction, they were the only bidders and the procedures suggest that 
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the auction was merely a formality to Jegaliz a previous agreement with Mora. The main 
accusation that Mora had the practice of borrowing money at will from the treasury of 
the national distillery very likely became an issue of confflct only after 1857 when the 
national treasury was almost depJeted.26 
There was another very important aspect involved in the issue of the 20,000 peso 
bribe. By accepting that payment Mora took the operation of the national distillery away 
from Aguilar. Aguilar's strong interest in running the distillery indicates that regardless 
of the problems related to the supply of brown sugar, Mora's mismanagement from the 
revenues of liquor sales, and other difficulties the enccrprise was still profitable in 1859. 
Aguilar already had considerable investments in the liquor business and inf onnation in the 
notarial records points out that he had very solid capital which would have enabled him to 
overcome the financial obstacles in the operation of the distillery that had compelled bis 
debtor Carranza to cancel bis contract with the government. Once those obstacles were 
O\ICICOIDC Aguilar could have profited from the business. But the financial prospects that 
Aguilar might have had concerning the distillery were frustrated by Mora's rejection of 
his bid. By 1859, the friendship that in the past had brought Mora and Aguilar together 
in a business partnership h:ld turned into animosity as a result of a lawsuit filed by Mora 
against Aguilar two years bcfa-e. The biucmess aeated by that lawsuit put Mora in a 
position in which he was not going to use bis power for the economic benefit of his 
former business panner and give him the contract that he wanted. Aguilar was not 
willing to pay a gratuity to Mora either for the liquor contract if that were a condition for 
obtaining it. Mora was overconfident about his political power by the late 18SOs and did 
not anticipate that bis refusal to accept Aguilar's bid was going to precipitate the fall of his 
government. Aguilar was a very influential person who had significant reasons to resent 
Mora both as a private person and as president. The loss of the liquor contract provided 
an additional and very important reason for Aguilar's discontent toWards Mora and turned 
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him into the centtal figure behind the coup that overthrew the president. It was not 
coincidence that the military coup took place two weeks after Maa granted the liquor 
contract to Salazar, De Vars and Mouren. 
The operation of the national distillery during the 1850s illustrau:s that the active 
involvement of the coffee planters and merchants as private en~neurs in the 
implementation of key points of their political agenda was a source of both consensus 
and conflict. Mora established the national distillery to serve as the main source of the 
revenues that the government needed for projects such as the construction of roads, 
which would fosccr the growth of coffee expons. Many leading members of the elite 
strongly suppcn:d the creation of the distillery because it represented an excellent 
opportunity to obtain profits from a lucrative business. However, the accomplishment 
of the general goals of the elite entered into conflict with the fulfilment of the particular 
goals of the liquor contractors when problems such as the iJTegular supply of brown 
sugar created liquor shortages. Because the government largely depended upon liquor 
revenues to fulfill its main tasks it fined the conttactors for those shortages and that 
significantly reduced their profits. The financial crisis of the late 1850s and Mora's 
increasing reluctance to negodalc mangcments with the contractors regarding fines 
aggravated the conflicts of interests. The clashes that emerged from the operation of the 
distillery, in fact, turned the liquor business into one of the pivotal issues in the shifts of 
political alliances and loyalties that characterized the politics of the Mora yem. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TiiE ESTABLISHMENT AND BRJEF HISTORY 
OF 1HE NATIONAL BANK 
The growth of export agriculture required the support of a financial infrastructure 
that Costa Rica lacked by the mid-nineteenth century. During the first half of the 1850s 
the revenues generated by the government's monopoly on liquor sales managed to make 
up for that lack. Those revenues provided Mora's government with a steady source of 
funds that enabled the implementation of important measures aimed at promoting the 
development of coffee expcxts. The .military campaigns.fought in Nicaragua against 
William Walker in 1856 and early 1857, however, imposed a heavy financial b~_!! on 
the public treasury which exhausU:d almost completely its resources at the same time that 
created a substantial dcficiL 
The financial crisis brought about by the military campaigns against W aJker 
hampered the government's ability to defray its basic expenses, stt>pped the 
implementation of some important points of Mora's agenda and aggravated the problem 
of the lack of currency. That financial aisis, in fact, transformed the establishment of a 
b~ into an unpostponable project. The implementation of this project, nonetheless. 
encountered several obstacles which made this bank a financial institution with a very 
short life. M~ indeed, had problems obtaining capital abroad for the bank to begin its 
operations, and was not able to attT3Ct invesun at home. While most of the leading 
members of the elite were aware that the expansion of coffee exports demanded the 
creation of a bank. they did not support this project because the government would be the 
major stockholder. 
By the late 1850s Mora had begun to show an increasing tendency towards the 
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monopolization of political power in an attempt to solve his own financial troubles wiLIJ 
the help of the scarce public funds. The government's active participation in the bank 
opened a new avenue for Mora's misuse of his political power in ways that were 
beneficial for him but not so advantageous for the elite in general. Consequently, the 
majority of the elite did not want to get involved in the business of the bank. There was, 
however, a handful of coffee plantcr3 and men:hants who did strongly suppon Mora's 
idea of establishing a bank and invested in this project. 
The bankruptcy of a British commercial firm that had had financial links to this 
bank gave rise to a business dispute between two of the main investors in Costa Rica 
which forced its closure after b~ly a year in operation. Mora's participation in the bank 
as head of the government and as private investor got him involved in that business 
dispute as well. The clashes of economic interests that resulted from this business 
dispute were so strong that they played a crucial role in the fall of Mora's government in 
1859. The analysis of the brief history of the bank established by Mora and the business 
dispute that resulted from its failure contributes in clarifying a very important issue of the 
political conflict that motivated the overthrow of his administration. Moreover, that 
examination illustrates how the endeavor of ;he coffee planter and merchant elite to use 
the public treasury to obtain compensations for economic losses hindered the achievement 
of long-term goals that would have helped it to cope with those losses more effectively. 
The implementation of Mora's plan of establishing an issuing bank revolved 
around the figure of Crisanto Medina. an Argentine-born merchant resident of Costa 
Rica. Medina. who was a personal friend of Mora, had an import and export firm in the 
pon of Pun~nas through which he had established business connections abroad. Mora 
regarded Medina's connections with foreign commercial firms as an important channel for 
obtaining capital abroad to establish the bank. Therefore, Mora negotiated a contract with 
Medina towards that end in July, 1857. Medina committed himself to looking for 
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investors in Europe and the United States for a bank that would open its doors on January 
1. 1858. 
The contract between Medina and the goyemmcnt stipulased that the bank would 
open with an initial capital of 250,000 pesos and that it could be enlarged to a maximun of 
one million pesos. The gtWCl1UDCllt granted Medina the exclusive right to operate the 
bank for a period of twenty years. which could be extended if both parties agreed. The 
bank would charge one percent per month interest, which was the maximum stipulated by 
law. The government would have credit in the bank up to the equivalent of the fourth 
part of all the bank notes in circulation. Also the government would receive ten ~nt of 
the bank's profits at the end of each year. The bank would be able to sell stock to private 
individuals for the equivalent of a quarter of all its capital.1 
Soon after signing that contract, Medina traveled to Europe and the United States 
in scan:h of potential investors for the bank. Regardless of his efforts, Medina was only 
able to attract one foreign investor, John Carmichael. a British mcchant established in 
Uverpool. Medina's connections with Carmichael dated back to the we 1840s when they 
both were involved in a project to establish a colony of foreign settlers on Costa Rica's 
Atlantic coast.2 That settlement was never established but Carmichael was able to 
develop some commercial links in Central America during the 1850s. 
Carmichael agreed on providing an eighth of the total capital with which the bank 
would begin its operation. That was an important investment but not enough to establish 
the bank. Therefore, Medina and Mora modified the tJ:rms of the contract signed in July, 
1857, to make the government a partner in the bank and to encourage the purchase of 
stock in the bank among local investors. This revised contract signed in Decembcr,1857, 
stipulated that government would take one fourth of the stocks of the bank. which was 
scheduled to begin operations no later than February 1, 1858.3 
The national treasury was almost depleted by 1857 and C!Jllscquently there were 
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no funds u, invest in the bank. The government of~ however, had granted Mora a 
loan of 18,541 pounds sterling which were the equivalent of about 100,<XX> Costa Rican 
pesos, in July 1857. This loan WU originally intended to defray the expenses of the 
military campaigns in Nicaragua. Even though the Peruvian Congress appro~ the loan 
to Mora's government in mid-1857 several circumstances delayed the deli~ of the 
money. This 1~ ~ ani~ in Costa Rica several months after Walker 
sunendercd and the war in Nicaragua was over.4 Consequently, Mora decided to use 
that money u, pay for the quarter part of the stock that the government would own in 
Medina's bank. 
The date on which the bank would begin operations, nonethel~ had to be 
postpalCd one more time because it wu not until April,1858 when the Costa Rican 
government finally recei~ the money from the .Peruvian loan. Mora's Minister of 
Fman~ Jos6 Mana Cadas and Crisantt> Medina signed a new contract fer the creation of 
the bank on June 1, 1858. According to the tmns of this contract Medina obtained the 
exclusive right to establish a bank for a period' of twenty years. The capital of the bank 
would be 100,000 pesos and it could inc:n:ased u, one million pesos through the sale of 
stock. The government would borrow half of the initial capital of the bank. that is 
50,000 pesos, and would pay interest of one percent per month. The government 
would also have the right to borrow half of the capital that would enter in the bank in the 
future from the stock sales. 
The Banco Nacional Cmtarric;eng • as the bank was named. would have the 
power to issue and put into circulation bank noces in a number that would be double the 
sum of the cash in hand This ability was granted in compensation for the right of the 
government to bolTow half of the bank's capital. The bank notes would be signed and 
sealed by the govc:mment and they would be accepted u cash and with preference to 
other documents in all government offices. The bank would also have the right to take 
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deposits from the public and would be exemp1l:d from all taxes and contributions, even in 
case of war.5 
On June 1s, 1858, Medina announced in the newspaper OJSoiq de Costa, Rica, 
that the bank bad opened its ~ and he inviled the public to buy s10Cks at 100 pesos 
each. He also held meetings with the leading coffee planters and merchants to 
encourage them to invest in the newly established bank. Medina tried to sell stock in the 
bank by emphasizing that it would become the main financial agent fer coffee cultivation 
and other major agricultural ventures and for all commercial activities. Medina pointed 
out that the all the revenues of the public treasury would enter into the bank which would 
administer and invest those funds according to the government's plans. 6 The idea that all 
public funds would be conccntratcd in the bank provoked.a negative reaction among the 
main circles of the elite. Most coffee planters and merchants were toWly opposed to the 
idea of a bank that tacitly would put all public funds in the bands of Mora as the head of 
the govcmmcnt and Medina as one of the majcr S10Ckholders. 
There was consensus among the elite about the idea of creating an issuing bank 
to solve the problem of the lack of currency and to assist the government in its task as the 
promotor of the growth of export agriculture. However, by 1858 Mora's political 
behavior had changed substantially as a result of~ endeavcr to recover from the 
financial reversal that forced him to sell several important properties the previous year. 
The resolute attitude with which Mora had handled problems earlier in his administration 
had turned into a despotic OllC amid the national financial crisis since he had began to 
abuse of his power in an attempt to utilize the scarce public resources exclusively on his 
benefit. Therefore, the discontent of the majority of the elite towards the administration of 
Mora was growing because it had turned increasingly "despotic, demanding and was 
constantly shon of money."7 Most of the members of the elite, to be sure, were not 
willing to support a bank that would facilitate Mora's misuse of public funds and provide 
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him with another reason to tty to remain in power indefinitely. 
Likewise, the prominent coffee plamas and merchants disttus1l:d Medina's 
capacity to manage the bank properly became of bis close connections with Men. That 
some members of the elite dislibd Medina was also very imp«tant in their reluctance to 
invest in the bank. Acccrding to one contemp01my source, Medina regardless of his 
eloquence, was not able to attract large numbers of invesurs to his bank because "he was 
not popular in the business circle since he had a violent character, was pretentious and 
had a tendency to disdain those who did not agree with him. "8 The circumstance that 
Medina was a foreigner and not fully integrated into the small group of closely-related 
families that made up the elite also contributed to the rejection. That same source poinu:d 
out that if Medina had been "the appropriate person," that is one who had had the trust of 
the business circle, he would been able to gather the 100,000 pesos that he needed for 
the bank and maybe even more.9 
The distrust and rejection of the maj<Xity of the elite towards the bank was 
retlec11:d in the fact that only fourteen people bad bought stock in the bank by the time it 
began operations in June, 1858. These local investors were Juan Rafael Mora, the 
Bishop Anselmo Llorente, Jos6 Maria Cas~ Jos6 Maria Canas, Demettio Iglesias, 
Mateo Mora, Luciano Peralta, Manuel Antano Bonilla, Anacleta Mayorga. the firm 
"T'moco & Co.," Ram6n M~ Carlos Giralt. Domingo Calderon and Manuel Ma'a.10 
John Carmichael was still the only prospective fcxeign inYeS101' by the time that the bank 
opened. Certainly, in July, 1858, Carmichael gave Olders to 1os6 Guardiola, the agent 
that his firm had in C"•oarcrnata, to travel to Costa Rica to inquin: about the operation of the 
bank. Carmichael told Guardiola that if he found that the bank was operating properly he 
should buy stock in it for 30,000 pesos.11 
The money loaned by Peru, which would be used to pay for the government's 
stock in the bank, had been sent in a draft issued by the British finn of Anthony Gibbs. 
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Mora gave Medina that draft for 18, 541 pounds S1erling and entrusted him to cash it 
through the firm in Great B~tain that had emitted it. Medina, nonetheless, enda'sed that 
draft to John Carmichael instead of cashing it. There was no need to eDdone the draft to 
Cannichael but Medina probably regarded that u a convenient way to transfer the money 
from Great Britain to Costa Rica using Carmichael's commercial channels. Medina took 
the equivalent of 10,000 Costa Rican pesos in cash from the 18,541 pounds S1Crling and 
left the rest of the money deposited with Carmichael's firm in Liverpool. Medina's 
agreement with Carmichael stipulated that the former would draw drafts in Costa Rica 
and those would be paid from the sum deposited with the latter in Great Britain.12 
The contract that Medina signed with the government stipulated that the bank need 
at least 50,000 pesos to begin operation and issue banknotes. The bank, however, 
began operations with 16,000 pesos and Carmichael's promise to invest 30,000 pesos. 
Medina and Men were confident that Carmichael would very soon send the capital that 
he had promised to invest in the bank. Hence, the bank began to issue banknotes and put 
them into circulation even though there was no substantial cash deposited to endorse them 
yct.13 The financial situation of John Carmichael, however, was not very solid by the 
time that he committed himself as one of the most important investors of the bank. 
~ by early October, 1858, the 30,000 pesos that Carmichael had promised to invest 
had not yet entered into the bank's safe even though it had begun operations four months 
before. 
By that time Medina had already begun to suspect that the delay in Carmichael's 
investment was an indication that this British merchant had financial troubles. 
Consequently, when Medina received a notification that Carmichael had temporarily 
suspended the payment of the drafts that he had drawn on the account that the Costa 
Rican government had with Carmichael's firm in Liverpool, he became increasingly 
womcd. As a result of that notification Medin~ as president of the b~ called a 
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meeting of stockholders on October 1, 1858, and expressed his fears that the financial 
problems of Carmichael could lead to a bankruptcy of the British firm. Medina 
announced in that meeting that he had requescect JOl6 Guardiola. Carmichael's agent in 
Guatemala. to give him a wriucn guarantee that the capital deposited in Liveipool on 
behalf of the Costa Rican government would be piocec:ted in case Carmichael went into 
bankruptcy.14 
At that time Guardiola was in Cmta Rica where he bad tra.Veled following 
Carmichael's orders to carry out some bank-related business. Guardiola took with him a 
letter of introduction and a letter of credit addressed to "Tmoco & Co." that he delivered 
to Demetrio Iglesias who was the manager of that firm. The two panners of the firm 
"Tmoco and Co." were Satumino Tinoco and Franci3co Marla Iglesias but they were 
residing in Guaaemala in exile in 1858. Tinoco and Iglesias. therefore, bad granted 
Dcmetrio Iglesias, who wu Francisco's brother and Satmnino's brother-in-law, power 
of attorney and entrusted him with the administration of their businesses in Costa Rica. 
Guardiola contacted Demettio Iglesias because "Tmoco & Co." was one of Carmichael's 
clients and the British merchant wanted to use that local cOOllDtlcial firm as an 
intermediary in the purchase of stock in the bank. Guardiola, indeed. requested "Tinoco 
and Co." to give 30,000 pesos to Medina on behalf of Carmichael to pay his part of the 
stock in the bank.15 
"Tmoco & Co." had not given Medina that sum by the time that the meeting of 
stockholders was held. However, Demetrio Iglesias offered to work out an agn:cment 
with Guardiola to ~t the sum coaesponding to Carmichael's stock in the bank and 
to guarantee that the money deposited in Liverpool would be protected against an ~tual 
bankruptcy .16 The document that Iglesias signed with Guardiola on October 2, 1858, 
stipulated that "Tmoco & Co." would give Medina S0,000 pesos in the "unlikely and 
unforeseen" event that the drafts that Medina had drawn on the account that he had with 
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John Carmichael's firm were returned unpaid.17 The document stated that the 30,000 
pesos of Carmichael's stock in the bank would be covered from those 50,000 pesos. 
Likewise it was pointed out that the additional 20,000 pesos wou1d be subtracted from the 
debit that ''Tinoco & Co." had with Carmichael.18 
Medina's suspicions about the financial situation of Carmichael's firm were well• 
grounded. Indeed, several days after Iglesias signed the document with Guardiola the 
drafts that Medina had drawn on the account with Carmichael began to be sent back to 
him unpaid. These drafts were returned accompanied by a statement that their payment 
had been refused by Carmichael and that Medina was liable for resulting damages and 
losses. The news of Carmichael's bankruptcy arrived along with the retmncd drafts.19 
Thcrefcre, the document signed by "Tmoco & Co." guaranteeing the payment of 50,000 
pesos to Medina came into effect from the moment that it was confirmed that the 
Carmichael firm was insolvent. 
Contrary to what Medina expected, Demetrio Iglesias refused to comply with the 
obligation of paying him the 50,000 pesos. Iglesias argued that the document that he 
signed with Guardiola on October 2, 1858 did not make ''Tmoco & Co." responsible for 
any payment since that document was not a draft or a bond Medina made Iglesias a 
proposal of an arrangement through which "Tinoco & Co." would loan him 50,000 pesos 
for a shon term period to keep the bank in business. Medina told Iglesias that if ''Tinoco 
& Co.", loaned him that sum of money, the document of October would be invalidated. 
Iglesias did not accept this request and firmly maintained his position that ''Tmoco and 
Co." did not have any financial obligation with Medina.20 
In view of the reluctance of "Tmoco & Co." to fullfil its financial obligation, 
Medina tiled a suit in court for the payment of the 50,000 pesos. This lawsuit has been 
regarded traditionally as one of the events that provoked the overthrow of Mora's 
govemment.21 Despite that this lawsuit has not been the focus of any detailed study. 
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The tendency to emphasiz the epic aspects of the war against William Walker has 
coottibuted to leaving unclear an issue that is pivocal for a beuer understanding of the 
nature of the elite's sttuggle for the control of the govemmem. 
Medina .tiled the lawsuit in December, 1858, through his lawyer Lcremo 
Mootufar. Julwl Volio, who was TlllOCO's son-in-law and cousin of Francisco and 
Demettio Iglesias, defended the interests of "TlllOCO & Co." in that suit. "Tmoco & Co." 
presented all the legal arguments imaginable in an auempt to avoid the payment of the 
50,000 pesos to Medina. Volio argued initially that Demettio Iglesias as manager of the 
firm 'Tinoco & Co." did not have the legal capacity to sign the agreement of October 2, 
1858, with Carmichael's agent, Jose Guardiola. That was the document that made 
"Tinoco and Co." liable for paying Medina part of his capital if Carmichael went into 
bankruptcy. After it was demonstrated that Iglesias had been granted power of attorney 
by "TlDOCO and Co," and therefore could legally sign the agxeemcnt, Volio claimed that 
the document did not constitute a bond or guarantee of any obligation. The evidence 
presented by Medina's lawyer refuted this argument. The laywe:r of "Tinoco & Co.," 
therefore, bad to acknowledge in view of that evidence that the document in discussion, 
in fact, established a financial obligation to Medina. Nonethel~ Volio contended that 
Medina had used deceitful means to convince Iglesias to sign the document with 
Guardiola. 22 
Regardless of Volio's attemptS to portray Demettio Iglesias as a naive person 
who had been a victim of Medina's schemes, Iglesias was surely aware of the legal 
implications of the document that be signed with Guardiola. Iglesias was a laywe:r and 
had a good knowledge of the business of "Tmoco & Co" because he had been the firm's 
book.keeper for several years. Moreover, Iglesias had manifested publicly his 
willingness to reach an agreement with Carmichacrs agent reprding the guarantee of the 
capital deposited in Great Britain. That agreement had been discussed and supported by 
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other stockholders, among them Jose Mana Castro who was a prominentjmiscult.23 
Those facts demonstrau:d that Volio's claims wen: p-oundless and indicate also that 
"Tmoco & Co." had strong motives to go as far u suggesting that Demcttio Iglesias had 
surpassed the legal powers granted by bis relatives to manage their business. Central in 
those motives was the effon to conceal that Iglesias had signed the conttact with 
Guardiola because the agreement promised to be economically very advantageous for the 
firm. 
As a matter of fact, Carmichael's decision to invest in the bank that Medina 
established on behalf of the government was welcomed with enthusiasm by ''Tmoco & 
Co." This firm had done business on a regular basis with Carmichael and had a 
substantial debt with him which was the result of several cash and merchandise advances. 
Indeed, by mid· 1858, Carmichael had extended the credit of "Tinoco and Co." to 8,000 
pounds sterling, which were the equivalent of 41,500 Costa Rican pesos. Carmichael's 
participation in the bank wouJd faciliwc the fulfillment of the credit obliguioos that 
Tmoco & Co. had with him. The local connections with Carmichael would contribute to 
overcoming the commercial limitations imposed by the low level of development of 
Costa Rica's financial infrastructure by the mid•ninetcenth cenrury. The absence of a 
financial infrastructure frequently made it difficult for the coffee planters and merchants to 
pay for their obligations with the forei~ mainly British. creditors. They had to 
purchase drafts in pounds sn:rling which had been drawn by foreign merchants and were 
in circulation in Costa Rica to be able to pay their debts with the ca:nmcrciaJ firms abroad. 
Commonly it was not easy to obtain drafts negotiable abroad since there was not a large 
number of them in circulation in Costa Rica. 24 
Carmichael's involvement in the bank would make less expensive and less risky 
the transference of money for his debtor "Tmoco & Co." since the firm would be able to 
pay its debts with Costa Rican pesos. The decision of "Tmoco & Co." to give 
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Guardiola the 30,000 pesos to purchase suxk in the bank on behalf of Carmichael 
actually constituted a partial payment of its credit with this British merchant.25 The fact 
I 
that the contract between Iglesias and Guardiola implicitly meant the opening of more 
direct channel of credit for "Tmoco and Co." has not been brought into light in works that 
refer to the dispute between that finn and Medina. regardless of its imp<XtanCe for 
understanding the issues behind the lawsuit. 26 
Another indication that Carmichael's pmticipation in the bank would be 
advantageous fer the partners of "Tmoco & Co." was their active involvement in the 
creation of that financial institution which the majority of the elite had decided not to 
suppa:t. Francisco Iglesias and Satmnino Tmoco had bad serious clashes with Mora in 
1856, had suffered some degree of political persecution as a result of the supposed plan 
to overthrow his gm,:mment, and had been forced to leave Costa Rica by orders of 
Mora. Nevertheless, the firm of Iglesias and Tmoco was among the investcri in the 
bank along with odler prominent members of their family and in-laws. The investors in 
the Medina's bank, indeed constituted two groups, one centered around Mora which 
included three of bis relatives and a few other people close to his administration. The 
other group revolved around the Iglesias family and included the Bishop Ucrente, who 
was the uncle of Francisco and Demetria Iglesias and Jose Mana Castro. The 
directorate of the bank. in fact, was made up of Crlsanto Medina as ~ Miguel 
Mora. the president's brother, as cashier and first accountant, and Demetrio Iglesias as 
second accountant and bookkeeper.Z7 
Far "TlDOCO & Co." the pmchase of stock in the bank established by Medina in 
close association with Mora was a business that held the promise of being very 
advantageous. However, a combination of adverse circumstances turned it into one that 
gcDCl"l.led substantial economic losses. In fact, Carmichael's bankruptcy proceedings 
placed a temparary embargo over a shipment of coffee that belonged to "Tmoco & Co." 
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and was deposited in the warehouse of Carmichael's firm in UverpooL28 Francisco 
Mana Iglesias was in Europe in mid-1858 conducting business in France and Great 
Britain. Iglesias had made an agreement with Carmichael for the ttansportation to Costa 
Rica of merchandise Iglesias bad bought on behalf of bis WiillDtiCW firm. "TlilOCO & 
Co." cxi,ected the merchandise to anive in Puntarenas by December,1858. This 
merchadise was already on board the ship that was going to Costa Rica when Carmichael 
went into bankruptcy. The ship and its cargo were also temporarily embargoed by the 
trustees of the bankruptcy proceedings. The embargo placed on the ship delayed for a 
few months its arrival in Puntarenas. "Tmoco & Co." lost the opportunity to sell out the 
cargo during December, which according to the firm, was the best time of the year for 
doing it, and a very good month to get a lower freight charge to transpcxt the cargo from 
the coast to the interior. In fact, by mid-February, 1859, "Tmoco & Co." was still 
awaiting the arrival of the ship carrying merchandise valued at more than ~00 pounds 
sterling. 29 
The losses of "Tmoco & Co." resulting from Carmichael's bankruptcy also 
included 10,000 pesos lost after a frec7.e of assets was ordered by the court when Medina 
filed the suit The court froze over 90,000 pesos in merchandise in the store of ''Tinoco 
and Co." in San Jose and over 70,000 pesos in assets, promissory notes, bonds, and 
certificates of the public debt held by the firm. Even though, the merchandise was 
returned to "TlDOCO & Co." after the judge decided the lawsuit with Medina in June, 
1859, the losses came from the fact that the merchandise was frozen for several months 
preventing the firm from selling it during that period. 
The coun ruled in favor of Medina and ordered an auction of the frozen 
certificates and bonds of the public debt to pay the so.~ pesos that ''Tinoco & Co." 
owed to Medina. The certificates and bonds had a face value of 57, 754.52 pesos. They 
were awarded to Medina in June, 1859 for half of the value, that is for 29 ,m .26 pesos 
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because there were no bidders in the auction.30 
The adjudication of these negotiable documents to Medina implied that he was 
able to recover part of the bank's capital that be had deposi1ed with Carmichael thanks to 
the court's niling that forced "Tinoco & Co." to fulfill the obligation contnlC1ed with 
Guanliola in 1858. Medina. however, did not recover the capital in cash. Consequently, 
there was not enough cur:rency in the bank's safe to endorse the bank notes in circulation. 
In addition to this, Medina had taken what little capital was in the bank and part of his 
own to pay all the drafts that were returned unpaid when Carmichael went into 
bankruptcy, plus interests and damages.31 
Medina's failure to obtain cash from "Tinoco & Co" made impossible the re-
opening of the bank, which had been forced to close in late March, 1859, as he cxpcc1ed. 
The financial failure of the firm of the prospccti~ foreign investor, the lack of strong 
• suppcxt from the local commercial circ~ and the business dispute between "TlllOCO & 
Co." in fact, precipitated the closure of a bank whose foundations had been weak from 
the beginning. The difficulties confron1ed by that bank, nonethel~ did not make Mora 
desist from his plan of establishing a financial institution 
As a matter of fact, Mora signed a contract towards that end on August 4,1859 
with Crisanto Medina, on behalf of the firm "Medin.a & Sons." By virtue of this contract 
the government would receive 9,798.50 pesos in promissory noces. and 40,201.50 
pesos in certificates from ''Medina & Sons" as if they were casb.32 These negotiable 
documents would be deposited in the Adminim::w;i6n Principal, which was the 
governmental office that collected all the re~mJCS of the public treasury. Once the 
documents were recei~ as cash they would yield a monthly interest of one percent 
wluch would be paid to "Medina & Sons" yearly. 1bcsc promissory notes and 
certificalCS would become part of the capital with which the new bank would begin its 
operations. Medina got a document stating that the government owed the firm "Medina & 
94 
Sons" S0,000 pesos, and that he was entitled to receive that amount plus interests in cash 
if the bank was not established after a period of one year. 33 1bc project to establish 
another bank. however, could not be implemented during the ~nment of Mora 
because he was overthrown on August 14, 1859, ten days after signing the contract with 
"Medina & Sons." 
Even though that contract never went into effect it was used by the partners of the 
firm "Tinoco & Co." as an instrument to obtain compensations from the public treasury 
for the losses that resulted from the agreement with Carmichael and the failure of the 
bank. The partners of that firm managed to obtain those compensations through the 
political influence derived from the high-ranking public offices that Francisco Iglesias and 
Julian Volio held in the administrations thai followed Mora's. The significance of this 
issue for explaning and understanding the ccnttal argument of this study makes it 
necessary to extend the discussion of the business dispute between Medina and Tinoco 
beyond the fall of Mora's govcmmcnt. 
By August, 1859, when Mora was overthrown, the dispute between Medina and 
Tinoco had not been completely settled. The court ruling of June of that year awarded 
Medina certificates and hoods for a total value of less than 30,000 pesos. Hence, 
"Tmoco & Co," was still owing Medina more than 20,000 after those certificates and 
bonds were handed over to the latter by the judge. Medina had a meeting with Juli4n 
Volio, in his capacity as lawycrof "Tmoco & Co." on August 13, 1859, the day before 
Mora was ousted. to reach an agreement about matters still pending in relation to the 
dispute. According to ~ be proposed several solutions to Volio, who took with 
him the documents drafted in that meeting and promised to contact him the following day 
with his answer. Medina declared that he never heard from Volio after the coup and that 
all his attempts to reach an agreement with "Tmoco and Co." were fruitless after that. 34 
The main reason behind the refusal of "Tmoco & Co." to settle the pending 
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matters with Medina after the OYCrtbrow of Men was that the change in goyemment 
tipped the balance of power to the side of its panners. Iglesias and Volio u members of 
the Cabinet of Jose! Mana Montealegre, Mora's successor, cenainly, put the political and 
legal apparatus at the service of their interests. Iglesias and Volio were able to obtain a 
nullification of the court ruling that ordetM "Tmoco & Co." to pay the 50,000 pesos to 
Medina and also managed to receive that sum plus interests from the public treasury. 
The series of legal actions that led to the misappropriation of public funds by 
''Tinoco & Co." began soon after Mora wu ovenhrown. On September 13, 1859, the 
new president Montealegre halted the execution of the decree of August 4 of that year.35 
This wu the decree that fcxmalized the contract through which the finn "Medina & Sons" 
would receive cash for the 50,000 pesos in negotiable documents that it had deposited in 
the public treasury. Montealegre justified that order by saying that the contract between 
Mora and "Medina & Sons" was detrimental to the public treasury since Mora's 
government had accepted those certificases and bonds at their nominal value when their 
real value was lower. There were, to be sure, many irregularities in the contract between 
Mora and ''Medina & Sons," the most important of which was the acceptance of the 
certificates u if they were cash. Taking into account these irregularities Montealegre's 
decision was widely justified. The government was entitled to break the contract and 
keep the certificaies and bonds u assets in the public treasury because in some way they 
could make up fcx the capital of the Peruvian loan which Mora had given to Medina to 
open the bank and which was lost when Carmichael went into bankruptcy. 
Mon1ealegre's order to halt the payment of interest to Medina over the certificates 
deposited with the government, however, did not repair the damage that the contract in 
discussion caused to the public treasury. On the contrary that order served for a 
considerable misappropriation of money from public funds. This order, indeed, 
prepared the terrain for ''Tmoco & Co." to appeal to the Supreme Court for the 
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nullification of the niling of June, 1859 that had made the firm liable to pay Medina 
50,000 pesos. The appeal was followed by a petition of "Tmoco & Co." to freeze the 
certificates and bonds that Mora's government had n:ceived from "Medina & Soos." The 
court accepted the request of "Tmoco & Co." in October,1861, despi1e that the appeal 
under way of the lawsuit between Medina and "Tmoco & Co.," and the contract between 
"Medina & Sons" and Mora's government were legally two ditfenmt mancrs.36 
The Supreme Court declared null and void the decision of the lawsuit between 
Medina and "Tinoco & Co." dictated during Mora's government. Consequently, the 
Supreme Court ordered the return of the certificates and bonds given to Medina in 1859 
to their <Xiginal holders, that is to "Tinoco & Co. ".'37 The political maneuvering of 
Iglesias and Volio, undoubtedly. was pivotal in the Supreme Court's nullification of the 
argument that the decision was biased because the judge who had nilcd in the lawsuit in 
IIrid-1859 was Manuel Argilello, Mora's nephew. Argilello allegedly had favored the 
interests of his uncle's friend Medina in the lawsuit and had forced "TlDOCO & Co." to 
pay an obligation for which the firm was not responsible. Nonetheless, Argiiello's 
ruling was not biased because it was demonstrated in court that Medina had all the legal 
rights to request the payment of the 50,000 pesos to "Tmoco & Co.", and the auction and 
adjudication of the certificates and bonds were carried out according to the law. Hence, 
there was no legal basis for the subsequent nullification of the sentence. 38 This 
nullification moved Medina to file lr new lawsuit which delayed the illegal return to 
'Tinoco & Co." ~ the certificates and bonds that were deposib:d in the public treasury. 
As a matter of fact, when Medina filed another suit, Iglesias and Volio requested 
and obtained a court ruling in 1862 that ordered the sequestration of the 50,000 pesos that 
were allegedly deposited in the public treasury. This sequestration meant that the money 
in litigation should remained deposited in the tribunals until the court decided which of the 
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two parties involved in the lawsuit should be awarded the sum in dispute.39 
It was not until August, 1866, and under the administration of Jes Mana Castro 
that "Tll10CO & Co." succeeded in obtaining a court ruling that mdel'ed tbe removal of tbe 
sequestration and tbe payment of the S0,000 pesos and the interests to the firm. 40 
Crucial in the enactment of this illegal nlling was tbe fact that the Iglesias family also held 
important political offices in tbe government of Castro. Julim Volio was Castro's 
Minister of Finance while Francisco Mana Iglesias was the President of Congres~ and 
his brother Demctrio, who was Castro's son-in-law, was a member of the Senate. On 
August 24, 1866, Volio sent a leum to the AdminimJdgr Principal stating that a judicial 
decision had ordered the government to give "Tinoco & Co." the S0,000 pesos that the 
administration ~ to Crisanto Medina plus the interest yielded by that sum up to that 
date. Volio explained that to comply with that ruling, the government had ordered the 
Adminim:w;i6n Principal to cancel the account that Medina had with the government and 
to open a new account in favor of "TlDOCO & Co.", and io transfer the money to this new 
account after the due interests had been paid. 41 On the same day, Minister of Finance 
Volio signed a contract on behalf of the government with Francisco Mana Iglesias as the 
managing partner of the finn "T1110CO & Co." By virtue of this conttact the government 
acknowledged the obligation to pay "TlDOCO & Co." 91,900 ~ which was the sum of 
the original 50.000 pesos plus the interest accrued up to August,1866. Iglesias agreed to 
receive this amount in several installments. The firm would receive 11,900 pesos in cash 
at once, and the rest of the money would be paid in fom pans within a period of four 
years at an interest of one percent per month. Accolding to the contract on August 31 of 
each of the next four years the government would pay 20,000 pesos plus interest to 
"TlDOCO & Co." To comply with this obligation the govemment encumbered the national 
revenues that came from the custom-house. 42 This contract between Volio and Iglesias, 
that was so detrimental for the public treasury, was approved by president Castro on the 
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same day that it was signed. 
The damaging consequences for the national finances brought about by 
arrangement between Castro's goyemment and 'Tmoco & Co." went far beyond the 
illegal payment of almost 100,000 pesos that, in reality, had never entered the public 
treasury in cash. The Costa Rican govemm:m actually paid twice for the same 
obligation. As a matter of fact, "Medina & Sons" had a promissory note that Mora had 
given that firm fa- the certificates deposited in the public treasury in 1859. This firm 
endorsed that promissory note to the London company "Grant, Brodie & Co." on May 
3, 1866, after "Medina & Sons" was unable to receive any payment because of the legal 
actions of 'Tinoco & Co." 43 "Grant, Brodie & Co." requested the Costa Rican 
government the payment of that promissory note in Janumy, 1868. That petition was 
rejected by Castro's government with the explanation that the S0,000 pesos deposited by 
"Medina & Sons" were no longer in the public treasury. As a result of this n:fusa}. the 
British firm sued the Costa Rican government, and in 1869 the court ruled that the public 
treasury should acknowledge and pay the obligation stated in the promissory note held by 
"Grant, Brodie & Co. "44 In addition to paying twice for the same obligation. the Costa 
Rican government by the late 18(,()s was still indebted to Peru which had supplied the 
loan for 18,541 pounds sterling which gave origin to this complicated series of financial 
failures and lawsuits. 
Iglesias and Volio, just like Mora a decade earlier, went too far in their 
manipulation of the legal and political apparatus for their personal ecaiomic benefit. The 
open and tenacious ways in which Volio and Iglesias used their political position to 
nullify the court ruling of the lawsuit between Medina and 'Tinoco & Co." and to tum all 
previous legal actions to their own favor, in fact, raised voices of censorship and 
opposition within the elite circles. These voices were heard both in the newspapers and 
in Congress where some of its members refused to provide a legal cover for the actions of 
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Iglesias and Tinoco which openly plundered a public treasmy that was almost 
exhausted. 45 Volio's excessive abuse of bis political influence u minister for the benefit 
of his family discredited mm so amch that Castro relieved him from bis post in August, 
1868. Castro sent Volio to Europe to cany out some "imponam business" there on 
behalf of the government. 46 But in reality Volio's mission abroad wu intended to 
remove him temporarily from the political stage and to abate discontent at home. Ca.mo's 
efforts to save Volio's political career and his own administration wiere fruitless. 
Certainly, Castro's active participation in the events that led to the payment of almost 
100,000 pesos to "Tinoco & Co." contributed importantly to the coup that overthrew him 
in 1868. 
The failure of the bank showed that the government's task of creating a financial 
infrastructure for the expansion of coffee exports was hindered considerably by the 
tendency of the elite members to use the public treasury to obtain compensation for their 
economic losses when business went wrong. In the case of the bank, the bankruptcy of 
John Carmichael in 1858 would not necessarily have meant its clmure if "Tinoco & Co." 
have been in a disposition to assume its financial responsibility towards Medina. Instead 
of fulfilling their obligation with Medina the partners of that firm waited until the course 
of political affairs turned around in their favor and used their public offices to obtain a 
reparation with interest from the government. This tendency to missappropriatc public 
funds for personal use in the long nm actually weakened those same structures that elite 
wu intending to build and strengthen to serve u the foundations of the export economy. 
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CllAPI'ER FlVE 
THE COLLAPSE OF POLITICAL CONSENSUS 
The measures implemented by Mora during the early years of his administration to 
strengthen the executive and the military apparatus enabled him to concentraie almost all 
political power in his hands. Mora's political stten~ which was pivoatl in the creation 
of the climate of stability that characterized the 1 SSOs, however, became inaeasingly 
detrimental to the interests of the elite in the last two years of his govemmenL Mora's 
tendency to use arbitrary means to reap economic benefits from his public office at the 
expense of other members of the elite generated a growing discontent that prompted the 
fall of his administration. 
One of the persons most affected by Mora's excessive misuse of power was his 
former business partner Vicente Agtm3!. Mora, in fact, took advantage of his previous 
commercial association with Aguilar to sue him in 1857 for reparations and damages in 
business dealings that had taken place almost a decade before. Behind that legal action 
was an attempt on the part of Mora to solve urgent financial troubles in a moment when 
the public treasury was almost exhausted. and therefore no longer able to serve as his 
supplier of funds. Even though there was no solid ground for Mora's demands he 
managed to obtain 100,000 pesos from Aguilar in an out-of-court settlemcnL The 
imposition of that settlement marked the definite rupture of the amicable personal relations 
between Mora and Aguilar. The animosity that Mora's political behavior motivated in 
Aguilar turned into political rancor two years lat.er when Mora rejected his bid for the 
operation of the national distillery and enacted a decree ordering the re-sale of lands in an 
area in which Aguilar had several coffee haciendas. 
Aguilar, certainly, became Mora's most imponant and influential political enemy 
and he was the central figure behind the military coup that ousted him. The discussion of 
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the events that gave origin to the political enmity between Mora and Aguilar illustrates the 
role played by personal passions in the overthrow of Men. But more importantly it 
shows that the limits ex tolerance ex the elite to Mora's abuses of political power were set 
by the direct effect that they bad upon the economic in1ereSt of its memben. 
The lawsuit that Mora filed against Aguilar in lall: 1857 dealt with business 
dealings that were canied out between 1842 and 1848 when they were partners in the 
firm "Men & Aguilar." The company was dissolved in February, 1848 by mutual 
agreement. Aguilar was the partner who had invested the largest amount of capital during 
the firm's years of operation. In fact, at the time the partnership was dissolved, it was 
agreed that Mora would pay Aguilar 28,000 pesos in cash and 94,'377 pesos in 
mech~ coffee and cash corresponding to his investments. According to that 
contract Mora would be responsible for paying the debts that the firm had incurred with 
"John Thompson Wattson & Co." in Owe. The only money that Mora was to receive 
would come from the eaminp from the sale of the last shipment of coffee and other 
goods sent by "Ma-a & Aguilar" to Clile before the company was dissolved. I 
The problems between the two former partners began ~ months after the 
company was dissolved when Mora received a statement of the account that "Mora & 
Aguilar" bad with "John Thompson Wattson & Co." Mora found out that the debt with 
the foreign firm was larger than swed in the documents he had signed with Aguilar and 
that the profits from the sale of the coffee sent were less than what was specified in the 
contract. Mara blamed Aguilar fer the diffi:Z'ence in the figures and began to claim 
publicly that his fcrmer partner intentionally bad omit1Di information in the contract of the 
dissolution of the company to embezzle money from biJD.2 
Mora coafronted Aguilar about the difference in the figures. Mora declared that 
Aguilar "confused and ashamed since his wrongdoing had been discovered" agreed to 
compensate him and asked him to keep quiet about the incidcnt3 Aguilar, however, said 
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that there was no mistake or deliberaie omissicn because me numbers in the c:omract 
that had dissolved their company rqRSerued th,! esrimattd value ex. the coffee and other 
goods before they were sold. The tigmes in the account that Mara received from the 
foreign ~ acccrdin1 to Aaui]ar, represented the actual prices ll which mat 
merchandise was sold. The fall in the price of coffee in 1848 ICCOUD1ed largely for the 
big difference between the estimued and the real value. Aguilar added that he gave Mora 
six thousand quintals of coffee, even though he had no obligation to do so. Aguilar said 
he did that to compensate his fa:mer partner for the Josses that resulted from the fall in the 
price of coffee. 4 
Aguilar justified his request to Mora to mp quiet about the incident because 
Mora's claims of embezzlement hati damaged bis commercial reputation. Mora declared 
that he was fully satisfied with the agreement reached since he bad received adequate 
compensation. Consequently, Mora manifested that he did not have reasons to damage 
Aguilar's honor and reputation and agreed to sign a document that stated that his former 
business partner was an honest man. Furthermon:, in January, 1849, Mora signed a 
document in which he agreed not to file any claims against Aguilar in the future. S 
Mora's declarations indicate that his differences with Aguilar OYer losses and profits in 
the company had been settled definitively. 
Several years later, however, the business dealings of the dissolved company 
became an issue of a heated debate. In 1857 and not long after Mora sold two of his 
largest coffee haciendas in Pavas he claimed that he had discoven:d that Aguilar had 
misappropriated more than 350,000 pesos from the capital of their company. Mora 
declared that with occasion of the payment of his debts to "John Thompson W anson & 
Co." he had gone over the books of the company "Mora & Aguilar'' and was able to 
document with the help of a bookkeeper the misappropriation of that considerable amount 
ofmoncy.6 
107 
Mora's explanation of why after eight years he suddenly became interested in 
going over the boob of the dissolwd company was not very solid. Mora claimed that 
after he and Aguilar bad signed the settlement ex 1849 he found out that there were other 
imgularities in Aguilar's bookkeeping procedures. Mora explained that soon after be 
discovered those imgularities he intended to sue Aguilar but he decided to pay his debts 
with "John Thompson Wattson & Co." first. Likewise, Mora declan:d that his election as 
president in late 1849 forced him to postpOne the suit against Aguilar because be did not 
want to sue him while he was in office. In 1857, Maa said that he could not postponed 
the suit any longer because the period stipulated by law to file such claim would expire 
soon.7 
By late 1857, however, Mora still had plenty of time to file a suit for damages 
because the period stipulated by law fer that type of claim was of twenty years. Aguilar 
claimed that the reason for Mora's interest in bringing a mancr into court that bad been 
already settled was, that at that time, his fcxmcr partner "had a legion of creditcrs nmning 
after him" and had used up all means to deal with them and to delay the payment of his 
debts. Aguilar said that as a result of that situation Mora saw the possioility of 
straightening out his finances at the expense of his form:r business partner's capital. 
Aguilar underscored that there was no legal basis fer Mora's demands and that he had 
suffcn:d an unfair stripping of a considerable part of his capital because of those claims. 8 
Aguilar's refutation of Mora's claim., pointed out that the company "Mara & 
Aguilar" bad begun operations with a capital of 18,(XX) pesos which was later inaeased 
to 30,000 pesos. According to Aguilar, the amount of the initial capital of the company, 
the high interests charged by fcxeign creditorS, the small size of the domestic market and 
other factors, set important limitations to the profits yielded by the partnership. The 
maximum operations of the company, in fact. am>unted only to 31:1 ,332 pesos. Aguilar 
remarked that the company would have needed to reproduce ten times the amount of the 
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initial capital to have earned profits in the proportion that Mora claimed, something that 
simply had not occurred. The business partnership never yielded enough profits to 
permit the alleged misappropriation of 350,000 pesos, in Aguilar's account.9 
It is not possible to c:orroborab: the assertions of Mora and Aguilar with the books 
of the company since the documentation related to this business dispu~ refers to them but 
docs not reproduce all the data of the accounts. Nonetheless, the evidence seems to 
indicate that Aguilar's exposition of the accounting of the company was accurate. 
Aguilar explained that the first of Mora's claims of embezzlement bade in 1848 were 
based in part on his unawareness of the real state of the business. Aguilar contented that 
during their partnership, Mora did not separate the transactions that be carried out on 
behalf of the company from those that he did on his own. Actually it was the confusion 
between Mora's persaial accounts and the accounts of the company and along with his 
business practices that led Aguilar to request the dissolution of the company. Aguilar 
was very harsh in his opinions of Mora's capabilities as a businessman. He said that 
Mora's administration of his business -ventures was characterized by a lack of order and 
proper management practices which resulted in his inability to obtain substantial profits. 
Those management practices, according to Aguilar, accounted significantly far Mora's 
being frequently in debt and his continually opening new credits to pay previous ones.10 
Mora, nevertheless, blamed Aguilar far his financial trouble which forced him to 
sell the two large coffee haciendas in Pavas in 18S7. Mora declared that Aguilar had 
become very rich at his expense because the inaccurate bookkeeping of the company 
enabled Aguilar to misappropriate large amounts of money while he, Mora, became 
responsible to pay a huge debt. Mora added that it took him almost ten years to pay the 
debt with the foreign creditors but that his time had come to demand a compcnsation.11 
Mora's acknowledgement that Aguilar's capital was much more solid than his own is 
significant. It indicates that behind Mora's demands, which the data related to the dispute 
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suggest were not well-grounded, was an attempt to solve his financial troubles with part 
of Aguilar's capital 
Aguilar was in Europe when Mora began to camnent publicly about the alleged 
discovery of the dishonest management of the company and to take the first steps to sue 
his former partner. Thus, on November 25, 1857. soon after Aguilar tetumed to Costa 
Rica, he wrote a letter to Mora proposing a private conference to discuss the matter. 
Aguilar told Mora in that letn:r that he wanu:d to avoid a lawsuit because he was 
convinced that legal disputes always yielded ruinous results for all parties involved. 
Aguilar also told Mora that he was willing to reach an agreement since be wanu:d to keep 
his good reputation and his properties intact. 12 
At the meeting Aguilar initially offered Mora a compensation of ro.ooo pesos. 
Mora did not accept it and Aguilar raised the offer to 80,000 pesos. Mora, however, only 
accepted the compensation when Aguilar offCJCd biml00,000 pesos. As a result of this 
meeting, Aguilar and Mora signed a document on December 18, 1857, in which they 
declared the dispute settled. The agreement S1alCd that there had been no 
mismanagement on the part of Aguilar. The document said that Mora, to honor the truth 
and to prou:ct the honesty and good reputation of Aguilar, declared that his claims 
origiruued in losses that bad resulu:d from bad sales of coffee and other goods that had 
been expcn:d by the company in the 1840s. Aguilar declared that he was positively 
convinced that Mora had suffered coosiderable losses as the partner responsible for 
paying all the debts of the dissolved company. 
Aguilar added that in view of those losses he had agreed to compensaic Mora 
with 100,000 pesos that would be pm in several installments within a period of four 
years. These installments would be paid mainly with income that Aguilar n:c:eived from 
the liquor distillery and the Factpna de tabaco . the governmental office that administered 
the monopoly over retail sales of tobacco. The tcnm of the agreement stated that by 
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virtue of that document Mora acknowledged that his claims against Aguilar had been 
settled and from then on all books, invoices, receipts and account statements of the 
dissolved company were to become null and void Mora had kept those documents but 
he gave them to Aguilar after they both agreed to des1roy them to prevent their use fer 
future claims. Mora and Aguilar decla!ed thatt they would keep secret the details and 
conditions of the contract that they had signed "voluntarily and under the best 
harmony. "13 
Mora declared afterwards that the fact that Aguilar took the initiative to settle the 
demands out of court was proof that his former partner was guilty and was aware that he 
couJd not conceal his misconduct any longer. Aguilar, however, was probably willing to 
reach to an agreement with Mora, even when the claims of the latter were groundless, to 
avoid a lawsuit that couJd be in court for a long time and could tum out to be even more 
damaging to his interests. The clause of the document of the settlement that handed all 
boo4 receipts and account statements of the dissolved company OYer to Aguilar 
represented a tacit victory for him. That clause, in fact, prevented Mora from using those 
documents in the future as an instrument to demand from Aguilar the payment of 
additional compensatioo. The first agreement that Aguilar pay reparation to Mora for 
losses in the fall of coffee price was justified but the second demand was apparently the 
result of Mora's misuse of the company's accounting books. Aguilar, nevertheless, only 
fulfilled the financial obligation assumed in December, 1857, while Mora was still in 
office. After Mora was ov~ ~ Aguilar stopped the compensation payments 
and requested a court nnJtificatioo of the contract claiming that be had been forced to sign 
it under the pressure of Mora's strong political power.14 
Another way in which Mora affected the interests of some members of the elite 
was through the appropiation of common and municipal lands to replace his coffee 
haciendas and enlarge his sugar plantations. The four cities of the Costa Rican central 
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valley were smrounded by agricultural villages that were divided into component units 
called neighborhoods. By the mid-nineteenth century there was still an important amount 
of common lands between the cities and the surrounding villages that provided access to 
subsistence to the majority of the population. Even after the initial development of the 
export economy access to common land was widespread especially in Canago and 
Heredia, and to a lesser but still important in extent in San Jose and Alajuela. Many 
people rented plots from these common lands for a small fee payable on an annual basis 
to the municipal government. These individuals cultivated the plots and frequently after a 
period of many ~ established private ownership aver them.15 
The municipal govcrnmcnt of each city had among its tasks the collection of the 
annuities charged to individuals for the use and cultivation of common lands. The 
municipalities also had control under the vacant lands located within their jurisdictions. 
In the late 1850s Mora's government ordered the sale of some vacant and common lands 
in the outslcins of San Jose and Alajuela with the purpose of increasing the revenues of 
their municipalities. The sale of some of those lands served also the purpose of 
facilitating for Mora their appropriatiat by fraudulent means. The common lands in 
discussion were located in Pa~ where Mora had some haciendas. 
Mota ordcred the division and public auction of part of the common lands in 
Pavas to generate funds for the comttuction of an aqueduct in San Jose. The 
govemme~ in fact, had signed a contract in A~ 1858 with Guillemx> Nanne and 
Francisco Kurttc, two Gennans residents of Costa Rica for the construction of that public 
work. The cost of the a,ueduct was 70,000 pesos to be paid in five installments. The 
first of 15,514 pesos was to be paid at the time of the signing of the contract. The four 
other installments of 13,621 pesos would be paid every fom months. The auction of the 
common lands would provide the cash that the government would pay the contractors to 
begin the construction of the aqueduct 16 
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For that reason the government ordered the bidders who took part in the public 
auction to pay cash for the plots they bought. Mora was able to get sane of the best and 
most conveniently locau:d plocs of the common lands in Pavas through sane iJrcgularities 
in the auction proceedings. As a maaa- of fact. one of the main bidders was Guillermo 
Nanne, who purchased three large plots that formed a piece of land measuring -
approximately 202 hectares. The total price of the plocs was1Z236 pesos that Nanne 
was supposed to pay in cash. Nanne, nonetheless, did not pay anything for these plots 
because he agreed with the government u, receive them in lieu of the first installment of 
money that he was going to get according to the terms of the contract u, build the 
aqueduct. Nanne received the balance of 15,514 pesos in promissory nores.17 Nanne, 
who was a close friend of Mora, kept only half of the piece of land that be had purchased 
in Pavas. He sold the other half of the plocs to Mora on May 10, 1858~ for 6,248 pesos 
that M<n was to pay in two years. Nanne declared that he had sold Mora 101 hectares of 
the land because they planned to fcmn a coffee hacienda on that property and worked it 
jointly. This imgular sale of land to Nanne meant that no payment was made for the 
plot in an auction which was allegedly intended to generate funds fer the municipality 
and for the aqueduct.18 
Mora also managed to acquire a substantial amount of common lands in mid• 
1858 through a municipal ruling of the city of AJajucla which ordered the division into 
plots and public auction of two municipal pasture ~ one called "Nuestto Amo" and 
the other called "Salitral." The ruling staled that the intendai purpose of the division and 
sale was to faciliwe fer the residents of Alajuela their access u, and use the land Many 
of the plots, to be sure, were purchased by individuals who resided in the outskirts of 
Alajuela, in neighborhoods such as San Antonio, San Jose de AJajuela, Santiago, and 
San Antonio de Heredia. The people bought plots that measured between thirty•six and 
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sixty-two hectares, in some cases two ex three individuals purchased one plot together, 
usually a large one.19 
Mora's ownership of the; popenies though, actually took land resources away 
from the residents of Alajuela. instead of facilitating their acquisition of plots. Mora 
bought fifteen plots which all together measured 781 hectares for 5,919 pesos. The 
pasture lands were auctioned for two thirds of the estimab:d value and the buyers were 
only obligated to pay one third of the total price of the plot at the time of the purchase. 
Consequently Mon paid ooly 1,963 pesos f<X a huge piece ofland.20 The fact that the 
plots bought by Mon were contiguous to his sugar cane plantation and cattle hacienda 
called "Ojo de Agua" !micates that the sale of the common pasture lands was a well-
calculan:d plan on his part to enlarge those properties through the purchase of land for a 
symbolic price. 
The irregularities involved in the sale of the common and municipal lands of 
Pavas and Alajuela in 1858 raised voices of opposition among the elite's circles. The 
issue of the sale of common and municipal lands, however, became really explosive in 
August.1859, and precipitated the overthrow of Mora's government. Mora, in~ 
entered a more d3ngemus ground. from the point of view of the interests of the elite, 
when he enacted a decree that ordered the owners of plots of land in a vast area of the 
outskirts of San Jose to validate their property titles through the payment of special fee. 
The properties affected by this decree were located cast of San Jose and 
comprised the neighborhoods of San Vicente. San Juan, Guadalupe and Mojon. The 
land on which these properties had been developed had been granted by the Spanish 
colonial authorities in 1768 to a group of neighbcn of San Jose. These individuals bad 
paid the Crown a fee ftr the official recognition of their right to cultivate the land and had 
received a collective property title. Therefore, these families and their descendants had 
cultivated these common lands since the colonial period. Many of these people later had 
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registered the individual properties that their families had W0lked for generations and 
thus, bad become legal owners of their plots. Sewral other, howe~, considered 
themselves owners by reason of their prolonged occupation and cultivation of the land but 
did not have individual legal titles.21 
Mora's decree stated that the lands included in the colonial crdinance were at the 
time occupied by a group of families who did not pay any ttibute or tax to the city of San 
Jose for the use of the plots. In other words Mora did not recognize their ownership of 
the land but treated them as merely utilizing common lands. The government claimed that 
the decree aimed at solving the problem of the occupation without payment because the 
city was in need of funds to finance diverse projects intended for urban improvement. 
The Mora administration declared that by virtue of the decree obligating the occupants of 
the lands in discussion to pay for the recognition of their property rights, it would be 
possible to reconcile public interests with private. Consequently, the deaee ordered that 
all the plocs be measumi and appraised to establish the amount that the de facto 
proprietcxs would have to pay to legalize their ownership of the land 22 
This decree of August 6, 1859, far from serving the intended purpose of 
reconciling the public and private interests made them clash. The <mer generated great 
discontent among these de facto owners because it implicitly meant the expropriation of 
their plots. The expansion of coffee cultivation had so substantially increased property 
values by that time that the fees fcx- properties titles would have been prohibitive based on 
the inflated land price. Consequently people would be forced to sell their plots to pay 
their dues to the municipality. The histaical woda of the Mora administration points out 
that this threat of a dispossession of the main means of subsistence of many people 
hastened the coup because most of them were civilians who made up the militias.23 A 
contemporary source contended, indeed, that the decree in discussion led these militiamen 
to revolt against the government. 24 
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nw the decree generated discontent among some militiamen is significant. What 
is more significant. however, is that among those legitimate property owners who were 
affected by the decree of August, 1859 was non other than the prominent and ver, 
influential Vicente Aguilar. Mora's former business partner, in fact, owned several 
properties in San Vicente, one of the neighborhoods affected by that order. Aguilar had 
received a coffee hacienda in San Vicente from his debtor Bnino Cmanza as payment of 
a aedit in May, 1857. This hacienda comprised several separa1e pieces of land planted 
with coffee that all together measured aproximarely eighty-seven hectares and had a value 
of 20,000 pesos. 25 Records of Aguilar's notarized transactions reveal that after he 
became the owner of Cam.nza's hacienda, he began to buy small plots in San Vicente. 
Aguilar, in fact. registered fourteen transactions involving properties in San Vicente after 
May, 1857 and during the next three years. The me of the plots was relatively small 
but all together amounted to thilty-dm:e hectares. 26 That all the plots bought were 
contiguous to other of Aguilar's properties indicates that the intended purpose of the 
pmchases was their gradual consolidation into larga' units. 
The vehemence with which Aguilar emphasized later that Mora's government had 
seriously amckcd private property through arbitrary acts that were justified by "specious 
pretexts" becames significant in light of the information concerning his haciendas in San 
Vicente. r7 Aguilar declared that the future administrations should dedicate their efforts 
to guarantee that such usurpation of private property will never again be repeated in 
Costa Rica. Aguilar was hopeful that the future goverments would never again decree 
the alienation of private properties, "such as the ones in San Vicente, San Juan, 
Guadalupe and Moj6n," to pay a huge municipal debt with somebody else's money.28 
The eloquence of Aguilar's declarations indicates that that decree provoked a reaction in 
him strong enough to make him play an instrumental role in the overthrow of Mora's 
government. 
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Mora's political actions in the wt two years of his administration that affected 
directly or indirectly the private interests of Aguilar and other prominent members of the 
elite certainly hastened the breakup of the consensus. Up to that time the elite had 
tolerated or been willing to overlook Mora's misuse of power, bis liberal use of the public 
treasury for his benefit. his violation of the constitution and other arbitrary act!. What the 
coffee planters and merchants were wiwilling to tolerate and ultimately forced them to 
overthrow Mora was the threats to their propeny rights. That was evident in a document 
published after the coup which declared that the shoncommings of Mora's administration 
could be characterized by his laclc of respect for private property. It was underscored 
that Men violated the rights that guaranteed private property and work because "he did 
not separate his public deeds from his private inteiests. "29 
It is interesting that the document that analY7.es the causes of the coup pointed out 
that the lack of separation between Mora's private and public roles gave origin to abuses 
of power, but it emphasized that those abuses were moderate before 1856.30 The abuses 
mentioned in that analysis were related to Mora's tendency to utilize the public treasury as 
the main soun:e of capital for his private ventures. The sound condition of the national 
finances during early 1850s ~ possible the mismanagement of the public treasury 
without damaging din:ctly the interests of the leading members of the elite and was what 
definitely enabled some to label as moderate Mora's abuses of power. Moreover that 
mismanagement of the public treasury was labeled as moderate because many if not all the 
prominent coffee planters and merchants were also benefiting from it. 
The document which dealt with the causes of the fall of Mora explained that after 
18S6 public treasury was of little help for Mora, "who was submerged in debts and 
continually in financial trouble because he squandered all his earnings on ill-calculated 
enterprises and businesses. "31 Consequently, that document declared, Mora began to 
look for new sources of funds to solve his financial troubles. The same source pointed 
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out that Mora did not exclude any means to accomplish his goal "reganlless, that the 
principles of justice and prudence advised him not to employ some of them. "32 
Mora. indeed. applied the lenaCity that accouncr.d for the successful 
implcmentatiai of the central point of his agenda, such as the strengthening of the 
executive power, in his endeavor to solve his urgent financial situation.33 Mora's 
tenacity to pursue goals which fn:quently bcxdered on stubborness, however, turned 
against him on this opportunity. The publication that examined the causes of the fall of 
Mora's government mentioned in fact. that after 1856 Men no longer paid attention to 
"the voices of moderation" and enacted decrees, "against the opinion of many judicious 
persons, which despoiled individuals from their private properties"34 This was a clear 
reference to the deaee invalidating the propcny titles ex the lands located in the 
neighborhoods of San Vicente, San Juan, Guadalupe and Mojdn. 
The same document pointed out that after 1856 "the patriotic intentions of the 
unaffected republican president began to transform into the instincts of an autocrat "35 It 
emphasized that after the war against Walker most of the leading members of society had 
withdrawn from the administtation of public aff~ and that Men filled the vacant 
positions with adulatory individuals who followed his instructions blindly. The 
government then suppressed the freedom of the press, harassed and persecuted political 
opponents, and committed other abuses against the individual rights.36 
· The military coup was justified in the afolementioned document as the only 
avenue opened to prevent Mora from continuing his attacks against property and 
individual rights. It explained that by mid-1859 and after almost ten years in office Mora 
aimed at remaining in the presidency fer life to cope with his financial troubles and keep 
his social position. According to that source, Men expected to achieve that goal 
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through constitutional formalities, the 
support of his accomplices, the masses that 
be thought were loyal to him, the ganisons 
that he considered as his private property, 
and the gradual destruction of his adversaries. 37 
The elections were the constirutional formalities mentioned in that document 
through which Mora attempted to remain in power indefinitely. By mid-1859 Mora had 
managed to secure himself another six-year presidential term by altering the results of 
elections held a few months before. The document that justified the coup stated the the 
prominent members of society had tolerated Mora's increasing abuses of power after 
1856 because they knew his presidential term was soon to end Mora's fraudulent re-
election in 1859 destroyed the last possibility to resolve the problem peacefully and made 
it necessary "to resort to force to vanquish an illegal face." 38 Mora's lack of respect 
for the popular will, acccrding to that same source, was what moved the commanding 
officers of the two garrisons of San Jose to rebel against his authority. The document 
declared that those military officers had fulfilled their duties properly and had remained 
loyal to Mora up to that moment. Afra the clecuxal fraud, the document stated, the revolt 
became "an act of legal defense approved by human and divine laws. "39 The popular 
will, nonetheless, had actually little or no room at all within the Costa Rican politics of the 
nineteenth century because of the oligarchical nature of government. When the military 
officers deposed Mora on August 14, 1859 they were in reality acting on behalf of the 
same men who had put him in the presidential chair almost ten years before. The decree 
invalidating the property titles of many militiamen piompted the coup at the same time that 
it provided the high ranking military officers with a justification for their role of 
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intermediaries of the prominent members of the elite who could not longer tolerate Mora's 
abuses of power. 
The overthrow of Mora marked the formal closing of a very important period in 
the political and economic history of the Costa Rica. The coup, as a matter of fact, was 
the final blow in the detai<X'3tion of the political consensus that s13Ited when Mora began 
to surpass the limits of toleruicc of the elite f<x'ccd by his financial problems and his 
excessive political ambition. Therefore, the same economic and personal factors that, 
combined. had created a suitable political formula to meet the needs of the leading coffee 
planters and merchants in late 1849 were responsible fer its collapse ten years later. 
The rupture of the consensus, nevertheless, was only in relation to Mora as head 
of the government and his abuses of authority that directly affected the interests of the 
elite. Mora's program of creating an infrastructure fer the development of the export 
economy was not an issue of conflict in the political struggle of the late 1850s. The 
overthrow of Mora only meant a. tempouuy crisis in the intr:mal relations of the ruling 
coffee planter and merchant elite, one of several that cook place in the second half of the 
ninelCCnth century. These periodic and brief crises, far &om weakening the hegemony 
of the elite, actually strengthened it. They were periods of aero Io•· datiori and 
reestablishment of the equilibrum between the pursuit of the personal goals of the men in 
power and those of the elite in general. The momentaty disruptions of "Order and 
Progress" were actually adjustments of a path that was traced during the Mora years. 
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1llE MILITARY COUP AND nm 
EXECUTION OF MORA; nm PRINCIPLES RULING 
1llE RELATIONS OF TiiE ELITE 
By mid-1859 a serious financial crisis bad significantly hindered Mora's 
implementation of measures aimed at fostering agricultural and commercial 
development. The political consensus among the leading coffee planters and 
merchants towards the administration of Mora bad deteriorated as a result of Mora's 
excessive abuses of power which bad begun to affect negatively the interests of the 
elite. The breakup of the consensus, however, took place when Mora showed bis 
intentions of remaining in power indefinitely. Mora's reluctance to step down from 
power voluntarily prompted a military coup. 
The military coup that ousted Mora. however, was an event in which not even 
one shot was fired. Mora fell victim to his own endeavor to strengthen the military. 
This endeavor led Mora to concentrate almost all power in the two barracks of San 
Jose. This decision turned the commanding officers of these barracks into the two 
key figures with enough power and influence to ovcnum Mora's government without 
resorting to violence. As a matter a fact. the coup was the result of the betrayal of 
Colonel Lorenzo Salazar, the commanding officer of the Cuarb;l dJ; Artillena . one of 
the two barracks of San Jose. Salazar revolted in agreement with Colonel Maximo 
Blanco who was the commanding officer of the Cuartel Princ;ipal. the other barrack of 
the capital. 
Once Saluar and Blanco agreed on revolting against Mora. they sent a group 
of militiamen to his house at dawn on August 14, 1859. Mora was awakened by one 
of his servants who told him that outside the house was a military officer who 
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demanded to see him urgently. This officer was Sotero Rodnguez who told Mora 
there was a disorder in the Cuartel dg; Anillerla , and that his presence there was 
required to calm the ttoops. However, when Mora got out of the house he found out 
that Rodnguez and the rest of the militiamen had actually come to inform him that he 
was no longer president. The militiamen, indeed, told Mora that his rule had been 
disavowed by Salazar and they had orders to arrest bim.1 
The ttcason of both of the military men whom in the past Mora regarded as 
loyal and reliable enough to entrust with the main strongholds of the country, left him 
with no possibilities to fight for his own restitution of power. Therefore convinced of 
the hopelessness of the situation, Mora did not offer resistance to the aITCst. Mora 
was briefly held prisoner in one of the barracks and later he was conducted to the 
National Palace. Mora remained there for two days along with his brother Jose 
Joaqwn, his brother-in-law Jose Mana Canas, and his vice-president Rafael G. 
Escalante. After this short stay at the National Palace, the principal figures of the 
Mora administration were taken to the port of Puntarenas and sent into exile. 2 
That Mora was overthrown by the same men who were in charge of defending 
his government has led some to consider his military policies as mistaken measures 
that only had negative effects. Historians dealing with Mora's administration, in 
fact, have emphasu.ed that his determination to strengthen the army made his 
government, and the ones of his successors, very vulnerable to the will of the 
military officers. Mora's decision to make the army the main foundation of his 
political power, in the opinion of these scholars, gave origin to a praetorianism that 
lasted for several ycars.3 According to this view, the strengthening of the army 
during the 1850s ttansformed the military into the arbiters of the political affairs of 
the country. It has been pointed out that beginning with the 1859 coup and for the 
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next ten years the colonels Salazar and Blanco decided who should be ousted from 
power and when.4 
The military, certainly, had a decisive role in politics after 1859. Mora's 
policies regarding the army, however, did not tum the military into an independent 
political force that kept Costa Rica continually at the brink of armed revolt, as some 
authors have argued.5 The political events of the decades irnrnediatel.y after the 
Mora years show that the military dutifully performed the expected task of serving 
as the guarantor of order. But the military fullfilled this task in a way that, although 
was very effective, was not the one intended by Mora. lbe military to be sure, as a 
repressive force was a very important component of the state apparatus in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. The military, nonetheless, functioned more as 
an institution that acted as mediator in the internal conflicts of the elite than as the 
backbone of the government's authority . 
Costa Rica in the second half of the last century was not a country in which 
the military had the task of supressing revolts of popular masses armed and 
mobilized by a caudillo, or by contending political factions. The threats to the 
disruption of order came instead from inside the ruling elite. Those threats 
originated, indeed, in the strife of the members of a smal19 very homogeneous9 
closely-related ruling elite for the economic benefits derived from holding a high-
ranking public office and other privileges that came along with the control of the 
government. The common people that the elite claimed to be representing were 
never called to arms in support of any faction of the ruling class. The coffee planters 
and merchants ruled over the country as if they were managing a family venture. 
These individuals resolved their internal political differences through negotiation and 
compromise rather than civil war. 
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The strong military apparatus that was built up dwing the Mora years 
provided a very important service in that respect. The military kept the equilibrium 
between the conservation of political stability and the quarrels of the members of the 
elite over the benefits derived from a position in the government. The existence of 
a powerful military. indeed. was instrumental in the consolidation of the coffee 
planters and merchants as a dominant class. This military apparatus prevented the 
internal conflicts of the elite from evolving into sharp divisions that could have 
weakened it economically and politically. 
The creation of a strong military force during the 1850s reoriented and set the 
limits of the elite's struggle for the control of power in two ways. The military 
became the indispensable ally of any faction of the elite willing to overthrow a 
government. The commanding officers of the barracks of San Jose represented a 
decisive force that any group ·of coffee planters and merchants, interested in 
overturning a president, had to recruit to tip the balance of power in their favor. For 
the man ousted from the presidency, as happened to Mora in 1859. the military 
became an adversary that it was very difficult if not impossible to defeat. In fact. the 
existence of a centrali7.ed army condemned to a failure any attempt by a deposed 
president to challenge the power of the high-ranking military officers who had taken 
sides with his opponents. 
Thel859 coup. therefore, marlced an important historical tmning point as it 
was the first instance in which the military overturned a government for the direct 
benefit of a group of coffee planters and merchants. Historians who have dealt with 
the intervention in politics of the Colonels Salazar and Blanco have pointed out that 
they were the key figures in the overthrow of Mora. and in the downfall of Jose Marfa 
Castro in 1868. These historians, nonetheless, have overlooked a very important 
aspect of the political role played by these two military men from the late l 850s to 
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the late 1860s. What has been overlooked is the fact that Blanco and Salazar only 
played the role of agents that deposed two presidents who bad lost the support of 
the majority of the elite. Salazar and Blanco were intermediaries who never held 
political office because they did not belong to the circle of the leading coffee planters 
and merchants who controlled political power. 
The task assigned to Salazar and Blanco, nevenheless, was very important. 
They were commissioneC:f to-assume absolute responsibility for the destitution of 
Mora and Castro, which in reality had been planned by a group of coffee planters and 
merchants discontented with their governments. The leading political figures of the 
second half of the nineteenth century manifested continually their belief that order 
was a sine gpa non for progress. Consequently, these individuals did not want to 
appear as directly involved in a coup that disrupted constitutional order, no matter 
how justified it might have been. That the coffee planters and merchants 
constituted a small elite that was linked together by kinship, business relations, and 
friendship provided another very important reason for leaving to the military the 
actual task of overthrowing governments. The political conspiracies of a group of 
discontented elite members frequently were aimed against their former business 
partners, close or distant relatives, or in-laws. Therefore, the military provided a 
cover up for the coffee planters and merchants to maintain a public image as citizens 
who bad only the deepest respect for constitutional principles and kinship bonds. 
In the case of the overthrow of Mora. Colonel Lorenzo Salazar assumed 
responsibility for the it in a proclamation which was addressed to the Costa Rican 
people and circulated on the same day as the coup. In that proclamation Salazar 
explained that he bad remained loyal to the government up to the point in which 
Mora, "intoxicated with a manifestly usurped power," began to violate the most 
sacred rights of the people. In a clear allusion to Mora's decree ordering the sale of 
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lands owned by some militiamen, Salazar said that be could not remain impassive in 
the face of the government's attempts to expropriate many legitimate owners. 
Salazar declared that Mora's harassment of his political opponents had also 
compelled the military to put an end to that "tyrannical adminisU'ation." Salazar 
concluded his proclamation declaring that he wu confident that a new man would 
come "to regenerate the country and to establish liberty with peace, order and 
security."6 
Mora had been forced by the adverse circumstances to step down from power 
after the coup but that in no way did mean that he had resigned himself absolutely to 
the idea that he wu no longer president. Mora up to the day of his death in 
September, 1860 continued to claim that he was still the constitutional president of 
Costa Rica. This circumstance showed the events that followed Mora's overthrow 
to be unusually clarifying of the role that the military played as intermediaries of 
some elite members. Inf~ Salazar's claims that he had acted according to the 
dictates of his conscience were refuted by Mora soon after the coup. 
Mora contended that the real authors of the coup were not the military but "a 
few factious individuals" that had bought the loyalties of the commanding officers of 
the bamu:ks of San Jose. 7 Mora was more specific in his accusations when he 
arrived in El Salvador a week after the coup. He pointed out then that Vicente 
Aguilar, Julian Volio, Francisco Mana Iglesias, and Edward Allpress, Aguilar's 
business partner and son-in-law, were the individuals responsible for his overthrow. 
Mora claimed that these people had commissioned Ram6n Mo~ an obscure 
merchant who was a close friend of Salazar, to talk him into deposing his 
administration. Mora contended that the plotters had givcnl0,000 pesos to Salazar 
as payment for revolting against his government. 8 
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A notable contempOrary observer of the political events of the late l 850s 
emphasized the idea that the military, in fact. had only served u intermediaries for 
a small group of people detennined to oust Mora from power. Lorenzo Montufar, a 
Guatemalan lawyer who resided in Costa Rica for many years, wroce in his memoirs 
that the downfall of Mora had its roots in events that were not political but economic. 
He stated that the coup originated in private interests that "were being discussed 
vehemently in court at that time. "9 
Montufar was referring to the two most important business disputes of the 
period, the one between Mora and his former partner Vicente Aguilar, and the one 
between Crisanto Medina and the firm "Tmoco & Co". Montufar argued that 
Aguilar planned the coup u a way to avenge from his former partner and avoid 
fulfilling the financial obligation that he assumed after settling the dispute with 
Mora. IO Likewise, Montufar contended that the partners of the firm "Tmoco & Co." 
were of the opinion that Mora had used his power to influence the court decision that 
ordered their firm to pay 50,000 pesos to Medina. Consequently, according to 
Montufar, the partners of the firm ''Tmoco & Co." got involved with Aguilar in a 
conspiracy to overthrow Mora and destroy bis political influence that was so 
damaging their economic interests. Montufar added that these individuals 
accomplished their goals by making use of the swords of Colonels Blanco and 
Salazar.1 1 
Montufar criticized harshly the betrayal of the military officers and casted 
serious doubts about their integrity in commentaries he made on the day of the coup. 
Montufar was quoted as saying in the presence of his wife and some other people, 
that Salazar's loyalty to Mora had been bought for 10,000 pesos. He also said that 
Sotero Rodnguez, the officer who mested Mora. had received 5,000 pesos for his 
action. After these commentaries, Montufar added that the "brave" military officers 
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that deposed Mora and installed J= Mana Montealegre in the presidency would 
oust the latter and place someone else in power if they were offered a substantial 
amount of money in retum.12 
Montufar was also quoted as declaring that Julwt Volio was the person who 
delivered the sum of money paid to Salazar. According to the same source, Montufar 
added that Ram6n Molina was celebrating the successful accomplishment of the 
mission assigned to him.13 According to another source, Molina's assignment 
included persuading Blanco to take part in the coup.14 Apparently, Bianco's 
involvement in the coup was limited to backing up Salazar's revolt. Mora's nephew 
Manuel Argiiello, who also left a firsthand account of the events surmunding the 
1859 coup, wrote many years later that several people claimed that the military 
officers were paid to overthrow his uncle. Argiicllo declared that regardless of this 
repeated asscrtioi he personally never had any proof or evidence that Blanco and 
Salazar actually sold their loyalty to Mora for a sum of moncy.15 It is very likely, 
however, that these military officers received a bonus for caff)'ing out the coup in 
addition to their promotion to the rank of generals. What Salazar and Blanco might 
have received in return for their actions, however, is not as important as the fact that 
they took the lead in ousting Mora on behalf of a group of leading members of the 
elite. 
The bitterness and animosity that resulted from the business dispute 
between Mora and Aguilar, in addition to the conflicts with the members of the 
Iglesias family over the losses and profits in the liquor business, and the failure of 
the national bank, to be sure, provided these men with important reasons to want 
Mora's ovcnhrow. Whether there were only Aguilar, Volio and Iglesias behind the 
initial planning of the coup or if other people were also involved, the fact of the 
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matter was that the military took the necessary steps to prepare the terrain for the 
transference of power from one group of coffee planters and men:hants to another. 
The appointment of the tempOrUy president and the preparations for the 
establishment of a new government, nonethele~ were affairs in which only the 
leading members of the elite took part. The negotiations with the military and the 
selection of the person who would replace the soon-to-be ousted president were 
apparently simultaneous processes. Not only was Colonel Salazar's proclamation 
circulated on the day of the coup but another document was issued on the same day 
too. While Salazar expressed his confidence that a new man would come to 
"regenerate the country," the second document, an act signed by eighty-seven 
residents of San Jose!, bore the name of the man already selected to carry out this 
regeneration. That the two documents were issued separately is of utmost 
significance as it maintains an appearence of independent action by a military 
uninfluenced by the political elite. 
The act of the residents of San Jose! stated that it should be regarded as a 
manifestation of the will of all the country. This document approved Salazar's 
actions by declaring that Juan Rafael Mora was no longer recogni7.ed as the 
president of Costa Rica. The signatOries of the act also expressed deep gratitude to 
Salazar for the enormous service that he had rendcn:d to the country by deposing 
Mora, therefore restoring the liberties that he had usurped.16 The act declared that 
Jose Marla Montealegre had been appointed as temporary president. The document 
explained that Montealegre had been given all-embracing powers to govern until 
elections were carried out to choose Mora's successor. Likewise, the act indicated 
that the Congress had been declared dissolved and that a constituent assembly 
would be summoned shortly. The act of the residents of San J~ stated that in his 
capacity of temporary president Montealegre would order Mora, J~ Maria Canas, 
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and Manuel Argilello to leave Costa Ria immediately. The exile of these three men 
was considered esscnti~ for the preservation of the political stability of the country. 
But the document emphasized that the new government was committed to 
guaranteeing the lives and properties and other rights of Mora and bis relatives.17 
Due to the oligarchical nanue of Costa Rican politics in the nineteenth 
century it is not surprising that eighty-seven people declared that their actions 
represented the will of the whole population of the country. This act is significant 
from the point of view that indicates that while the actual planning of coup might 
have involved only a small number of people their decision to oust Mora was 
sanctioned by most of the elite. In addition to Vicente Aguilar and Julwl Volio, the 
signatories of that act included Jos6 Mana Castro, Manuel Jos6 Carazo, several 
members of the Carranza family, Manuel GutiCITCz, Ram6n Quiros and other leading 
figures. The circulation of this act soon after the coup suggests that the elite had 
reached a consensus about overturning of Mora's government before it took place. 
The establishment of that consensus and the smooth transition from one 
administration to the next was eased by the nature of the changes in the government 
in the second half of the ninctccnth century. The overthrow of a government during 
this period meant basically just a change of the individuals who were in key public 
offices and not a radical shift in political programs. After &a the disruption of the 
constitutional order was only intended to facilitate the alternation in power of the 
leading figures of an elite who shared economic, social, and political goals. 
The capacity of the coffee planters and merchants to alternate themselves in 
power without having to resort to violence is one of the most interesting of their 
characteristics as a ruling elite. The struggle for control of power, to be sure, was 
very important among the coffee planters and merchants, and frequently divided 
them. However, once a remporary conflict over the control of the government was 
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resolved, the losers accepted their defeat. The defeat wu easily accepted because 
the overthrow of a president did not mean his total and permanent isolation from the 
political life of the country of the vanquished but only a. tempormy separation from 
power. The possibilities to go back and serve in a high-ranking public office were 
always opened to the main political figures and many of them were able to do it. 
Jose Maria Castro, for example, was forced to resign his presidential post in 1849, 
but was elected once again in 1866 only to be ovenbrown by a coup in 1868. But 
even Castro's second forced exit from the presidency did not put an end to his public 
life. In fact, he was president of the Supreme Court in the early 1870s and served as 
Minister of Foreign Relations &om 1886 to 1890.18 Castro's political career 
exemplifies that constant oscillation of many distinguished memben of the elite 
from periods of active participation in public affairs as congressmen, ministers, and 
presidents to periods of separation from politics because of differences with the men 
in power at that moment. 
The coffee planters and merchants apparently had another important reason 
to step down from power when the political situation turned adverse to them, 
especially in the case of a military coup. This reason was closely related to the 
elite's preoccupation for the preservation of order and stability. Even when the man 
in the presidency thought that he had a legitimate right to remain in office he did not 
offer resistance after being informed that the military had disavowed his authority. 
To resist the military and to try to recruit men to tight for the presidency would have 
meant involving the country in a civil war the consequences of which might have 
been ominous. Therefore, no ooe ·wantcd to be blamed for getting the country into 
any kind of armed conflict. 
Juan Rafael Mora's ambition to remain in power indefinitely made him an 
exception to the general rule because it never let him resign himself to the loss of the 
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presidency. The fact that Mora repeatedly attempced to regain power gave rise to a 
_ situation that brings to light the factors that made the other members of the elite to 
conform to their fate. Mora's determination to recover the presidency, indeed. 
ttansfonned him into a continual threat to the country's stability. The restive climate 
created by Mora reached a point in which the only way to eliminate the focus of 
instability was to execute him. Although the execution of Mora wu an action 
justified by his political condu~ the government of Montealegre felt the need to 
explain the application of that harsh punishment to a former president. and one of the 
leading members of the elite. Some of the elements that were determinant in the 
smooth transition of power between the coffee plant.en and merchants come out from 
that explanation. 
Mora showed the first indications that he was not going to accept his fall 
from power without a fight soon after the coup. Immediately after Mora was notified 
of the military revolt against his authority, indeed, he began to claim that he was 
still the legitimate president of Costa Rica because the people had had no 
participation in the coup. He contended that on the contrary, the Costa Rican people 
had sided with him and were determined to restore him to power. Mora kept 
repeating this assertion over the next founeen months. Two days after the coup, 
Mora was conducted to Puntarenas along with his brother Jose Joaquin., his brother-
in-law Jose Mana Canas, his nephew Manuel Argilello and his former vice-
president Rafael G. Escalante, in addition to an escort of one hundred militiamen. 
On August 19, 1859, Mora and his party were embarked on a ship bound for 
Guatemala Just before the ship left~ Mora made a proclamation addressed to 
the diplomatic envoys to Central America in which he reiterated that he had been 
despoiled from power violently. Mora in this proclamation asked the "civili.7.ed 
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nations of Europe and America" to reject any action taken by the new administration 
because the men in power were usurpers that were in the government illeplly.19 
Mora disembarked in El Salvador where be was warmly received by 
President Gerardo Barrios. Mora and Barrios had become good friends as a result 
of having fought side by side against William Walker in 1856 and 1857. As soon as 
he arrived at the Salvadoran pon of La Union, Mora wrote a letter to Barrios to 
inform him about the coup. Mora declared in this letter that the overthrow of his 
government was the result of a conspiracy of four or five individuals who had lured 
the military into revolt. According to Mora's claims, the Costa Rican people were 
determined to spill their blood to reinstate him in power. Mora said that no 
insurrection had taken place because he had not given the orders to begin, however, 
the people were ready and waiting for instructions of the leaders. 20 
There was some veracity in Mora's declarations. The prominent participation 
that Mora had in the campaigns against Walker won for him the admiration and 
esteem of the militiamen. This appreciation and respect moved some low-ranking 
military officers to try to put their former leader back in the presidency. The day of 
the coup and soon after Mora wu made prisoner, a group of militiamen attempted to 
organize a counterrevolution. However, they were apparently discouraged when they 
learned that Colonel Salazar had declared that he had orders to kill Mora if there 
wu any armed movement in his favor.21 
The coup apparently took Mora's supporters by surprise, and they could not 
act rapidly enough to offer resistance to Salaz.ar and Blanco. The government's 
suppression of several attempts to revolt in the months that followed the coup 
indicates that there 'W'Cre isolated and not very successful reactions to the fall of 
Mora. 22 It is not very clear who was acrually behind those failed uprisings and how 
important they were, but those movements pointed out that a restive political 
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climate prevailed in Costa Rica in the months that followed the overthrow of Mora. 
The restive climate stemmed as well from constant rumors of invasions and revolts 
which kept the Montealegre goverment in a continual state of alert. One of the 
rumors that circulated in November, 1859, was that Mora had ordered the blockade 
of the ports of Puntarenas and Caldera and was on a ship with eighty cannons ready 
to be fired. 23 
This persistent rumor proved to be false, but it was not very far from the 
truth. Certainly, Mora was supposed to pass by Puntarcnas on his way back to El 
Salvador from a trip to the east coast of the United States in late December, 1859. 
The Montealegre administration feared that Mora's supponers among the militiamen 
would take advantage of his presence aboard a ship anchored in the Pacific pon to 
revolt against the government. The fears of the government were well-grounded 
because there was an imponant group of militiamen loyal to Mora in the province of 
Alajuela. There were strong indications that these militias were ready to tum to 
Mora's side and to help him march from Puntarcnas to San Jose. President 
Montealegre ordered Lorenzo Salazar to go with his ttoops to take control over the 
towns where militias were allegedly ready to back Mora. According to the account 
of Mora's friends who went aboard the ship to talk with ~ he was determined to 
disembark because he had been told that there was a group of militiamen wanting 
him to tevolt. Mora's friends dissuaded him from the idea of going ashore pointing 
out that there was not such a military force.24 
The stubbomess of Mora and his inability to accept that the coup was an 
irreversible event forced the government of Montealegre to concentrate most of its 
efforts and resources on defense instead of orienting them to productive activities. 
Therefore, it was imperative for the government to look for a solution to the situation 
created by Mora. It was well-known among the leading members of the government 
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that the bad state of Mora's personal finances played a very important role in his 
schemes to recover power. Consequently, in December, 1859, Jwwi Volio, who 
was now one of Montealegre's ministers proposed carrying out negotiations with 
Mora to help him financially, taking advantage of the fact that he was on a ship in 
Puntarenas. The idea was accepted and Volio wrote a letter to Mora letting him 
know that the government had a series of propositions for his consideration. Mora's 
close friend, Guillenno N anne served as intermediary in the negotiations with 
Volio.25 
The ·government of Montealegre offered to give Mora a life pension, and to 
appoint him as a plenipotenciary minister of Costa Rica to the country of his choice. 
Likewise, the government was willing to buy all the properties that Mora had in 
Costa Rica. Mora would have to renounce the presidency and make a commitment 
to not return to Costa Rica without a special permission of the government. 26 
According to Volio, he also told Nanne that be would ask the government not to 
prosecute Mora for his misuse of public funds and not to demand him the retmn of 
what he had misappropriated while in office. 27 
The efforts of Volio to reach to an agreement were unfruitful and generated 
instead more animosity between Mora and the Montealegre administration. On 
December 31, 1859, the newspaper Nueva Era said that Mora rejected Volio's 
propositions and gave Nanne a list of conditions that the government should fulfill in 
retmn for his promise to abandon his belligerent attitude. The list of conditions was 
published in that newspaper and it included a life pension of 4,000 pesos a year, and 
the payment of 8,000 pesos for back salaries correspondent to his rank as army 
general. Mora also demanded back payment of the salaries of his brother Jose 
Joaquin, and Jose Mana Caftas in their capacities of military officers and the salaries 
of former vice-president Rafael G. Escalante. Mora wanted that the government to 
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purchase from him the arms and ammunitions that he had bought in preparation for 
his intended invasion. He also demanded that the government to respect and 
protect his properties in Costa Rica. 28 
After the publication of these demands. Mora denied that he had ever made 
them and declared that these false and slanderous requests reflected an attempt to 
dishonor him in front of his friends. Mora contended that he had sent a letter to 
Volio in which he made totally different demands. These demands stipulated that 
the public affairs of the country should go back to the state that they had been on 
August 13, 1859, that is, that Mora would be reinstated in power and all the laws 
and orders enacted by the government of Montealegre would be invalidated. The 
demands also stated that none of the public officers of the Montealegre 
administration would be prosecuted, with the exception of the military officers who 
had betrayed him, and Vicente Aguilar. the minister of finance.29 
The same issue of the Nueya Era reprinted the testimonies of Rafael 
Alvarado and Guillermo Nanne, the two people who had seen the letter sent by 
Mora to Volio. Nanne and Alvarado declared that Mora had actUally made the 
demands that he later denied and labeled as false. Nanne declared that the 
contradictory behavior of Mora was incomprehensible for him, who had been his 
friend and business partner. The only justification that Nanne could think of for 
Mora's denial of his earlier demands was that the adverse circumstances had led 
him to make mistakes and to act without regard to the consequences. 30 
Mora made the serious mistake of assuming an intransigent position 
because he misinterpreted the efforts of the government of Montealegre to negotiate 
with him as an indication of weakness and lack of support. As a result of Mora's 
erroneous perception of the political situation of the Montealegre administration, he 
went on with his plans to organize an armed invasion. Mora continued making 
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proclamations addressed to the Costa Rican people in which he declared that 
downfall of the Montealegre administration wu near, and that he wu counting on 
every ordinary citizen to contribute towards that end.31 Mora. his relatives, and 
close supporters thought that once the invasion or an internal revolt began. other 
focuses of insmrec:tion would break out and the victory over the government forces 
would be easier. 
The control that Montealegre's government had over the main military forces 
of the country , nonetheless, proved that Mora and his group were wrong. The 
superiority of the governments forces, which were under the command of Lorenzo 
Salazar, was demonstrated in the rapid and effective suppression of the two 
attempts of revolt in early 1860. The tint one took place in Guanacaste in mid-
January when small group of people gained control over the baJTack of the town of 
Liberia and over the neighboring villages. The leaders of the movement, however, 
fled to Nicaragua when they learned that Salazar was on his way to Guanacaste 
with his troops. The second movement came in A~ 1860 and was an attempt to 
capture the two barracks of San Josd. The plan wu never put into practice because 
the government learned about it beforehand and the people involved in the 
conspiracy escaped before making any move.32 
Unlike the men involved in these failed attempts at revolt who gave up when 
they realized that they bad no chance of winning, Mora did not desist from his 
endeavor to overturn the government of Montealegre. In fact, the setbacks of early 
1860, far from discouraging Mora led him to appeal to the presidents of Guatemala 
and Nicaragua for usistance for what turned out to be his last military venture. He 
traveled to Guatemala to request military aid from president Rafael Carrera. In the 
meantime, Manuel Argilello held conversations with the president of Nicaragua, 
Tomas Martinez with the same purpose. While Carrera did not give Mora a definite 
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answer, Martinez signed a secret treaty with Argaello. By vinue of this treaty 
Martinez made the commitment of lettin1 Mora and Caftas use the border region of 
Nicaragua to prepare an invuion of Costa Rica. Marunez authorized Mora and 
Cada to recruit one thousand men in the Nicarapan towns close to the border and 
to arm them with rifles. When the uprising began, Mart!nez wu going to march into 
Costa Rica with the men recruited to back up Mora's men.33 This secret treaty, 
however, wu never put into practice. The key figure that actually helped Mora was 
the Salvadoran president Gerardo Barrios. 
Barrios wrote an urgent letter to president Montealegre on August 26, 1860. 
In this letter he informed Montealegre that William Walker had occupied the 
Honduran port of Trujillo and that it was necessary for all the Central American 
governments to act jointly to expel the American intruder once again. Barrios 
requested that Montealegre send him on the next ship available two or three 
hundred rifles with the correspondent ammunitions to be used in the offensive 
against Walker.34 The Costa Rican government acceded to Barrios' petition and 
sent the arms. That petition although based on a real situation was apparently a 
pretext to get arms for Mora. Indeed. later it was found that the rifles sent to the 
government of El Salvador were the same that Mora took to Costa Rica for the 
invasion of mid-September, 1860. 
The events relating to the military expedition that would cost Mora his life 
are regarded as the most tragic pages of Costa Rica's history. A combination of 
factors made Mora's invasion of September, 1860, a venture that was doomed before 
it began. Mora and his close relatives embarked in this military adventure without 
being fully prepared for it. In some ways they were forced to act precipitately by an 
ultimatum that was sent to El Salvador by Mora's supporters. According to this 
ultimatum, Mora's followers in Costa Rica had established September 15, as the day 
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of the uprising against the government. The plan was to take control of the military 
post of Puntarenas to prepare for Mora's arrival. In the meantime, Mora's key 
supporters in the villages along the road to the interior were going to encourage the 
people to back the revolt, and to join them in the march to the capital. The organizers 
of the uprising declared that they would go ahead with the plan even if Mora did not 
arrive in Puntarenas on the next ship as they demanded. These people said that if 
Mora did not show up and the revolt failed he was going to be remorseful for 
abandoning his supporters. These declarations moved Mora to accept the plans and 
to arrange an invasion on such shon notice.35 
Canas and Arguello had serious objections to the plans of Mora's supponers 
in Costa Rica. The most important one was the idea of an invasion centered in 
Puntarenas. According to Cadas and Argilelllo, the invasion should to take place in 
Guanacaste. They undescorcd that in the eventual case of a defeat it was going to be 
more feasible to escape from there to Nicaragua36. The possibilities of an escape 
were virtually null in Puntarenas. This pon was located on the tip of a tongue-shape 
peninsula and was only connected to the mainland by a narrow spit of land. 
Unfortunately for Mora and his men their defeat had a lot to do with the geographical 
characteristics of Puntarenas which made the siege of the port very easy. 
The determining factor in the defeat of the uprising, nonetheless, was the 
advanced knowledge that the government had of it. Mora's supporters were 
counting on the circumstance that the Costa Rican militias were largely made up of 
reserve troops who kept their rifles at home. According to the plans of the 
"revolutionary commitee," as Argilello referred to the organizers of the revolt, they 
would mobilize the members of these reserve troops and other people from the 
interior to Puntarenas to augment the number of men there. The organizers gathered -
20,000 pesos to give ten pesos to each man to help him pay for his transportation to 
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the port. The plan failed not only because someone misappropriated a considerable 
part of the money but because one of the leaders of the movement betrayed the 
group and informed the government of CM?)' detail of the uprising.37 
Indeed. u soon u the government became aware of the plans of Mora's 
backers, it ordered the blockade of the road to Puntarenas to prevent the 
mobilization of sympathizers towards that port. Simultaneously, General Muimo 
Blanco was sent to Puntarenu at the head of t!u= battalions of t!u= hundred men 
each and an artillery brigade of one hundred men to confront Mom's forces. Mora 
had amved in Puntarenas in September 17, along with six other people. These 
people were, Jose Joaqufn Mora, Jose Mana Cams, Manuel Argilello, Oodomiro 
Montoya, Antonio Argilello and a Salvadoran colonel. They established their 
headquarters in the pon and from there sent orders to the men located in the two 
points that were strategical for the defense of their position. 
These two points were the Barranca river and the narrowest point of the strip 
of land that connected the peninsula of Puntarenas with the mainland, called 
Angostura. It has been pointed out that Mora overestimated the response of the 
common people to the news of his presence in Punt.arenas. Consequently, Mon. 
remained in that port waiting for a massive uprising that never took place instead of 
marching to the capital as soon as he had gathered some mcn.38 The sources do 
not mention how many of Mora's supporters were able to travel to Puntarcnas before 
the government ordered the blockade of the road to the port. The accounts of the 
events in Puntarcnas indicate, however, that Mora's forces were very small in 
comparison with the government's troops. Therefore, Mora's decision to wait in the 
pon reflected more the weakness of his movement than a tactical mistake. 
While Mora and his men were waiting for reinforcements, the government 
troops were rapidly advancing towards the port. The cowardice of Ignacio Arancibi~ 
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a Chilean who was the commanding chief of Mora's men assigned to defend the 
crossing point of the Barranca river, facilitated the advance of the official troops. 
Arancibia panicked and fled after he saw the government's troops getting near and 
the men under his command attempted to defend their position but without any 
success. The government's troops took conttol over the boat~ in the absence of 
a bridge, was the only way to cross the river. After this obstacle was overcome, 
General Blanco and his men continued the march to the place called Angostura 
where Mora's supporters had made a trench and placed six cannons in it. 
The trench of Angostura was the only barrier that protected the access to the 
pon and therefore, most of Mora's forces had been sent to that point under the 
command of Canas. The Mora brothers remained in Puntarenas wim a very small 
number of men at their disposition. Blanco and the other military officers learned 
about the actual situation of the enemy after the capture and questioning of a 
Frenchman who was part of forces loyal to Mora. After learning that the pon 
constituted an easy target because it was vinually unprotected, the goverment 
military officers decided to combine the attack on the trench with an assault on the 
town by sea. Thus, on the night of September 28, Blanco and his troops attacked 
the trench at Angostura and and engaged in bloody combat with Mora's forces that 
lasted for several hours. During this time about one hundred men died and other 
another hundred were wounded, according to Argilello's firsthand account.39 
The superiority of the government's troops forced the withdrawal of Mora's 
men who fled to Puntarenas. But when Caftas. Argilcllo, and a few others got to 
town there was a lot of chaos and confusion because a group of about fifty men 
loyal to the government had disembarked in the port a few homs before and had 
tried to capture Mora. Canas and Argilello were informed that Mora and his brother 
Jose Joaqufn, however, had managed to escape and were in hiding at the moment. 
144 
Canas, realizing that the situation was hopeless. sought refuge in the house of the 
consul of New Granada in Puntarenas. ArgUello wu taken prisoner when he was 
discovered on one of the streets of the port trying to learn about the whereabout of 
his uncle.40 
The small contingent of the government's forces that disembarked in 
Puntarenas that night of September 28 had very good knowledge of the situation in 
the port. thanks to the information provided by the confession of one of Mora's 
supporters who was captured a few a hours before. This information led these men 
directly to the house where Mora was staying in Puntarcnas. While the men 
guarding the house engaged in gunfue with the government's militiamen, Mora 
escaped through the back door and went to the house of Richard Fm'C1', who was the 
British consul. and his friend and former business partner. Argilello said in his later 
account of these events that on the night of September 28, Juan Rafael and Jose 
Joaqu!n Mora went to Farrer's house and he bid them. 41 But Fmer wrote in his 
diary that when the Mora brothers appeared in his house that night, he asked them 
to leave. According to Fmer, Mora requested protection under the British flag, but 
he had to tell him that that was impossible because he had no authorization to offer 
asylum. Likewise, Farrer wrote that he told Mora that bis house offered no security 
because it would be the first place where the government troops would look for him 
since everybody knew they were friends. Farrer declared that he was relieved 
when.Mora left bis house.42 
In bis capacity of British consul Farrer did have powers to provide Mora with 
the protection he asked for. The last paragraph of his diary's entry of September 
30th sheds some light on Farrer's negative attitude towards Mora. Furer wrote 
that he could have saved Mora from death had he been a man injustly penccuted for 
supporting a fair cause. Nonetheless, Fm'C1' thought that Mora was not in that 
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situation, and that in his opinion "he had to die instead of many other people. "43 
Farrer's opinion explains the role that ~ played in convincing Mora that he should 
surrender to the government. Apparently, Mora returned to Fam:r's house at 
dawn on September 29, to beg him to save his life. Farrer, by his own account, told 
Mora that there were no possibilities for him to get out of that difficult situation 
alive. Farrer wrote that he then informed Mora that he had talked to Francisco 
Mana Iglesias and· Francisco Montealegre, the president's brother, about his 
situation. According to Farrer, these two people had given him their word that if 
Mora would tum himself in and assume all the responsibility for the failed uprising, 
the other people involved in it would not be punished. Farrer declared that after 
listening to that proposal Mora agreed to surrend and asked him to go look for 
Iglesias. 44 
Montealegre and Iglesias had been appointed by the government as civilian 
commissioners to accompany General Blanco and his troops to Puntarenas. 
Therefore, Iglesias, in his capacity government representative, met with Mora for an 
hour and assured him that the sacrifice of his life would spare those of the others 
implicated in the movement. 45 Mora turned himself in at nine o'clock in the morning 
on September 30, 1860 along with his brother J~ Joaquin. 
Immediately after this, according to a military report of these events, a coun-
martial was summoned to judge the Moras, the Chilean Ignacio Arancibia who had 
been captured shortly before, Canas, who had also turned himself in, Argilello, and 
other leading figures of their group. The military report did not mention the names of 
the members of that court-martial. It only said that this tribunal gave a verbal 
sentence in which it condetmned Juan Rafael Mora and Arancibia to be executed at 
three o'clock on that same day and left to the government the task of deciding the 
punishment of the other people. 46 Mora and Arancibia died that afternoon. The high 
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ranking authorities in San Jos6 sentenced Canas to death on October 1, 1860 and he 
was executed the next day in Puntarenas. Jos6 Joaqmn Mora and Manuel Argilello 
were deported and they went to El Salvador.47 
The works written many years after these events to praise the memory of 
Mora as the hero of the military campaigns against William Walker have described 
his death that afternoon of September 30, 1860 as one of the most unfortunate 
episodes of Costa Rica's history. The exaltation of Mora's figure has led to creating 
a myth around his personality and his political can:er. Consequently, these works 
contend that Mora was a martyr who fell victim to political passions and hatred. 48 
The later generations, however, were not the only ones for whom it was difficult to 
understand the application of the death penalty to Mora. Certainly, the execution of 
Mora was an event that immediately became well-known outside Costa Rica and 
produced sttong reactions, especially in the other Central American countries. There 
the news about Mora's death astonished many people and enraged others since he 
was regarded as the greatest defender of the sovereignty of Central America. The 
repercussions abroad of that event compelled the government of Montealegre to 
explain the reasons that moved the administtation to apply such harsh punishment 
to a former president. 
The result of this need to legitimate the decision made in relation to Mora 
was the publication of a pamphlet titled Exposici6n hist6rica de Ia r:evoluci6n de 15 
de setiembre de1860 The pamphlet is dated March 15, 1861 and was published by 
the government. This publication opens a very important door for understanding the 
death of Mora and why it represented an exceptional solution to an internal crisis of 
the coffee planter and merchant elite. Likewise, this publication brings to light the 
elements that let the elite maintain an equilibrium between the conservation of order 
and the struggle for the control of the government. Indeed, by explaining an unusual 
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even~ this pamphlet enables the identification of factors that normally made the use 
of violence unnecessary to solve political differences among the elite. The 
aforementioned pamphlet was preceded by the leaflet Expmjci6n de Ios motivos 
para el cambio politico acaec;ido eo 14 de agosto de 1859 published by the 
government in April, 1860. This leaflet was intented to justify the overthrow of Mora, 
and as such is also valuable to understand the principles ruling the relations among 
the members of the elite. 
The changes in the government in the second half of the nineteenth century in 
Costa Rica meant only the ttansfcrcncc of power from one group leading coffee 
planters and merchants to another. Those changes were accepted by the 
vanquished faction of the elite because they, indeed. merely represented an 
alternation of the control of the government among a fahiy small circle of people. 
That was a crucial element that facilitated the rapid organization of the new 
government. Once the new authorities had been appointed, they began fulfilling their 
tasks and things went back to normal, even if the former government was deposed 
by a coup. 
In the case of Mora's overthrow, Jose Mana Montealegre assumed power in 
the capacity of temporary president immediately after the coup. In October, 1859, 
the constituent assembly began the drafting of a new constitution, which was 
adopted in December of the same year. Montealegre was elected president in 
elections held in April,1860 and was inaugurated later that month. The elections 
also chose the members of Congress and the newly established Senate. The 
Montealegre administration, nonetheless, was not able to dedicate completely itself 
to "the promotion of agriculture, commctee, intelligence and public spirit under the 
influence of fair, liberal, and stable institutions" 49 as it intended, because Mora 
never resigned himself to the loss of his political power. 
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Mora's stubbomess to recover the presidency forced Montealegre's 
government to put into practice every single mechanism that tbe coffee planter and 
merchant elite had to reconcile its iniernal discrepancies. !mrnrdiatety after tbe 
coup, Mora appeared to have accepted the fact that the elite had turned its back on 
him and that the overthrow was an irreversible event. However, SOOD after Mora 
went aboard the ship that was going to take him to El Salvadcr in exile. he changed 
his attitude. It was then when Mora made the proclamation addressed to the foreign 
governments claiming that he was victim of a conspiracy and began to make 
accusations. The government's pamphlet of 1861 declared that it was at that 
moment when Mora "took his mask off" and showed his real intentions. The leaflet 
added that from then on Mora dedicared himself full-time to inciting revolts and 
invasions, forcing the government to discuss publicly his personal defects and his 
political wrongdoings.SO 
The introduction to this leaflet written to justify the coup, in fact. explained 
that the Montealegre administration had tried by all means to avoid the public 
discussion of the flaws and mismanagements of the previom government. It 
remarked that that attitude originated in the fact that the main concern of the new 
govcmmcnt was the normalization of the political situation of the country and not the 
promotion of disagreements among the public. This pamphlet asserted that with that 
purpose in mind, the government had decided to throw a veil over the abuses and 
wrongdoings of Mora's administration instead of prosecuting him. The pamphlet 
pointed out that Montcalegre's government was determined "to do without the past" 
to avoid the debate of the unpleasant matters and affairs of the Mora years and thus, 
be able to focus all the attention in the present and the future.SI 
This disposition of the elite to forgive and forget all of what had happened 
during the deposed administrations reflected the unwillingness of the leading coffee 
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planters and merchants to punish any member of their own group. In the case of 
M~ no one was going to point out who was guilty of what because many 
members of the elite had participated actively in bis administtation, especially during 
his early years in office. The rest of the circle of leading coffee planters and 
merchants had tolerated Mora's abuses of power when they were advantageous to a 
larger number of people. Therefore, they were not going to condemn something that 
they had condoned previously. 
This reluctance to denounce and accuse fellow members of the elite stemmed 
also from the circumstance that the coffee planters and merchants constituted a 
group close! y related by kinship, business relations and friendship ties. The coffee 
planters and merchants had no inclinations towards political scandals because those 
would have meant casting accusations upon their close or distant relatives, their in-
laws or their business partners. Kinship and the other links that tied the members 
of the elite together, indeed, abated political antagonisms, and in consequence, 
facilitated the reconciliation of contending factions after the overturn of a government. 
A veey interesting aspect of this tendency of the elite to promote 
reconciliation instead of persecutions and reprisals after a coup is the correlation that 
was established and emphasized between that political behavior and the often-
touted characteristics of the Costa Rican people. The coup of 1859 and the execution 
of Mora were presented as exceptional events that were contrary to the peaceful 
nature and customs of the Costa Ricans. These two events were depicted as 
regrettable instances in which political violence had prevailed over the attempts of 
conciliation between contending factions. It was underscored that the Montealegre 
administration had dealt with Mora's behavior after the coup with "the tolerance that 
distinguished the behavior of the inhabitants of the country." This tolerance, 
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according to the leaflets published by the government, stemmed from the love that 
Costa Ricans had for order and peacc.52 
Mora's inability to conform to his political fate put to the test the tolerance, 
prudence, and moderation that allegedly governed the comportment of the Costa 
Ricans. Mora's endeavor to return to power, ccertainly, forced the elite to break 
many of the rules that governed its relationships as a dominant class. The tendency 
to avoid political scandals and public embarrassment of former officers also reflected 
the respect and deference which seemed to have ruled the relations among the coffee 
planters and merchants. The pamphlet that justified Mora's overthrow, in fact, 
explained that the "former social position" of the deposed president entitled him to 
be treated with consideration. 53 Therefore, after the coup Mora was held prisoner in 
the National Palace and not in the barracks, and was visited by his family and friends 
without any restrictions. Mora even received presidential discretionary funds after 
he was ousted and left the country knowing that his family and properties were 
safe.54 
The leaflet of April, 1860, pointed out that the government of Montealegre 
had initially refrained from publicly criticizing Mora's political behavior regardless of 
the serious nature of his abuses of power. The leaflet claimed that government did 
not want to reveal negative aspects of Mora's personality, because that might have 
hurt his personal feelings and put him in an unpleasant situation. The pamphlet 
added. however, that it had become imperative for the government to explain why 
Mora was ousted as a way to refute his accusations that he was victim of a 
conspiracy. According to this pamphlet, Mora had demonstrated with his belligerant 
attitude that he no longer deserved to be treated with consideration and respect. The 
government considered that to maintain silence out of a courtesy for which Mora 
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seemed to have no appreciation might have been interpreted as a confirmation of his 
"sinister assertions. "SS 
The pamphlet that dealt with the circumstances that forced the execution of 
Mora remarked that the efforts of the Montealegre administration to persuade him to 
abandon his plans of an invasion reach a point at which tolerance became "a risky 
magnanimity. "56 The government's acceptance of.Volio's motion to offer Mora a life 
pension and other benefits was pointed out as an example of that risky magnanimity. 
Certainly, the aforementioned pamphlet acknowledged that Volio's proposals were 
out of the ordinary because they not only guaranteed Mora's impunity for his 
wrongdoings. but also rewarded and honored a guilty man. The leaflet added that 
regardless of that the government agreed to accept Volio's proposals because 
"politics had anomalies and demands to which it was necessary to submit even if it 
meant doing so with risk and aversion." 57 The official publication quoted above said 
that the Montealegre administration agreed to be more generous than what Mora 
deserved because the proposals represented a possibility to eliminate the source of 
the restive climate that prevailed in the country. The door to any conciliation. was 
closed definitely, however. when Mora rejected the government's proposals. He 
took a path from which there was no return when be chose to engage the country in 
brief civil war. 
The pamphlet that explained the antecedents of the coup. to be sure. used 
several harsh phrases and adjectives to describe Mora's political behavior. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting that regardless of how far Mora went in his 
stubbomess to recover power his actions were censured in the newspaper ~ 
m, the leaflet of 1861. and in other documents in ways that expressed 
compassion more than personal animosity and political hatred. Mora's behavior was 
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explained and, to a certain extcn~ justified in these publications as the typical 
comwtbllellt of a man whose political ambition had blinded him. 
Nµeya Era, for example, published a commentary three days after the coup 
that illustrates this point. The commentary was about the proclamation that Mora 
made shortly before leaving the country in which he said that he had been victim of a 
political intrigue. The newspaper regretted that the overturn of his government had 
not helped Mora realize that he had been a victim of his own political ambition which 
"had obfuscated his mind.•• The commentary added that became of this obfuscation, 
Mora was not able to face facts properly.58 Also on January, 1860, there was a 
commentary in this newspaper in relation to Mora's rejection of the government's 
propositions to abandon his belligerant attitude in exchange for a pension for life and 
other benefits. The Nueya Era pointed out that Mora not only did not accept what 
was offered as a gesture of conciliation but bad the nerve to make "outrageous 
propositions to the government." The newspaper's commentary added that Mora's 
propositions reflected the demands of "a man devoted wholly to deep dreams who 
did not want to see the auth. "59 The article even raised the possibility that Mora 
was being pushed by certain individuals to swim against the tide of political events. 
In fact, it remarked that knowing Mora's intelligence and experience it was likely 
that some of Mora's friends were the ones whom in good, or perhaps, bad faith were 
encouraging those dreams and illusions. The newspaper commentary suggested 
that these people were pieventing Mora from opening his eyes to reality and 
expressed hopes that he would be able to open bis eyes before it was too late. 60 
Julian Volio's failed attempt to reach an agreement between the government 
of Montealegre and Mora constitutes another example of this compassionate 
attitude towards the deposed piesident. Volio wrote in the Nueya Era that from the 
first day after the overthrow of Mora on, he had regarded him not as .. the despot 
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that unfairly and violently had destroyed the fatherland" but as a defeated and fallen 
man, a person who inspired him compassion. Volio declared that the compassion 
that Mora's fate inspired him led him to forget the attacks and accusations that Mora 
had made against his family and to exteod the deposed president a generous hand. 
Volio said that after the coup he gave Mora some money for his jomney to El 
Salvador and used his influence to protect his family and properties in Costa Rica. 
Volio added that it was also his desire to help a man in disgrace that moved him to 
ask the government for a monetary compensation and other benefits for Mora. Volio 
expressed his great disappointment with Mora's attitude and declared he was no 
longer going to intercede for a man who had not appreciated his good intentions.61 
By September, 1860 when Mora and his close relatives disembarked in 
Puntarenas to lead the revolt that never took place. the government had run out of 
tolerance. After more than a year of political unrest originating in constant rumors of 
rebellions, it was no longer possible to deal with the intruders with leniency. The 
pamphlet of 1861 declared, in fact. that after fourteen months of magnanimity and 
moderation, it was imperative to act with energy and determination in relation to 
Mora. Consequently, the government ordered the suspension of the constitutional 
guarantees and issued a decree outlawing Mora and his supporters. By virtue of 
these orders Mora was transformed into a traitor to his fatherland when he 
disembarked in Puntarenas. 62 The explanation of the events that led to Mora's 
execution emphasized that it had been unnecessary to set up a court-martial to 
judge him. He had already condemned himself because the constitution established 
that the act of high treason should be punished with the death penalty.63 
Regardless of how justified the execution of Mora was, the government felt 
that it had the obligation to explain it. This explanation comprised in the pamphlet 
published in 1861 began by underscoring one more time that the Costa Rican people 
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was not cruel and bloodd'lirsty. On the contrary, the leaflet said, Costa Ricans had 
peaceful instincts and moderate and industrious customs. It went on to say, 
however, that there were some instances in which powerful motives forced the 
Costa Rican people to separate momentarily from its peaceful customs.64 The 
obstinacy of Mora to recuperate power by force, according to the go~emmcnt, 
constituted one of those very few instances in which violence had to be applied to 
supress violence. 
The climate of political unrest and the brief civil war brought about by Mora's 
stubbomess, nonetheless, did not destroy the compassionate feelings that the 
government and the elite had towards him. Those writing the publication that dealt 
with Mora's execution said that they would discuss it with the respect that the 
memory of Mora and Caiias demanded, two people who in the past had had a 
prominent place in the political life of the country. This pamphlet pointed out that 
these two people fell victims of their own blindness and deviations, and that in their 
illegitimate search for power they only found their graves. Mora. the leaflet~ 
"expiated on the scaffold the obsession that dragged him down into a reluctance to 
accept events that were irreversible. "65 
The Montealeg:re's government pointed out that the sacrifice of Mora's life 
was "a sad but harsh lesson that the people in a feverish moment taught to the men 
who persisted in keeping them under its servitude. "66 More accurately. it was the 
elite acting on behalf of the ordinary people who taught the lesson. Mora, to be sure, 
paid dearly for the political blindness that led him to challenge to the last 
consequences the elite's mechanisms to abate conflicts The efforts that the 
Montealegre administration made to avoid a violent solution to the problems related 
to Mora, nonetheless, provide a valuable key for understanding the elements that 
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ruled the relations among the elite and contributed to keeping the equilibrium 
between consensus and conflict. 
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CONO..USIONS 
The growing demand of the European industrial economy fer raw materials and 
foodstuffs in the second half of the ninctecnth centmy gave rise to the development in 
Costa Rica of an expat agriculture based on coffee cultivation. As in most of Latin 
America dilling that peri~ the reestablishment of the linb to the world market which 
had been broken or weakened after independence mmed a tmning point in the country's 
political and economic development. Coffee expons not only laid the economic 
foundations on which Costa Rica's rest at the present but it also hastened the process of 
consolidation of the national state. 
The architects of the political institutions that ~ firmly established in the late 
nineteenth century were the members of an elite whose economic intcn:sts revolved 
around coffee expats. This elite made up of coffee planters and men:hants exened 
absoluce control of political power and transformed the government into the fundamental 
agent of the development of the expon agriculture. The significant historical role played 
by this elite makes the study of the relations of its members crucial for understanding the 
major political and economic events of the second half of the nineteenth century. 
The political events that revolved around the figure of Juan Rafael Mora were 
charactcrizcd by such a radical shift in the relations of the coffee planter and men:hant elite 
toward one of its memben that makes the period between 1849 and 1860 very valuable 
for the study of those relations. That period began with a consensus among the elite 
regarding Mora's election and ended with his overthrow and execution after ahmst ten 
years in office. The analysis of the relations among the coffee planters and men:hants 
during the Mara administration reveals that role assigned to the government as the main 
economic agent for the development of the export agriculture was the source of both 
consensus and conflict. 
162 
In the early decades of the expansion of coffee exports the local economy that had 
traditionally been of subsislence was of little help for pncratin1 the capital needed to 
consolidate them. Consequently, the elite actively worked towards the stmigtbcning of 
the state apparatus to bestow on the government with enough financial capabilities to 
invest in major infrastructure works such as road construction. 
The elite's control of political power at the same time that enabled its leading 
members to shape the government to perform the assigned economic role, gave them 
direct or indirect access to public funds. The coffee planters and merchants began to 
depend largely upon the resources of the public treasury for their own business ventures 
and utiliz.ed them so liberally that there was no clear separation between their private 
interests and public affairs. That situation increased the struggle for the control of 
government among the members of a small, homogeneous elite closely- related by 
kinship that tempaatily divided it over how much access to public funds anyone of 
them should have. 
The discontent of the coffee planten and merchants towards Mon. which ousted 
him from power, in fact, was rooted in his tendency in the late 1850s to monopolize the 
access to public funds. The analysis of the politics of that period within the broader 
context of the determining facttX'S in the relations of the elite clarifies the nature of the 
struggle for control of the government and the centtal reason behind events that at first 
might appear as simple clashes of individual political ambitions. 
The prominent political figures of the nineteenth century, such as Juan Rafael 
Mora. whom earlier historical works ideaUzrd and praised as epic characu:rs ~,cting in 
isolation, emerged in that broader context as what they actually were, leading actors of 
economic and political processes. The economic and political behavior of the elite, 
indeed, was determined in large pan by the main factors involved in those processes. 
The ways in which the leading coffee planters and merchants responded to those factors 
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were pivotal in setting the course of the Costa Rica's history in the late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century. 
That the coffee planters and merchants constituted an elite closely-related by 
kinship and that the factors generating consensus were strong enough to abate conflicts 
were also crucial in the system of political domination that they established. The political 
institutions that consolidated in the lace nineteenth century, to be sure, were oligarchical. 
Nonetheless, the elite's capability to resolve conflicts through negotiation and 
compromise led its members to make the elections one of their main instruments to throw 
a veil of legality over their agreements that prevented the outbreak of armed 
confrontations. Even though, initially there was no popular participation in the elections, 
the important role that they played for the elite, led to the development and strengthening 
of the electoral system. By turning elections intt> an instrument of its interests, the elite 
made it possible their lan::r evolution intt> the main foundation of the political system of the 
present day in which popular participation in the elections is significant. 
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